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Introduction
This paper explores the limited public accountability of local quasi-public
development corporations in negotiating and implementing public redevelopment
projects by examining the history of the Baltimore Development Corporation (BDC).
For most of its two-decade existence the BDC has strenuously resisted all public inquiry
and oversight, a tradition inherited from its predecessors that originated as private
business-led entities performing tasks under contract with Baltimore City (City). Like
other similar quasi-public local development corporations, the BDC justified its need for
secrecy as necessary to ensure the BDC’s effectiveness and efficiency in negotiating with
private businesses on redevelopment projects. This assertion that a business-like model
with limited transparency or public oversight was critical to achieve successful
redevelopment projects dates back to the Progressive Era’s good government reform
movements, which ironically also pushed for government transparency and
accountability. Springing from these Progressive roots, quasi-public entities modeled on
private businesses and insulated from direct political control became the primary entities
responsible for urban redevelopment in parallel with the growth of professional city
planning, another offspring of Progressivism.
Although this concentration of power in these quasi-public development
corporations led to accusations and examples of despotic power grabs and corruption,
these quasi-public entities remained entrenched, largely resisting attempts to increase
transparency and public oversight by asserting that successful redevelopment required
secrecy and autonomy in negotiations with private partners who required quick action
and flexibility of their counterparts.

This argument has had success not only with

legislatures, but also with the courts (both federal and Maryland), which have accepted
that transparency and accountability must be balanced against the efficiency and
effectiveness of these quasi-public development corporations.
As this paper illustrates, courts have therefore been reluctant to interfere too
intrusively in the operation of these local development corporations by upholding the
public’s right to know how these quasi-public entities have spent public funds and used
the uniquely public power of eminent domain in redevelopment projects. Both the
Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals have fastened on the nominal and
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perfunctory approval by legislatures of the quasi-public development corporations’
operations as providing sufficient public accountability, despite evidence that the BDC
and similar entities effectively controlled the redevelopment process with minimal public
oversight. The courts did recognize the potential for these quasi-public entities to abuse
public powers if completely autonomous, but nevertheless accepted the notion of a
Faustian bargain in which effectiveness required less accountability, a concept derived
from Progressivism and its elitist preference for professional, technically-expert
bureaucrats over the madding crowd that Progressives identified as supporting political
bossism.
This paper begins with an analysis of how the Supreme Court, in Kelo v. New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), relied on the public planning process to hold the local
development corporation accountable in its exercise of eminent domain power delegated
by the municipality for a major redevelopment project. This belief by the majority of the
court that the planning process was truly public, and that the municipal government had
significant control over the redevelopment project or its implementation, contrasts
sharply with the actual interaction between the quasi-public development corporation and
the municipal government. This contrast serves as a point of departure to explore the
court’s problematic reliance on the formal approval by the municipal government of the
redevelopment project drawn up and implemented by the development corporation as
rendering the project a sufficiently “public purpose” to justify the use of eminent domain
delegated to the development corporation. Lurking behind the majority’s opinion lay the
concern to weigh the effectiveness of the redevelopment project against the
accountability of the development corporation to the public in whose name it operated.
The paper then traces the evolution of quasi-public government corporations and
of public planning that began separately in the Progressive Era but which increasingly
intersected with each other over the middle of the last century. These interactions led to
the current domination of urban redevelopment projects by quasi-public development
corporations like the BDC, despite concerted attempts to restrain and curtail the
autonomy of these quasi-public entities and to require greater transparency. These efforts
to ensure public accountability, which also traced its roots to the good government reform
movement of the Progressive Era, failed to overcome the concern that oversight and
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transparency

represented

obstacles

to

successful

redevelopment,

with

some

accountability the price to “get things done.”
The next section turns to Baltimore and the BDC, in particular to two recent
decisions in which the Court of Appeals balanced efforts to subject the BDC to
transparency requirements under Maryland law against the claims of the BDC and City
that effective and efficient redevelopment required autonomy from accountability
requirements that covered public entities. In City of Baltimore Development Corporation
v. Carmel Realty Associates, 359 Md. 299 (2006), the court declared that the BDC was a
“public body” subject to the transparency requirements of Maryland law in a unanimous
opinion that appeared to express frustration with the tortuous interpretations by which the
BDC and City sought to avoid compliance with these public information laws. The paper
then explores the backstory to this decision, and to the court’s apparent annoyance, in the
cat-and-mouse efforts of transparency advocates and the BDC and City over the role the
BDC played in city government, whether a private contractor or public agency.
The final section turns to another unanimous decision by the Court of Appeals
this April, 120 West Fayette Street, L.L.L.P. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 413
Md. 309 (2010), where the court appeared to retreat from its Carmel stance favoring
subjecting the BDC to public accountability. Growing out of the same redevelopment
project that inspired Carmel, the plaintiffs in 120 West Fayette Street claimed that the
BDC, as a non-public entity, lacked the authority to structure and implement the project
on behalf of the City, and that the project was a “public work” subject to competitive
bidding requirements. The court rejected both claims, holding that the BDC was a “public
body” under Carmel and so did not exceed its authority, but that the redevelopment
project was not a “public work” because the public benefit was merely incidental to that
of the private developer. The paper illustrates how the court carefully cherry-picked facts
and precedents to ensure that the redevelopment project, a decade in the making, was not
further stalled. Like the Supreme Court in Kelo, the Court of Appeals in 120 West
Fayette Street relied on the formal procedural oversight by the City Board of Estimates
(Board), despite evidence that this oversight was nominal and that significant gaps
existed in the chain of authority between the Board and the BDC. In declaring the
redevelopment project not a “public work,” the court selectively cited cases based on
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significantly different legal principles and varied governing statutes depending on the
foreign jurisdiction.

Moreover the court’s exclusion of land acquisition from the

redevelopment contract enabled it to avoid addressing the contradiction inherent in its
ruling: if the redevelopment project was not a “public work” because it was insufficiently
“public,” then how could the City obtain the property to be sold to the developer under
the contract by eminent domain, which required a “public purpose”? In the view of this
paper, the court intentionally ignored these claims that the BDC, and the City, exceeded
its authority by avoiding public accountability requirements because the court fell back
on the Progressive idea of a balance between accountability and effectiveness, accepting
the BDC’s argument that autonomy from oversight was required to foster successful
redevelopment in Baltimore – in sum, that the ends justified the means.
The paper concludes that the BDC, and other quasi-public local development
corporations, have been granted excessive autonomy from public accountability,
especially by courts too much influenced by the Progressive mantra that effective
governance requires government to become more business-like. This view ignores the
powerful role that these quasi-public entities play in reshaping cities courtesy of their
control of the uniquely public power of eminent domain (the threat is almost as powerful
as its actual exercise) and public financing. The limited, perfunctory review by elected
bodies, like the Board, of the planning, negotiating and implementing of redevelopment
projects performed by these quasi-public entities is not sufficient to ensure that the public
approves the projects done in their name and with their funds. With enhanced powers
should come increased responsibilities, whereas the BDC is permitted to inhabit a
shadowy netherworld, neither fish nor fowl, with tremendous power to reshape Baltimore
on behalf of the public but without any obligation to explain its actions or any direct
accountability to Baltimore’s electorate. This paper examines how the BDC has been
permitted to accrue such power.
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I: Defining the Problem: How “Public” Are Public Redevelopment Entities?
Kelo v. New London
In his majority opinion in Kelo v. New London, Justice Stevens held that the plan
to redevelop New London’s Fort Trumbull neighborhood “unquestionably serve[d] a
public purpose, [and so] satisf[ied] the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”
545 U.S. at 484 [emphases added]. To support his ruling, Justice Stevens specifically
cited the “comprehensive character of the plan [and] the thorough deliberation that
preceded its adoption,” and asserted that “[t]he City carefully formulated an economic
plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community.” Id. at 483
[emphases added]. In concurring, Justice Kennedy echoed Justice Stevens’s focus on the
“comprehensive development plan” and the city’s involvement in the planning process:
“The city complied with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate review of the
record and inquiry into the city’s purposes.” Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) [italics
added].
Neither justice, however, questioned the “public” nature of the planning process,
even though Justice Stevens described the entity that created the plan and that controlled
the negotiations to purchase or condemn properties in order to implement the plan, the
New London Development Corporation (NLDC), as a “private nonprofit entity.” Id. at
473. Justice Stevens emphasized that the City first approved the development plan
prepared by NLDC and then designated NLDC the City’s development agent to
implement the plan. Id. at 473, 475. After this initial discussion, Justice Stevens explicitly
treated the City and NLDC as the same (with the exception of a subsequent footnote). Id.
at 475 n. 3, 476 n. 4. Justice Kennedy never referred to NLDC, clearly viewing it as
identical to the City and sharing the same goals and constituencies. Id. at 490-93
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice O’Connor, in dissent, did call attention to NLDC’s lack of public
accountability: “[NLDC] is not elected by popular vote, and its directors and employees
are privately appointed.” Id. at 495 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor also
criticized Justices Stevens and Kennedy for relying on the “relatively careful deliberative
process” and “integrated plan” to uphold the takings. Id. at 503-04. Nevertheless, Justice
O’Connor failed to link this criticism to the private nature of NLDC, and throughout her
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dissent Justice O’Connor echoed Justices Stevens and Kennedy in eliding NLDC with the
City as a single entity under the rubric of the “sovereign.” Id. at 504 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). Instead of raising the question of the degree to which the planning and
development process was “public” and how accurately the process represented the
“public purpose,” Justice O’Connor focused on limiting the authority of the legislature to
determine that a taking had a “public purpose.” Only in passing did Justice O’Connor
refer to the potential conflicts of interest raised by the dominant role of NLDC, a private
entity, to plan the development on behalf of the public: “The beneficiaries are likely to be
those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process,
including large corporations and development firms.” Id. at 505 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
Justice O’Connor’s decision to not address this conflict between a private entity
planning on behalf of the public may be due to the City’s approval of NLDC’s plans and
its delegation of eminent domain power to NLDC under a Connecticut statute that
specifically authorized a municipality to designate a nonprofit development corporation
as the municipality’s development agent, as Justice Stevens had cited to support his
opinion. Kelo at 475, citing C.G.S. §8-193 (definition of development agent in C.G.S. §8188). The statute’s purpose finds support from a quotation used by Justice Stevens from
Berman v. Parker: “The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of
private enterprise than through a department of government – or so the Congress [or
relevant legislature – here the City] might conclude.” Kelo at 486 (quoting Berman, 348
U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954)). Although Justice Stevens used this quotation to support his focus
on the legislature’s authority to determine the “public purpose” of a takings instead of
investigating the identity of the ultimate owner (the “results” of the planned
development), he probably would also apply the quotation to the Kelo circumstances,
where the legislature determined that a private entity would best represent the public in a
redevelopment project (the “process” of planning the development).
Yet why should the judiciary defer to the legislature’s decision to privatize the
preparation and implementation of a redevelopment plan, and hence to frame the “public
purpose” justifying the use of eminent domain, as serving the “public end?” The Berman
quotation referred to a public entity opting to use private entities to build on land the
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public entity condemned and in accordance with a redevelopment plan prepared by the
public entity. In Kelo, however, the plan itself – the expression of the “public purpose” –
was outsourced to a private entity, which also oversaw the implementation of both the
condemnation and redevelopment. Should the legislature’s approval after the plan has
been finalized by a private entity be sufficient to establish that the plan represents a
“public purpose?” Given the weight that Justice Stevens placed on the “thorough
deliberation” and “careful formulation” of the plan, should judicial review stop with the
legislature’s approval of the final plan, especially if the preparation was done by a private
entity with the legislature only voting on the final result? Id. at 483.
Justice Kennedy’s focus on the “elaborate procedural requirements” reflected a
concern with both the transparency and accountability of the legislature – but does this
square with the scenario where the plan was prepared by a private entity that does not
have to comply with public record laws? Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although
he recognized the possibility of circumstances where the “procedures employed [are] so
prone to abuse” for which a higher standard of scrutiny would be appropriate, Justice
Kennedy stated that the Kelo facts did not fit this category. Id. His refusal to further
define the test of what constitutes sufficiently abusive procedures to trigger higher
scrutiny, suggesting that a pro forma procedure would suffice – or in Justice O’Connor’s
words, that “it is difficult to envision anyone but the “stupid staff[er]” failing it.” Id. at
502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1025-26, n. 12 (1992)). At what point does the role of a private entity in deciding
the parameters of a plan become so prominent that the purpose of the plan shifts from
“public” to “private” or a mixture of the two? Justice O’Connor highlighted the
likelihood of the latter: “The trouble with economic development takings is that private
benefit and incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing.”
Id. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Should a legislature’s approval after the planning
process cleanse any suggestion of an “impermissible private purpose?”
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Id. at 493

Kelo’s Backstory
The facts of Kelo bear out these concerns. Justice Stevens’s description of
NLDC’s involvement (“established some years earlier to assist the City in planning
economic development, was reactivated”) failed to identify who revived NLDC and
implied that the revived NLDC continued the original mission of the entity. Yet NLDC
was created in a different era of urban revitalization, in 1978, and appears to have been
dormant for most of the twenty years between its creation and revival.1 The catalyst for
the reactivation came not from the City, but instead from the state Commissioner of
Economic and Community Development, Peter Ellef, who as political advisor and later
co-chief of staff to Governor John Rowland pushed major urban development initiatives
in heavily Democratic cities to gain political advantage for the Republican governor in a
Democratic state.2 Ellef and Rowland followed the suggestion of a prominent state
lobbyist (and former New London mayor and state representative) to revive NLDC and to
select Claire Gaudiani, the president of New London’s private Connecticut College, as
the leader of that initiative.3 Gaudiani revived NLDC, hand-selected the other NLDC
board members, who duly elected her president.4 NLDC only reached out to the City
after finalizing discussions with the state and Pfizer, which agreed to build a new
research and development facility to New London provided the adjacent Fort Trumbull
area was redeveloped in accordance to a “vision statement” and sketch prepared by
Pfizer’s architect.5 Most importantly, the state, through Ellef’s agency, provided $8
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Articles of Incorporation filed June 5, 1978, filing # 626989, v. 9390, p. 842; the Articles of Organization
were filed two months later, August 1, 1978, filing # 626990, v. 9440, p. 931; apart from Articles of
Amendment filed Jan. 29, 1982, filing # 626991, v. 9960, p. 2669, no reports or amendments were filed
until “reactivated” in 1997, when reports for 1994, 1996, and 1997 were filed simultaneously September
10, 1997, v. 145, pp. 1839, 1843, 1871; from Connecticut Secretary of State, Commercial Recording
Division, available at http://www.concord-sots.ct.gov/ CONCORD/online?eid=99&sn= InquiryServlet. A
study available on the personal website of Claire Guadiani, the then-president of NLDC, stated that NLDC
had been dormant since the “mid-90s,” without any reference: Peggy Cosgrove, “New London
Development Corporation Case Study” at 2 (prepared for The American Assembly), stored at
www.clairegaudiani.com (but unobtainable through searching that site: instead by a Google.com search
under “Claire Gaudiani Peggy Cosgrove”).
2
Cosgrove, supra n. 1 at 1; Morgan McGinley, “Rowland’s Tarnished Legacy At Fort Trumbull,” The
[New London] Day, August 14, 2005.
3
Cosgrove, supra, n. 1 at 1; McGinley, “Rowland’s Tarnished Legacy,” supra, n. 2; Ted Mann, “Pfizer’s
Fingerprints On Fort Trumbull Plan – wired in at birth,” The Day, October 16, 2005.
4
Cosgrove, supra n. 1 at 2-3.
5
Mann, “Pfizer’s Fingerprints,” supra n. 3. The New London City Manager, Richard Brown, declared in
October 1997: “We should be consulted now, not after a deal has been arrived at.” Kate Moran, “A
Question of Leadership: New London Debates How It Does Business,” The Day, October 17, 2004.
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million in state bonds for the initial planning of the redevelopment directly to NLDC,
without any participation by the City.
The City Council, with reservations and discontent, did eventually approve
NLDC’s role in planning the redevelopment as well as the plan itself, but only under
recognition that state funding of the project – eventually totaling $120 million –
depended on NLDC controlling the project.6 The then-mayor stated that Gaudiani, the
then-president of the NLDC, showed him the plan for the redevelopment as a faitaccompli: “We were told what we were going to do. It was state-run from the start.”7
When the City Council in 2004 sought to exercise its limited influence on the
implementation of the redevelopment plan by withholding city-issued bonds (a paltry $4
million or 1/30 of the state contribution), the state threatened future economic
development aid to the City.8 Even when the City Council threatened to use the “nuclear
option” of revoking delegation of municipal authority to NLDC in order to change
NLDC’s leadership in the aftermath of the Kelo decision, only state intervention
delivered the departure of the chief operating officer. Even so, the City Council was
forced to back down on its insistence that NLDC’s president be removed as well.9 The
state’s financial support for NLDC effectively neutered the City Council’s power to
influence the redevelopment plan, and so prevented New London residents from being
able to hold NLDC accountable for its decisions that profoundly impacted the city. At the
same time the state’s use of NLDC to run the project permitted plausible deniability, and
so reduced the likelihood of discontent with the New London redevelopment becoming a
statewide political issue – as a state official put it: “[NLDC and the City] have taken all
of the missile attacks…. That’s the beauty of distance.”10
The lack of accountability derived partly from the lack of transparency: NLDC
asserted that as a private entity it did not have to release its records.11

Although
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Moran, “A Question of Leadership,” supra n. 5.
Cindy Anderson, “A House Divided: Eminent Domain in Connecticut,” Yankee Magazine,
January/February 2007, available at http://www.yankeemagazine.com/issues/200701/features/housedivided/all.
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Moran, “A Question of Leadership,” supra n. 5; McGinley, “Rowland’s Tarnished Legacy,” supra n. 2.
9
Ted Mann, “Council Votes to Cut Ties with NLDC,” The Day, October 18, 2005; Ted Mann, “New
London Councilors Rescind Vote to Cut NLDC Ties,” The Day, October 22, 2005.
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Mann, “Pfizer’s Fingerprints,” supra n. 3.
11
Cosgrove, supra n. 1 at 10.
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complaints led Governor Rowland eventually to order NLDC to comply with state open
records laws, documents remained hidden for years with the aid of stonewalling by state
and NLDC officials.12 The lack of transparency by NLDC permitted potential conflictsof-interest by the individuals involved, especially the president and board members of
NLDC who often were chosen on the basis of their expertise based on their activities
outside of NLDC. Thus Gaudiani served simultaneously as president of NLDC and
Connecticut College, whose funds Gaudiani used to buy buildings to be used by NLDC’s
real estate arm.13 Gaudiani’s role as NLDC head permitted her to use New London as a
laboratory for her academic work, and elevated her media exposure as a dynamic leader
of a liberal arts college, both useful for her future career advancement.14 Gaudiani’s ties
to Pfizer ran deep – her husband was a Pfizer executive and she chose a Pfizer vice
president and trustee for Connecticut College to serve on NLDC’s board (he resigned to
lead Pfizer’s involvement, once it was made public).15 Gaudiani’s successor, Michael
Joplin, a builder from a town 25 miles away from New London, joined NLDC’s board
partly due to his real estate investments in New London, which he continued as NLDC
president – buying two of the properties Connecticut College had purchased under
Gaudiani’s leadership at the auction winding down NLDC’s real estate arm, raising
conflict of interest issues.16 Although Gaudiani and Joplin brought expertise and contacts
to the development process, NLDC’s lack of transparency and accountability created the
opportunity for hidden deals between the state and Pfizer to which the City was not
privy.17 NLDC’s role as a private intermediary linking government and private interests
created a smokescreen that led Justice Kennedy to assert, apparently incorrectly, that no
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private beneficiaries of the redevelopment plan had been identified at the time the state
committed its funds and so the “public purpose” of the redevelopment was not tainted by
“undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493.
NLDC’s involvement did not keep politics out of the planning process, but
instead shielded political decisions and actions from public view, while preventing New
London voters from intervening through the political process. Governor Rowland and
Ellef used NLDC as an element of their political campaign against Democrats, and their
subsequent convictions for corruption in public contracts raise additional concerns about
their involvement in NLDC and the Fort Trumbull redevelopment.18 At the local level,
Joplin responded to the City Council’s balking at issuing city bonds for the Fort Trumbull
project in an attempt to influence NLDC’s actions by using his position as NLDC
president to call for charter reform to create a strong mayor system instead of the current
council-manager form.19 This move had significant political implications as the local
Republican party supported charter reform at least in part to limit the local Democratic
party’s control of the City Council, and so represented NLDC acting as an interest group
intervening in government administration instead of functioning as an element of the
municipal government.20 Thus NLDC’s private status did not insulate it from political
scheming and favoritism involving both external and internal actors.
In light of these facts and concerns, should the City’s approval of NLDC’s
redevelopment plan only after it had been finalized be sufficient to whitewash the
previously private process by transforming it into a “public” planning process? The City
Council effectively was coerced into approving the plan and designating NLDC to
implement the plan, at the risk of losing state aid for both this and future projects. Was
NLDC’s private status really consistent with determining the “public purpose” necessary
to justify condemnation, especially since private negotiations formed the basis for the
plan – negotiations from which the City was excluded? Had NLDC been the City’s
Planning Department, the City Council and the public would have been able to inform
themselves of the details of the plan, and seek to influence the details, before the City
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11

Council acted on it, instead of having to wait to comment until an up-or-down vote on the
final plan.

Moreover, had the City Council retained more control over the

implementation of the plan, it would have been able to respond to changing
circumstances and to the public’s concerns, instead of being hamstrung by NLDC’s
autonomy.
Finally, what justifies the delegation of public powers to a private entity,
effectively masquerading as a public agency, while simultaneously permitting the private
entity to assert its private status to shield it from compliance with the requirements of
public agencies, whether open records laws, employment decisions or bidding
procedures? The exercise of eminent domain represents the most dramatic example of
this “privatization” of public planning, the fundamental concerns raised by outsourcing
public planning without retaining public transparency and accountability requirements
equally apply to all aspects of planning. Although public planning agencies may not have
the skills and resources to perform all required tasks and so will need to hire on occasion
private entities to perform planning services, the autonomy enjoyed by NLDC made a
mockery of the “public” planning process. There is a world of difference between a
public agency hiring private entities to carry out a redevelopment plan made by the
agency and the agency instead delegating to private entities the responsibility to
determine and implement public policy.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, private entities like NLDC - whether “public
authorities,” “nonprofit organizations” or “government corporations” - perform “public”
functions, especially urban redevelopment and planning “on behalf of” governments
across the nation.21 The widespread use of these pseudo-private/quasi-public
organizations, and their association with the circumvention of political accountability and
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transparency – echoing the criticisms of NLDC – led to they earned the moniker “the
shadow government” or “Fourth Branch of Government.”22 Yet ironically the roots of
these pseudo-private/quasi-public organizations lie in Progressive Era political reforms
that sought to improve government and forestall corrupt backroom political deals.
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Donald Axelrod, SHADOW GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN WORLD OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES – AND HOW
THEY CONTROL OVER $1 TRILLION OF YOUR MONEY (1992); Scott Fein, “Introduction: Public Authority
Reform,” 11 NYSBA Government, Law and Policy Journal 5 (Fall 2009).
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II. Evolution of Quasi-Public Entities for Public Redevelopment
Progressive Era Reformers’ Celebration of Private Business as Model for Government
The origins of both city planning and the use of government corporations like
NLDC and the BDC to perform public policy tasks in America lie in the Progressive Era
at the turn of the twentieth century. Progressive reformers attacked the “bossism” that
typified most American cities, which in the reformers’ view prioritized political
patronage over effective administration, with the results manifested in the unhealthy,
primitive and ugly physical shape of cities.23 Although the Progressive movement fought
to reform all levels of government, it “reached its zenith in city halls” because the
exponential growth in American cities over the nineteenth century had overwhelmed the
existing governmental organization of the pre-industrial era, leading to the rise of
political machines that sold city services and jobs.24 The Progressive reforms that laid the
groundwork for government corporations focused on improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of public administration by reducing the power of politicians, particularly that
of political machines and bosses, on government administration, and by importing
professional techniques from the business world to improve government performance.
These twin goals recognized that defeat of boss politicians and the election of Progressive
reformers to office would not be sufficient to address the municipal crisis unless the
bureaucracy was also reformed to remove politically-connected incompetents and to
attract expert professionals from the business world.25 Progressives and their
predecessors therefore pushed for a career civil service system that insulated government
bureaucrats from politically-motivated hiring and firing, and for the creation of
independent regulatory commissions, like the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887)
and Federal Trade Commission (1914), with members appointed on a non-partisan basis
with overlapping terms.26
As important as rooting out patronage was the application of new management
techniques to “straighten the paths of government, to make its business less
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unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization.”27 This emphasis on business
methods reflected the recognition of the improvements in efficiency achieved by the
railroads and other industrial corporations by “scientifically” analyzing operations to
maximize performance and minimize costs – the “scientific management” espoused by
Frederick Winslow Taylor.28 Progressives believed that applying scientific accounting
techniques, data collection and analysis and other management methods from both
business and the European administrative state would not only increase the effectiveness
of government administration, but also the efficient use of tax revenue.29 In the words of
Woodrow Wilson, the founder of the study of public administration in his prePresidential career as a Princeton political science professor: “The field of administration
is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics ….”30 The
freedom from political interference permitted the public administration to make decisions
based on technical expertise and with a long-term perspective regardless of the electoral
timetable. In the view of Wilson and other Progressives, “[g]ood administration would
involve the apolitical application of technical competence to politically defined ends.”31
The electorate and their political representatives should be limited to framing policy
goals, while the public administration would have the authority and discretion to
determine the most efficient means of achieving these goals. In Wilson’s formulation,
“[t]he broad plans of governmental action are not administrative, the detailed execution
of such plans is administrative,” and so should be left to professional technocrats armed
with modern management techniques and expertise in engineering, accounting or other
field relevant to the specific tasks.32 This framework clearly echoed recent developments
in corporate organization where ownership had been separated from management, who
enjoyed significant discretion in running the corporation, within the broad mandate from
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the shareholders to make a profit.33 In adopting this framework, the Progressives assumed
that no middle ground separates politics and administration, and so the decision to site a
bridge, define welfare benefit eligibility or fund mass transit requires only administrative
and technical expertise and does not implicate broader policy choices by the overall
society.34
Wilson and his fellow reformers overlooked the gray area between politics and
administration because they trusted the “educated men of goodwill,” the new civil
servants who would replace the incompetent political hacks and who possessed the skills
and integrity to make public administration the equal of private business.35 In an era of
dynamic corporate leaders and organizations, the Progressive rhetoric extolling
“nonpolitical” and “businesslike” civil servants derived from the stark contrast between
corrupt, incompetent local governments and efficient, powerful corporations (even as
these same corporations drew Progressive ire for being too successful).36 Although the
prominent Progressive theorist Herbert Croly, in The Promise of American Life, blamed
the rise of “bossism” on the undue influence of powerful corporations in politics, he also
celebrated the American businessman as a “very special type of man – the man who
would bring to his task not merely energy, but unscrupulous devotion, originality, [and]
daring,” for whom business was constant war to be conducted relentlessly.37 This portrait
of uncompromising drive and creativity reverberates in Croly’s praise of “Mr.
Roosevelt’s endeavor to give to men of special ability, training and eminence a better
opportunity to serve the public.”38 In Croly’s view, Roosevelt’s efforts to give these
talented men powers consistent with their capacities were fundamental to improving the
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functioning of government: “[Roosevelt] has tried to supply them with an administrative
machinery which would enable them to use their abilities to the best public advantage.”39
Wilson echoed this call to not clip the wings of talented men when he asserted that civil
servants should be granted “large powers and unhampered discretion.”40 This trust in
talented men recalls Wilson’s prior analysis of political, as opposed to administrative,
reform: “political genius cannot develop its full strength unless special opportunities be
opened to it in the institutions of government. … statesmen must be cultivated. They can
be gotten only by assured bounties of actual power.”41 Similarly, to attract these business
entrepreneurs to redirect their tremendous energies from their self-interest to instead
serve the public and the state would require granting the degree of autonomy and
independence typical in the corporate world.42 Wilson argued that conferring this degree
of power would increase its responsible use, whereas checks and balances on power only
leads to irresponsible exercise of power due to the dispersal of accountability.43
Behind these calls for special power for special men lay an elitist trust in the
discretion of “university men” which pervaded the Progressive movement.

Croly

attacked Jeffersonian “equality” vociferously, asserting that it blinded the public to the
reality that “[t]hose who have enjoyed the benefits of wealth and thorough education start
with an advantage which can be overcome only by very exceptional men.”44 Echoing
Croly’s repudiation of equality in favor of a pragmatic recognition of class differences,
Robert Moses, in his pre-Triborough career as a Progressive reformer, praised the British
civil service system that he analyzed in his PhD thesis for its reservation of upper level
administrative policy jobs to “university men”: “Can the state repair the defects of
heredity or of early education? Can it endow the average individual with the intelligence,
acuteness and cultivation which economic exigencies have denied him?”45 Calling for
the US to adopt this class-divided system, Moses admiringly quoted Wilson’s contrast
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between the “statesmanship of the expert civil servant versus the mob rule of the
masses.”46 The admission policy of first school of public administration in America, the
Training School for Public Service founded in 1911 by the prominent Progressive think
tank the Bureau of Municipal Research, aimed to bring “university men” into public
administration – and only the top “university men,” including Moses.47 Wilson himself
justified the “large powers and unhampered discretion” for these cultivated civil servants
because “the people [and their elected representatives]… are selfish, ignorant, timid,
stubborn, foolish,” and so should not be trusted with the details of administration, but
instead limited to “superintending the greater forces of formative policy ....”48 In
Wilson’s view, these civil servants should respond with “ready docility to all serious
well-sustained public criticism,” but should not stoop to respond to general public
criticism beyond expressing “impudent exclusiveness and arbitrariness.”49 This classism
pervaded Progressivism and remains a latent influence in government corporations even
today, as expressed in contemporary assertions of exclusivity and technocratic superiority
by officials of government corporations – “trust us, we know better.”50

Progressive Era Reforms: the Origins of Government Planning of Urban Development
At the same time as Progressive reformers sought to impose order on corrupt and
ineffective bureaucracy by increasing the efficiency of government administration and
separating it from political patronage, proponents of city planning (there was significant
overlap between the two movements in members as well as principles) sought to impose
order on urban squalor, improving traffic circulation and planning for growth in newly
annexed suburban land in an organized and scientific manner instead of by back-room
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deals between real estate speculators and politicians.51 City planning advocates pushed to
imitate European municipal statistical offices that collected and analyzed information
relevant to city governance, and organized private organizations to research and propose
reform proposals, such as the Bureau of Municipal Research, founded in New York City
in 1907, where Robert Moses started.52 Other private groups, particularly the Municipal
Art Societies (New York, 1893; Cincinnati, 1894; Baltimore, Chicago, and Cleveland in
1899), focused on the physical layout and appearance of their respective cities and also
commissioned studies of proposed reforms, reports to use in subsequent lobbying
efforts.53 These efforts were not limited to façade treatments, but incorporated
improvements to sewer and drinking water systems, and updated traffic circulation
patterns with unified railroad stations, as critical elements of improving the physical city
along with tree-shaded boulevards, public sculpture and monumental city centers.54
The 1902 McMillan or Senate Park Commission plan for Washington, D.C, paved
the way for governments or private groups to commission plans for cities throughout the
country.55 Growing out of the late nineteenth century parks movement, these city plans
projected order over the existing city and its future growth, seeking to direct speculative
growth in a rational manner and organizing infrastructure around needs by the research
supporting the plan. The plans varied in subject matter, some covering only the city
center (Cleveland, 1902), others focused on projected future growth into surrounding
jurisdictions (Baltimore, 1904), but later plans increased the breadth to examine
economic and housing needs (St. Louis, 1907; Chicago, 1909 - although the plans did not
always propose solutions). Although some of these plans were commissioned by
governments (Cleveland’s 1902 commission appointed by the governor; New York City
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Improvement Commission created by the aldermen in 1903), others were the products of
private groups, either associations dedicated to parks or municipal arts (Philadelphia and
Baltimore) or groups of local business leaders (Chicago’s Commercial and Merchants
Clubs, 1909).56 In Boston in 1909, civic-minded business leaders organized “Boston 1915” to advocate for systematic planning for the future of the city and commissioned
both a city plan and an analysis of the city’s financial, housing, labor, and public health
conditions and resources. Boston - 1915’s efforts succeeded in convincing the legislature
in 1911 to authorize the governor to appoint a temporary commission to determine the
need for a comprehensive plan, although subsequent opposition by suburban
municipalities rendered the commission stillborn.57 These private initiatives dedicated
their own resources to hire planning experts to write these plans, in recognition that the
politicians either lacked interest or funding, and because it ensured the reformers control
over the choice of experts and scale of the plan. Daniel Burnham pushed for the
Commercial Club to privately finance the preparation of the 1909 Chicago Plan for these
reasons and to pressure politicians (and the public) into acting: “[t]he public authorities
do not do their duty and they must be made to.”58 This model of planning done by outside
experts on commission from a private interest group, with politicians (and the public)
involved only at the final presentation of the plan, clearly presages the circumstances
behind Kelo v. New London.
The popular success of these city plans soon led to public commissions charged
with preparing and implementing comprehensive plans – a development to which the
private groups happily acceded. Thus Chicago’s mayor endorsed the 1909 Plan of
Chicago within two days of its public release and the city council soon authorized the
mayor to appoint the Chicago Plan Commission, composed of most of the proponents of
the Plan together with other private citizens and elected officials.59 At the first National
Conference on City Planning held that same year in Washington, D.C., Frederick Ford,
the Secretary of the first official planning panel, the Commission on the City Plan for
Hartford, Connecticut, asserted that city planning would no longer be the province of
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private pressure groups, but instead “be undertaken more by official commissions with
ample authority to employ experts.”60 Ford was overly optimistic, as those cities that
established commissions to prepare a city plan often did not provide resources to hire
expert staff, with a private citizens’ group paying the salary of the city planner in one
case.61 More importantly, the authority of these commissions often was merely advisory,
and even planning proponents sought to separate the plan commission’s review of
proposals from power of the city council. Thus the National Municipal League’s 1916
model city charter provided for a planning board with the authority limited to advising
the city council – the council could not take any action that would affect the city plan
until reviewed by the planning board, but the council was not bound to follow the board’s
recommendations.62 This widespread model echoed Progressive ideals of insulating the
planning board from political power and concerns, in order to ensure that the board’s
recommendations were based on expert, technical advice and based on the long-term
needs of the community instead of the electoral schedule. Some of the leading city
planning proponents worried that any power beyond merely advisory would lead to a
backlash against planning. Alfred Bettman, the force behind much of early city planning
laws, asserted that the purpose of forcing a city council to wait for the planning board’s
advice before proceeding was to “force [the] council … into discussion with the planning
commission” and to permit the public to be “aroused and mobilized and to express itself,”
but not to give the planning board legally enforceable power over compliance with the
plan.63 Addressing a planning conference in Baltimore, Bettman asserted that giving the
planning commission complete control would be a mistake, as “pressure groups” would
focus on the commission, injecting political concerns into what should be a technical and
rational decision. Instead the ultimate legal authority should rest with the city council,
with

a

two-thirds

majority

required

to

reject

the

planning

commission’s

recommendations, so that the commission would be able to make expert
recommendations free from external political pressure: “A [planning] commission should
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be a unit of influence rather than legal authority.”64 The 1927 Standard City Planning Act
issued by Secretary of Commerce Hoover adopted this organization, with Bettman’s
influence manifested in the city council’s ability to reject the planning commission’s
recommendations, with the requirement of a two-thirds majority. Moreover, this model
act, used as the basis of local ordinances nationwide, provided that the planning
commission, not the city council, adopt the city plan, reinforcing the planning
commission as champion of planning, but also further removing the city plan and
planning from the political realm.65 This insulation from political power also led to the
political isolation of planning commissions, with the result that very few received
budgets to hire planning staff so that most of the comprehensive plans prepared in the
1920s continued to be done by outside expert consultants, while planning commissions
themselves came under fire as unnecessary expenditures during the Depression.66 Thus
the emphasis on technical expertise and a long term perspective, combined with
insulation from politics, created the expectation that city planning be completed out of
public view by private consultants for the planning commission, with only the final
version presented to the public for approval or rejection.

The First Government Corporations
It was in the midst of the culmination of Progressivism in government and
informed by the contemporary concern for, and study of, how to improve the functioning
and form of cities that the forerunner of American government corporations came to
existence – the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.67 This entity literally grew
out of a Progressive initiative – in 1911, Woodrow Wilson, then governor of New Jersey,
and the governor of New York each convened commissions to analyze methods to
improve the efficiency of New York Harbor, one port divided by the state line bisecting
the Hudson River.68 Despite this initial effort at cooperation, the rivalry between the
states quickly returned in 1914, when the New Jersey commission shifted its focus to
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consolidating the hodgepodge of local jurisdictions governing the New Jersey side under
the control of a state-sponsored “central port authority,” with an eye to challenging New
York’s previously unified side as an equal partner rather than multiple junior members.69
Although the local governments along the New Jersey shore lobbied successfully to limit
severely the authority of the resulting New Jersey Board of Commerce and Navigation (it
had no condemnation or financing authority), the Board unified New Jersey’s position
over the future development of the port and ultimately led to New Jersey filing a
complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission to overturn the unified freight
charge for New York Harbor, seeking to lower the cost to ship to the New Jersey
terminals and boost its competitiveness vis a vis the New York terminals.70 Pressure from
the business community and leadership by Progressive politicians interested in promoting
rational and efficient development of the port by removing power from parochial and
corrupt local politicians led to the formation in 1917 of the bi-state Port and Harbor
Development Commission to plan for the port’s future.71 After four years of negotiations,
New York, New Jersey, and Congress approved the creation of the Port Authority, a
manifestation of Progressivism – an autonomous entity independent of direct political
control with a businesslike ethic of a long-term perspective based on technical expertise.
New York and New Jersey transferred some of their authority to the Port Authority under
the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which limited the states’ ability to withdraw
at will, and so ensured that the Port Authority would be free from political threats from
the states to withdraw. The Port Authority could issue bonds backed by its revenues,
earned from the piers, warehouses, and other infrastructure built, purchased, or operated
by the Port Authority, thus enabling the Port Authority to resist political threats to cut off
annual appropriations. The six-member board, three from each state, served overlapping
six-year terms to smooth out any disruptions or radical reversals due to electoral changes,
and received no salary for their service in order to reduce the value of these positions for
political patronage – all designed to bolster the Port Authority’s autonomy. The board
had the sole authority to determine the salaries and duties of its employees, removing
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another potential means of interference by state or local governments. 72 As part of the
negotiations leading to approval, the Port Authority did not receive the authority to
condemn land, impose taxes, or regulate the building or operating of private
infrastructure that might compete with the Port Authority’s plan without the approval of
both state legislatures, which also retained control over any changes to any development
plan of the Port Authority.73 Despite these limitations, the Port Authority prominently
featured the Progressive principles that effective government required the delegation of
“large powers and unhampered discretion” to autonomous entities run according to
modern corporate methods, with a long-term perspective and based on professional
expertise.74
Although the key impetus to create the Port Authority as an independent
corporation was the need to overcome the competition between New York and New
Jersey – echoing New Jersey’s prior consolidation of control of its port facilities from
competing local governments – the model for the corporate structure came from the Port
Authorities of London (1908) and Liverpool (1857), created to remove control over
engines of economic growth from corrupt local government.75 Simultaneously with the
drafting of the Port Compact, and probably helpful in creating familiarity with the
concept of a public corporation, President Wilson created five government corporations,
run by appointed boards, to run aspects of the war effort after the U.S. joined World War
I in 1917. These Congressionally-approved corporations received administrative
autonomy, including freedom from governmental contracting requirements, within a
defined zone of responsibility – general war financing, ship-building, housing, grain, and
sugar price control.76 The Port Authority quickly became a model for other ports
nationwide, although the purpose for most of these port authorities was not to overcome
multi-jurisdictional competition, but instead to provide focus for economic development
efforts informed by technical, not political, concerns and needs.77 The Port Authority’s
influence extended far beyond the specialized needs of ports due to the fortuitous fact that
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a future President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, when governor of New York witnessed
first hand the Port Authority’s successful administration of major infrastructure projects,
most notably the George Washington Bridge. As governor, FDR borrowed the Port
Authority model to create the New York Power Authority to develop hydroelectric power
along the Saint Lawrence Seaway, and then as President, to form the Tennessee Valley
Authority, which he justified as “a corporation clothed with the power of government, but
possessed of the initiative and flexibility of a private enterprise.”78 Like the Port
Authority, the TVA’s regional mission covered multiple governmental jurisdictions,
which reinforced the importance of TVA’s independence to its director, David Lilienthal,
who built a grassroots power base among Tennessee Valley residents to fend off attempts
to limit the TVA’s autonomy. Lilienthal, with Robert Moses and Austin Toobin at the
Port Authority, was a pioneer of the “entrepreneurial governance” that became
synonymous with government corporations, and which recalls Progressivism’s goal to
bring the energy and efficacy of businessmen to public administration.79
FDR was so enamored of the government corporation model that he launched a
fleet of government corporations in a “chaos of experimentation” to address the Great
Depression, with an initial wave of national public corporations aimed at the crisis that
resembled President Wilson’s wartime government corporations, as well as the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation created in 1932 by President Hoover.80 In 1934, his
second year in office, FDR pushed to expand the use of government corporations to the
state and local level by sending the states a model enabling act for state legislatures to
authorize the creation of “municipal improvement authorities” and “nonprofit public
benefit corporations” with the power to issue revenue bonds to fund infrastructure
projects designed to gin the economy. The Public Works Administration and
Reconstruction Finance Corporation would purchase bonds issued by these new local
government corporations, effectively transferring federal aid to state and local
governments through these new government corporations. FDR followed up with
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personal letters to each governor further encouraging the authorization of state and local
government corporations. By the end of the decade, 16 states had authorized government
corporations, with 41 doing so by 1948, including 25 states that extended the
authorization to local governments.81 For FDR, a political reformer influenced by the
legacy of Progressivism, the government corporation model provided not only the
opportunity to improve the economic and administrative performance of government
administration, but it also enabled FDR to use federal aid as a means of encouraging local
government reform by sidestepping the existing political structures and so avoid local
political machines skimming from the new federal aid.82

Government Corporations for Urban Redevelopment
FDR’s initiatives firmly ensconced government corporations in urban
development because his Administration’s radical interventions in the housing market
relied on these entities. City planning groups supported the use of government
corporations for the Administration’s public housing and slum clearance programs –
indeed Ohio passed the first state act enabling metropolitan housing authorities in 1933, a
year before FDR’s Administration issued the model act to the states, because a sharpeyed Ohio planning proponent had noticed that a provision in the 1933 National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) permitted grants and loans to local government housing
corporations as well as private limited-dividend housing corporations (opening the door
to non-public entities to undertake redevelopment efforts on behalf of the government).83
The Ohio act derived from the report of a committee of the National Conference on Slum
Clearance, which included Bettman and other prominent planning professionals, that
urged the use of government corporations to ensure efficient and effective intervention



81

Mitchell, EXPERIMENT, supra n. 21 at 32-33; Walsh, THE PUBLIC’S BUSINESS, supra n. 21 at 28-29.
Kathryn A. Foster, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE GOVERNMENT 18, n. 47 (1999), citing
Mark I. Gelfand, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA, 1933-1965 2426 (1975). FDR’s push for local government corporation is somewhat ironic, given that his personal feud
with Robert Moses might have revealed the problems with creating a new power structure apart from
existing government institutions.
83
Scott, PLANNING, supra n. 51 at 319. The thirty-percent set aside of the initial stage of grants and loans
for private nonprofit or limited-dividend corporations, including unions, established a prominent role for
non-public entities in public urban redevelopment projects in the early stages of federal urban intervention,
and so a precedent for non-public non-profit local development corporations including the Charles Center
Management Office, the first predecessor of the BDC. Gwendolyn Wright, BUILDING THE DREAM: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF HOUSING IN AMERICA 224 (1981).
82

26

instead of relying on existing municipal departments and personnel.84 The Ohio law did
include a check on the autonomy of these new housing corporations by requiring referral
of all new streets, parks, and public spaces to the local planning commission in order to
ensure coordination between these two types of entities that were both guided by the
Progressive notion of technical expertise and insulation from politics. The National
Association of Housing Officials, in the program issued by a 1934 national conference
held in Baltimore, reiterated the planning community’s support for local government
corporations to play a prominent role in housing and slum clearance as part of federal
initiatives, as well as a role for planning commissions to prevent contradictions in policy
between the housing corporations and planning commissions.85
The real estate lobby joined city planners in supporting the use of government
corporations for urban development – and in so doing revealed the dark side of the
autonomy and reliance on technical expertise of government corporations. In 1935,
Herbert Nelson, the executive secretary of the National Association of Real Estate Boards
(NAREB), announced a Neighborhood Improvement plan that would permit a district to
create a government corporation, if approved by 75% of the district’s property owners, to
seek condemnation and taxing authority from the city council in order to improve the
district.86 NAREB lobbied state legislatures to enact authorizing legislation, issuing a
model Neighborhood Improvement Act in 1938 prepared by a prominent planner,
Harland Bartholomew, who envisioned the emergence of neighborhood planning
associations whose improvement plans would be approved by the planning commission
and city council and carried out in cooperation between the associations and city.87
NAREB’s Nelson, however, quickly expanded the scale of the undertaking, calling for
the creation of “city rebuilding companies,” government corporations with condemnation
authority that would leverage federal aid to raise capital to destroy blight and rebuild
throughout the city, not only in a single neighborhood. Although these corporations
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would work under the city plan and within specified conditions, Nelson did not appear to
require referral or approval by city planning commissions.88
The emphasis on administrative efficiency and expertise in government
corporations appealed to NAREB and Nelson because of the probability of finding
sympathetic and likeminded professionals at the head of the “businesslike” government
corporations, just as the real estate industry had established close ties with the Federal
Housing Administration (so the Director of the FHA’s Land Planning Division during the
preparation of the Handbook on Urban Redevelopment for Cities in the United States in
1941, three years later became the Director of the Urban Land Institute, which had been
created in 1936 by Nelson as NAREB’s research arm and spun off as an “independent”
entity in 1940).89

More importantly, government corporations promised NAREB

insulation from political pressures, especially from interference by the public, which
introduced uncertainty and associated extra costs that businesses hate. Nelson succinctly
stated this point in a 1949 letter to the president of NAREB: “I do not believe in
democracy. I think it stinks. I believe in a republic operated by elected representatives
who are permitted to do the job, as the board of directors should.”90 Although
diametrically opposed to Wilson’s focus on government role in promoting the public
good, Nelson’s elitist viewpoint echoes Wilson’s contrast between the “statesmanship of
the expert civil servant and the mob rule of the masses,” with both agreeing that
governance by experts is best as long as the experts share one’s own worldview.91 This
recognition by the private real estate investment community that government
corporations represented an opportunity to ensure the real estate industry’s involvement
without public scrutiny was an early harbinger of the criticisms leveled at government
corporations like NLDC and the BDC.
The dominant role of state and local government corporations in urban
redevelopment became firmly established in 1935, when the Sixth Circuit upheld a lower
court’s ruling that the Public Works Administration (PWA) could not condemn land for
slum clearance and housing under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) because
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it did not constitute a public use under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Certain
Lands in the City of Louisville, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935). The court distinguished cases
cited by the government as proceedings initiated “under state statutes passed to effectuate
the purpose of a declared public policy of the state,” whereas this case involved the
federal government acting under federal law. Id. at 687. Yet, declared the court: “[t]he
state and federal governments are distinct sovereignties, each independent of each other
and each restricted to it own sphere. Neither can invade or usurp the rightful powers or
authority of the other. In the exercise of its police power a state may do those things
which benefit the health, morals, and welfare of its people. The federal government has
no such power within the states.” Id. Although the Administration initially appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court, it withdrew its petition out of fear that the Court might
use the case to find Title II of NIRA unconstitutional and so amplify its striking down of
NIRA’s Title I in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), decided just months before the Louisville decision and cited by the appellees.92
296 U.S. 567 (1935), cert. granted; 297 U.S. 726 (1936) dismissed. As a result of this
decision, the PWA abandoned the policy of direct intervention it had adopted while
waiting for states to adopt enabling laws for state and local government corporations.
The federal government changed paradigms, turning to the states to act under
state laws authorizing eminent domain for slum clearance and housing based on state
constitutional powers, with the federal government providing the financing for the
projects to state and local government corporations.93 The Sixth Circuit in Louisville had
suggested this alternative, and two weeks after the Administration withdrew its appeal in
that case, the Court of Appeals of New York, one of the few states that had responded
quickly to FDR’s 1934 model act and enabled local government corporations for housing
that same year, ruled that a local government housing corporation could condemn land
for slum clearance and low-income housing as a “public use” under the state constitution
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and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.94 In the Matter of New York City Housing
Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936). This push to have state and
local government corporations lead slum clearance and housing efforts with federal
financing had been included in a bill that Robert F. Wagner, a leading housing proponent,
introduced in the Senate just before the Louisville decision. When Wagner’s bill
eventually became law as the 1937 Housing Act, it was the catalyst for the creation of
state and local government corporations for slum clearance and housing – over one
hundred local government housing corporations were formed by the end of that year, with
221 created by the end of 1938, under the enabling legislation passed by thirty-three
states.95 These state and local government housing corporations were overseen by a
federal government corporation – the United States Housing Authority, a “body
corporate” within the Interior Department.96 By the end of the 1930s, most states had
enacted enabling legislation, upheld by state courts, authorizing eminent domain for slum
clearance and housing.97
Yet policy makers, real estate interests, and city planners quickly judged the 1937
Housing Act to be only a partial response to the problem of slum clearance and urban
redevelopment, given the focus on providing public housing. Thus the passage of the
1937 Act inspired further legislative efforts to expand the focus from slum clearance and
housing to urban redevelopment, with particular focus on areas around the central
business districts.98 This concern with urban decay and the need to reinvent cities was
shared by the public, which flocked to two exhibits on cities at the 1939 World Fair –
GM’s “Futurama” depiction of car-based cities of the future and The City, a film created
by the American Institute of Planners, which contrasted urban ills with new garden
cities.99 Responding to this perceived need, in 1941 the Federal Housing Administration
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published A Handbook on Urban Redevelopment for Cities in the United States that
identified those needs of cities that federal funding could potentially help address.100 The
following year ULI called for a new federal urban redevelopment program to fund local
metropolitan land commissions authorized by state legislatures to draw up and implement
master plans of metropolitan areas, including the power to condemn property and change
zoning. These “land commissions” hewed to the Progressive ideal of autonomous
entities, separate from existing bureaucracy, with large powers and businesslike
operations, and ULI underscored the prominent role that private business would play by
insisting that the “public” role lay in assembling and clearing the land, while private
builders would do the construction and development.101
These lobbying efforts paid off in the decade after the 1937 Act, as state
legislatures debated laws authorizing the creation of local government corporations for
urban redevelopment with condemnation authority with different restrictions – some
states limited eminent domain provisions to specific cities (e.g., Michigan’s law restricted
to Detroit), and some states set minimum thresholds of ownership for the development
corporations to meet before receiving authorization for eminent domain (51% or 60% of
the redevelopment district).102 In 1944, when ten states had enacted redevelopment laws
authorizing government corporations to use eminent domain and ten other states were
considering similar legislation, ULI launched a lobbying campaign to ensure that these
redevelopment laws would not authorize existing local government housing corporations
as the redevelopment agencies, but instead enable new, separate redevelopment entities,
in order to ensure that redevelopment was not limited to public housing, but could be
used for commercial development surrounding central business districts.103 ULI also
pushed state legislatures not to limit the final use of redevelopment projects to public
housing, but instead to grant redevelopment corporations flexibility, provided the final
use complied with the comprehensive plan “and with the objective of securing the highest
and best use of the area,” which would give private real estate interests a prominent role
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in determining the location and use of redevelopment projects.104 Spurred on by
downtown business interests, cities quickly acted on state enabling laws and created
redevelopment corporations, with most big cities having such entities by the late 1940s.
These redevelopment entities, led by boards generally dominated by real estate and
business interests chosen for their expertise as well as interest, typically took over the
planning of redevelopment projects with the help of outside planning experts, with the
city council voting only on the final plan, which would then be incorporated into the
city’s master plan.105 This submission of the comprehensive master plan to the specific
redevelopment plan, as well as the dominance of the autonomous, technocratic
redevelopment corporation in preparing the redevelopment project, anticipated the
process used by NLDC in New London.

The Influence of Private Business on the Use of Government Corporations for Urban
Redevelopment
While state and local governments embraced government corporations for
redevelopment, World War II largely diverted the energy of the federal government. Two
Congressional bills governing urban redevelopment were introduced in 1943, one
supported by Bettman and city planners that emphasized local government’s control over
the redevelopment by requiring governments to lease, not sell, the cleared land, and a
rival ULI-supported bill that enabled governments to sell the cleared land to private
entities that would determine the final use. These bills stalled in Congress until 1949,
when the 1949 Housing Act established a national urban redevelopment program
financed by federal aid but managed by local redevelopment entities. The 1949 Act
included ULI’s provision permitting local governments to sell the cleared land instead of
maintaining control of the redevelopment by only leasing the land, as well as a provision
that similarly reduced local government’s potential control over redevelopment by only
requiring local government approval of a project as conforming to a “general plan of the
locality,” instead of specifying compliance with the comprehensive plan of the
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municipality.106

As the example of New London and NLDC reveals, this required

“approval” does not mean that the local government prepared or would implement the
project, especially if the redevelopment corporation has control over external funding
sources.

However, the 1949 Act did provide another means of leverage for local

governments in conditioning the federal government’s payment of two-thirds of the cost
of land assembly and clearance on a one-third contribution from local government. This
gave local government a seat at the table, especially since the local government
contribution was generally “in-kind” donations of land, street infrastructure, parks,
playgrounds, or schools and other public buildings.107 The process of determining the
composition and assembling this one-third contribution necessarily involved local
government in the details of the preparation of a redevelopment project under the 1949
Act, whereas New London’s contribution was only 1/30 ($4 million of the total $120
million project cost), and so had no impact on the preparation of the project’s plan,
especially as the contribution was in cash and not in land or facilities to be built.
ULI’s successful lobbying efforts at the federal and the state and local levels to
have the 1949 Housing Act, state enabling laws, and local laws creating redevelopment
corporations include broader and more flexible authority granted to local redevelopment
entities, ensured a prominent role for the private sector, which would control the building
and operation of redevelopment projects, with the public role effectively limited to land
assembly and clearance.108 The National Institute of Municipal Law Officials pointed out
the results: “Private capital will dictate the area in which its monies will be invested.”
The influence of private real estate interests, especially downtown businesses, was
magnified by the prominent role they played as members of the redevelopment
corporations as well as leaders of private civic groups that financed planning reports
offered to local governments as roadmaps for redevelopment.109 At the same time, the
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revival in the 1940s of municipal planning departments that had effectively gone dormant
during the Depression transformed planning into a professional discipline that created
distance between public planning decisions and the general public. Moreover, most of
this increase in municipal planning focused on zoning the contemporary city, not longterm planning, which instead became dominated by business interests and redevelopment
corporations funded by federal urban renewal programs.110

The increasing

professionalism and concomitant technical skillset of urban planning with the emergence
of graduate degrees in city planning that emphasized economics, social sciences, and
techniques used in business management, further justified the use of government
corporations for redevelopment planning.111
The case of Pittsburgh is illustrative: in 1945 the Pennsylvania legislature passed
an enabling act for local redevelopment corporations with eminent domain authority due
to the lobbying efforts of Richard King Mellon, the banking and industrial tycoon.112
Two years earlier, Mellon led a group of Pittsburgh business leaders in founding the
private Allegheny Conference for Community Development to push for dramatic
intervention in Pittsburgh’s grimy Golden Triangle. The Allegheny Conference, funded
by the Pittsburgh Civic-Business Council, provided detailed plans for the redevelopment
for the local government redevelopment corporation to use, as well as negotiated the
financing through an investment by Equitable Life Assurance Society, and then lobbied
successfully for the 1947 state redevelopment law permitting insurance companies to
invest in redevelopment projects.113 These redevelopment plans derived from those

produced by Robert Moses when hired in 1939 by Mellon’s predecessor as leader of
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Pittsburgh’s business community and of the private Pittsburgh Regional Planning
Association (PRPA), Howard Heinz.114 This dominant influence on redevelopment
projects by activist business leaders reflected a long tradition in Pittsburgh, with Heinz
and Mellon founding the PRPA in 1936 to lead planning efforts following devastating
floods combined with a municipal planning department overworked by the dramatic
increase in planning required by the New Deal.115 The PRPA itself was a revival of the
Citizens Committee on the City Plan, founded in 1918 by Mellon’s father and other
Pittsburgh business leaders to push for Pittsburgh to adopt city planning, and its parent,
the Municipal Planning Association, both of which disbanded due to the Great
Depression in 1933.116 Unlike the 1920s-era Citizens Committee, however, the PRPA and
Allegheny Conference aimed to catalyze public planning by providing plans for the city
to adopt instead of just building support for municipal planning efforts.117 The successful
redevelopment of Pittsburgh’s Golden Triangle enthralled the nation as proof that cities
could be saved by this model, adopted by the 1949 Act, of new government
redevelopment corporations acting in concert with private business interests.118
The dominant role of government corporations in urban redevelopment – the
precursors for NLDC and the BDC – was sealed with the passage of the 1949 Housing
Act and state enabling legislation for state and local government corporations for
redevelopment as well as for housing. With the massive federal funding for urban
renewal and highway construction (used for redevelopment purposes) through the 1970s,
these government redevelopment corporations firmly fixed the model of redevelopment
in the Progressive mold – autonomous, politically insulated (from accountability but not
from political intrigue), technocratic and businesslike.

Government Corporations as A Paradigm for Government
The early successes of the Port Authority and TVA, combined with FDR’s
extensive use of government corporations at the federal level and of state and local
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government corporations as conduits for new federal aid, heralded a huge expansion of
these entities. Although the ability to raise capital by issuing bonds, and so expand
governmental budgets without having to seek voter approval, was a key reason for their
popularity, equally important was the Progressive ideal of businesslike, efficient,
autonomous, and focused entities to do the “public’s business.” States quickly expanded
the use of government corporations beyond the purposes pushed by the federal
government, with Pennsylvania alone creating over 1,200 municipal government
corporations by 1950.119 Ironically, a further impetus towards government corporations
was the increasing size and complexity of government bureaucracy and the laws intended
to ensure good government, since the autonomy of government corporations usually
absolved them of compliance with contract bidding, civil service, auditing, and
management laws and regulations.120 Directors of government corporations energetically
asserted this autonomy, particularly from legislative oversight, justified on the
businesslike model of the government corporation and on the harm that political
intervention and full disclosure would cause by leading investors to avoid purchasing
government corporation bonds.121 More broadly, the directors defended their autonomy
by analogy to the private corporation where the management had ample discretion in
responding to shareholders.122

This analogy of the public as the shareholders of

government corporations retained its luster to public administration theorists, and the
public at large, even as scholars of private corporate governance attacked the assumption
that shareholders “owned” a private corporation, with the result of almost unfettered
discretion by management with limited accountability to shareholders. Although these
corporate governance studies clearly suggested that government corporations would share
this lack of management accountability to the public as “shareholders,” public
administration theorists doubled down on their praise for this increased independence for
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directors of government corporations, falling back on Wilson’s Progressive mantra of
ample discretion to management and insulation from the mob rule of the masses.123
The use of government corporations over the next three decades continued to
expand at all levels of government. A brief period of disfavor at the federal level under
the Eisenhower Administration was followed by a return to prominence under Johnson’s
Great Society program, while state and local governments proliferated in response to both
local needs and federal funds.124 By the late 1970s, over 7,000 regional, state, and local
government corporations existed, and the model become paradigmatic so that
management consultants advising governments routinely relied on “[a] common script –
define a specialized problem, seek a purely organizational solution, [and] spin off a
government corporation.”125
The 1970s also witnessed a growing critique of government corporations for the
lack of accountability and transparency that enabled directors to become lords of their
personal fiefdoms, as exemplified by Robert Moses, who lost his power over an intricate
web of New York City government corporations in 1968 after 44 years, or Austin
Toobin, the head of the Port Authority from 1942 to 1971.126 The 1974 publication of
Robert Caro’s detailed biography of Moses included extensive analysis of how Moses set
up and operated “his” government corporations to remain in power and unaccountable to
politicians and voters, and its clamorous reception, including the Pulitzer prize, further
ensconced in the public mind the corruptibility of government corporations.127 The
intricate web of state government corporations in New York led the Comptroller to
describe them as “the Fourth Branch of Government” in 1972.128 Starting the next year,
the threatened insolvency of the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), created in
1968, led to concerns that New York State’s fiscal health might be affected, both by
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having to bail out the UDC as well as the collateral concern over the debt-worthiness of
the state’s numerous other interlocking government corporations. Although catastrophe
was averted after three years of significant state aid and reform legislation limiting the
state’s exposure, the debacle raised serious concerns about the functioning of government
corporations – not just about the lack of transparency and accountability, but perhaps
more damaging, about the Progressive image of a businesslike technocratic entity that
outperformed the general purpose government.129 The subsequent use of the UDC by
Governor Cuomo to build prisons that voters had rejected in a bond referendum in 1981
further fanned criticisms of government corporations used as undemocratic backroom
political tools.130 These criticisms amplified opposition to the extraordinary powers
granted the UDC to override local government zoning laws and permitting the state to
intervene in New York City and other municipalities without recourse by the local
jurisdiction’s citizens – a harbinger of NLDC’s lack of accountability to the citizens of
New London.131
Despite these critiques, however, government corporations and private business
influence in public policy received a new boost under the Carter Administration, which
sought to replace the Great Society paradigm of top-down, “command-and-control”
government programs with more flexible, market-driven “public-private partnerships.”132
To replace the urban renewal program (shut down in 1974), the Carter Administration
created the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program that awarded grants
based on the level of partnership between public and private entities - the degree of
private investment, the use of public loans instead of grants, and the size of the “equity
kicker,” the ownership stake in the project, given the local redevelopment government
corporation. UDAG transformed local redevelopment corporations from conduits of
federal aid to active participants in the development process, negotiating with private
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developers to shape the ultimate deal, and in return becoming more and more akin to
developers.133 Whereas urban renewal prescribed that local government corporations
assemble and clear land before negotiating with private developers who would then take
over the project under the terms of the contract, UDAG encouraged local government
corporations to include private developers before finalizing plans for land assembly and
clearance, and to remain involved during the redevelopment phase, and after, through
profit-sharing mechanisms.134 In 1979, William Donald Schaefer celebrated this
commingling: “Today, the public and private sectors are each acting more like the other
use to act, and public/private ‘deals,’ publicly arrived at, have gained respectability.”135
Given the intricate, drawn out, and often secretive nature of real estate development, how
“publicly” the deals were arrived it is questionable – although Schaefer’s modus
operandi, shared by many mayors seeking results, suggests a loose definition.136 Indeed,
the executives of local redevelopment government corporations became “public
entrepreneurs,” wheeling and dealing with their private business partners with whom they
potentially identified more than their general-purpose government bureaucrat peers.137
These criticisms echoed those leveled at the government corporations with large bond
issues, which critics asserted rendered the executives more responsive to bond investors
than to the public.138 Nonetheless, this “public entrepreneurship” found fertile ground in
the market-focused Reagan era, sympathetic to the Progressive mantra of making
government more businesslike. Politicians saw government corporations as ideal tools to
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promote public-private partnerships, especially for directing economic development
policy, for which hundreds of new government corporations were created and existing
government corporations repurposed.139 UDAG itself, despite being targeted by budgetcutters antipathetic to the program’s social aims, survived until 1988 because of its
popularity with local governments and business interests.140
The continuing popularity of government corporations in the 1980s did not
silence critics, especially after the 1983 default by the Washington Public Power Supply
System on over $2.2 billion in bonds and Diana Henriques’ 1986 expose, The Machinery
of Greed: Public Authority Abuse and What to Do About It.141 In addition to this populist
focus on the unaccountability of government corporations, echoed by Donald Axelrod’s
1992 The Shadow Government: The Hidden World of Public Authorities – And How
They Control Over $1 Trillion of Your Money, more sober academic research analyzed
the successes and failures of government corporations, and proposed reforms including
calls for greater transparency but also greater politicization of government corporation
boards.142 In response, politicians enacted reforms that included consolidation of
corporations with overlapping mandates; greater political control including removing
much of the freedom from governmental reporting, contracting, and other regulatory
requirements traditionally enjoyed by government corporations; and privatization.143 New
York State in particular has taken the lead in importing modern corporate governance
principles from the private sector, with 2005 and 2009 legislation that included increased
conflict-of-interest regulation and fiduciary duty requirements of directors and
executives, tighter audit procedures, adoption of ethics code, whistleblower protections,
greater transparency of property disposition, and the creation of a State Inspector General



139

Mitchell, EXPERIMENT, supra n. 21 at 40-44.
Lynne B. Sagalyn, “Explaining the Improbable: Local Redevelopment in the Wake of Federal
Cutbacks,” 56 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION 431 (Autumn 1990).
141
Jerry Mitchell and Gerald J. Miller, “Public Authorities and Contemporary Debt Financing,” in PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT 71-81 (Jerry Mitchell, ed., 1992)
(discussing the background of, and responses to, the Washington Public Power Supply System default);
Robert Smith, “The Web of Actors in Authority Policy Implementation,” 18:4 POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL
986-98 (Summer 1990) (discussing the Federal government’s push in the 1970s and 1980s to increase
contracting with the private sector and ensuing complications).
142
Walsh, THE PUBLIC’S BUSINESS (1978), supra n. 21; PUBLIC AUTHORITIES (Mitchell, ed., 1992), supra n.
21; and Mitchell, EXPERIMENT (1999), supra n. 21; and Doig, EMPIRE, supra n. 26 (2001); as well as lively
debate in scholarly journals.
143
Mitchell, EXPERIMENT, supra n. 21 at 44-47.
140

40

with defined jurisdiction over government corporations.144 While these reforms focused
on the budgetary autonomy and discipline of government corporations, greater
transparency in this area will shed light on the operating practices of government
corporations. The recent financial crisis has inspired at least one scholar to query if the
Progressive ideal of “efficiency” in a businesslike government remains relevant, and to
propose that government corporations look to the alternative business model of
“sustainable development,” incorporating social, community, and environmental
concerns into the corporate mission – effectively inversing “businesslike government” to
ensure that public policy rises to at least equal the efficient bottom line as the aim of the
government corporation.145
And yet, in the midst of these attempts to fetter the autonomy of government
corporations in New York, the Progressive countercurrent resurfaced in a revisionary
analysis of Robert Moses’s career that celebrated him as “an unusually gifted public
servant who mastered the Art of Getting Things Done.”146 In the New York of the everpromised Second Avenue subway and the languorous, meandering redevelopment of the
World Trade Center site, these revisionists identified an appetite for “governmental actors
that can tame the bureaucracy and overcome the opposition” that has prevented New
York from “execut[ing] ambitious projects because of a multilayered process of citizen
and governmental review.”147 Most of these reviews, including environment, health, and
traffic analyses, did not exist in Moses’s day, and some were designed to ensure that a
future Moses could not run rampant over local opposition. This appreciation of Moses as
Alexander cutting the Gordian knot of red tape echoes some of the praise for Bloomberg,
the business executive turned mayor, and it underscores Moses’s Progressive beliefs,
which led him to create the tangle of government corporations through which he
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transformed the city: “Putting his trust in experts, he doubted the capacity of democratic
methods to arrive at the common good.”148 This realpolitik assessment echoes the
justifications for the latitude traditionally granted government corporations going back to
Wilson – it is better to trust the professional civil servant dedicated to the long-term
common good than the fickle passions of the masses.
While praising Moses’s efficiency, the revisionists also question the charge that
Moses was unaccountable to the electorate. As a prominent urban historian who praised
the revision put it: “anyone knowledgeable about the complexities of government knows
that [Moses] acted within the legal and structural constraints imposed by the
representative system of American government. He did not force his projects down the
throat of an unwilling city.”149 Similar statements could be made of New London and
NLDC, as Justices Stevens and Kennedy effectively did – the elected officials approved
the plan and authorized the government corporation to implement it.
But surely this view glosses over the fact that the use of government corporations
to “Get Things Done” privileges certain players with knowledge, power and connections
over the ordinary citizen, just as the rigid focus on free speech in campaign finance
overlooks the disparity between corporations and individual voters – everyone can speak,
but certain voices are louder than most others.150 Government corporations introduce an
intermediary between the public and private spheres, blurring the boundaries of
responsibility, especially in real estate development where secrecy is a vital part of
negotiating strategy. Influential private interests can use privileged contacts with the
government corporation to advance their interests, cloaked in the “independent” technical
judgment of the government corporation, while politicians can assert plausible deniability
of influence over their decisions based on their following the expert professional advice
of the government corporations.
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III. Baltimore: Is the Baltimore Development Corporation a Public or Private Entity?
The BDC has raised similar concerns about the appropriate balance between
efficiency

and

accountability

in

government

corporations

overseeing

urban

redevelopment since its 1991 formation as the agent of Baltimore City (City) for
economic development and urban redevelopment.151 Criticisms of the lack of
transparency in the BDC’s operations, and the BDC’s asserted exemption, as a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit corporation, from laws governing public entities, have dogged the BDC since
its creation two decades ago, and led to a series of cases in which the Maryland Court of
Appeals considered the role of the BDC in managing public-private partnerships for the
City and attempted to distinguish between the “public” and “private” spheres in urban
redevelopment projects. Two recent cases in particular highlight the ambiguous status
granted the BDC by the Court of Appeals, both deriving from the proposed
redevelopment of the Westside “Superblock” under an Urban Renewal Plan, the largest
urban renewal project in Baltimore since the Inner Harbor152, proposed by the BDC and
approved by the City Council, which delegated the implementation of the plan to the
BDC.
When the BDC, upon review of proposals by various entities to redevelop parts of
the Superblock, submitted a final recommendation to the Board of Estimates that the vast
majority of the Superblock be developed by a single entity (Lexington Square Partners,
LLC) with only minor roles for three other developers, one of the passed-over developers
requested the records of the BDC’s deliberations proceeding this final recommendation.
In response to the BDC’s refusal to release documents and minutes of meetings relevant
to this final recommendation, based on the BDC’s assertion that as a “private, non-profit
corporation” it was not subject to the Maryland Open Meetings Act (OMA) or Maryland
Public Information Act (MPIA), the spurned developer sued the BDC to force the release
of the requested records, claiming that the BDC was a “public body” subject to the OMA
and an “instrumentality” of the City subject to the MPIA.153
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Superblock Litigation I: the Carmel case
In City of Baltimore Development Corporation v. Carmel Realty Associates, the
Court of Appeals held that the BDC was subject to both the OMA and MPIA. 359 Md.
299 (2006). The court focused on the BDC’s authority to exercise eminent domain to
implement the Superblock Urban Renewal Plan, authority that the BDC enjoyed solely as
a part of the City’s exercise of its eminent domain powers. Id. at 317. Since eminent
domain, even if legally permitted, threatened a constitutionally protected right to private
property, the court emphasized that the process of exercising eminent domain “should be
even more open to public scrutiny, especially when the property might ultimately be
conveyed to other private parties.” Id. at 317-18, 333.

The court quoted Justice

O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo that called for “[a]n external, judicial check on how the
public use requirement is interpreted,” notwithstanding the considerable deference the
courts owe legislatures to determine “what governmental activities will advantage the
public,” because of the difficulty of determining “the line between ‘public’ and ‘private’
property use.” Id at 317 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496-97, (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
This focus on the uniquely public power of eminent domain authority recognized that it is
the key benefit that government redevelopment corporations provide their private
partners, and that that potential for abuse of this public power by private interests requires
a concomitant need for transparency in the exercise of eminent domain.
The court held that the BDC was a “public body” as defined by the OMA because
the mayor controls the nomination, appointment, and removal of directors from the
BDC’s board under the BDC’s 1997 bylaws. Carmel, 395 Md. at 326. The court rejected
the BDC’s claim that the method of creation of the BDC – as a private corporation, and
not by statute, charter provision, ordinance, executive order or other direct governmental
act – was the sole determinant of qualification as a “public body” under Section 10502(h)(1)(i) of the OMA. Id. at 323, citing MD. ANN. CODE, STATE GOV’T, §10502(h)(1)(i). Instead, the court held that the plain meaning of Section 10-502(h)(2)(i) of
the OMA expanded the definition of “public body” subject to the OMA to include entities
appointed by a chief executive of a political subdivision. Id at 324, citing MD. ANN.
CODE, STATE GOV’T, §10-502(h)(2)(i). The BDC therefore qualified as a “public body”
not only due to the mayoral control but also because of its numerous public traits,
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including the broad range of responsibilities performed by the BDC for the City and the
City’s contribution of over 80% of the BDC’s budget. Id. at 329-30.
These same public traits led the court to declare that the BDC was subject to the
MPIA as an “instrumentality” of the City because the court found that “[t]he BDC was
clearly established, and is maintained, as an agent or tool of Baltimore City in order to
accomplish the City’s ends or purposes.” Id. at 334.

Moreover, the City retained

sufficient substantial control over the BDC to render the method of creation of the BDC
(as a private corporation and not by a governmental act – although the court noted that
three of the four founding directors were members of the mayor’s staff (Id. at 308 n. 6,
323)) irrelevant in holding that the BDC was an instrumentality of the City, further
confirmed by the City’s use of the City Solicitor to defend the BDC. Id. at 335-36.
Central to the Carmel court’s reasoning was the intent of the General Assembly in
enacting both the OMA – to “assure the public right to observe the deliberative process
and the making of decision by the public body at open meetings” (Id. at 321 (quoting
New Carrolton v. Rogers, 287 Md. 56, 72-73 (1980))) - and the MPIA – to give citizens
“wide-ranging access to public information concerning the operation of their
government” (Id. at 333 (quoting Caffrey v. Department of Liquor Control for
Montgomery Co., 370 Md. 272, 305 (2002) (citations omitted)(quotations omitted)). To
assure compliance with this legislative intent, the judiciary must construe these statutes
“so as to frustrate all evasive devices.” Id. at 321 (quoting New Carrolton, 287 Md. 56,
72-73 (1980))). “It is, therefore, the deliberative and decision-making process in its
entirety which must be conducted in meetings open to the public, since every step of the
process, including the final decision itself, constitutes the consideration or transaction of
public business.” Id. (italics added). The court evinced frustration at the perceived
pattern of attempts by the City and the BDC to evade the requirements of the OMA and
MPIA, summing up its systematic and extensive analysis of the application of the OMA
and MPIA to the BDC with a table of the public traits of the BDC that visually
“demonstrat[ed] the extent to which the BDC has been able to cloak the business of the
Citizens of the City of Baltimore behind the veil of a supposedly private corporation.” Id.
at 329-30. This concern to ensure that the ruling leave no wiggle room for the BDC and
the City to avoid compliance with the OMA and MPIA reflected not only the specious
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arguments of the City and BDC in these proceedings, but also the City’s persistent efforts
to exempt its economic development arms from public scrutiny under the OMA and
MPIA in a twenty-year cat-and-mouse game with legislators, media organizations, and
transparency activists.

Historical Debates over BDC’s Identity as a Public or Private Entity
The creation of the BDC itself may have been partly due to concern with the
closed-door operations of the BDC’s predecessor, the Charles Center-Inner Harbor
Management Corporation (CC-IH) by members of the City Council. In June 1989, the
Council, outraged at CC-IH’s refusal to release the report of its Architectural Review
Board on CC-IH’s proposed waiver of Inner Harbor height restrictions for the IBM/T.
Rowe Price building at 100 East Pratt Street, slashed the Mayor’s proposed contribution
to CC-IH’s budget by 50%.154 The Council, upset at being forced to choose between
granting the height waiver or losing a city employer, sought to change CC-IH’s operating
method to permit more discussion earlier in the process, and so put the missing 50% in
escrow for CC-IH to request from the Council in six months if it could show
improvement (the Council did release the remainder in a supplemental appropriation.155
The Council’s action occurred just as CC-IH merged with the Market Center
Development Corporation to become Center City-Inner Harbor Development, Inc. (CCIH Development), merging responsibility for the economic development of the central
business district and citywide industrial economic development.156 Within months of the
Council’s action, Al Copp, the head of CC-IH Development who pushed for the
IBM/T.Rowe Price height waiver resigned, and his successor (and predecessor), Walter
Sondheim, Jr., changed his decades long-advocated view that CC-IH, as a private entity,
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could close its meetings to the public when he permitted press to attend the meetings of
CC-IH’s Architectural Review Board, the catalyst for the City Council’s action.157
In 1991, a year later, in response to a lobbying effort by media organizations, the
General Assembly strengthened the OMA with a broad introductory purpose statement,
and with revisions to explicitly cover advisory panels appointed by chief executives of
political subdivisions (the provision that the Court of Appeals ruled applied to the BDC
in Carmel) and to create an Open Meetings Compliance Board to provide advisory
opinions of the jurisdiction of the OMA.158 This revision to the OMA may have survived
the opposition of the Maryland Association of Counties and the Maryland Municipal
League because of an exception added by the House permitting closed meetings to
discuss negotiating strategies by the “public body” before opening bids or awarding a
contract.159 MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T, §10-508(a)(14). Governor Schaefer signed
the bill despite the law’s declared intent to cover gubernatorial advisory commissions, but
tempered its effect by appointing representatives of quasi-public corporations now
subject to the OMA to the newly created three-member Open Meetings Compliance
Board – Sondheim, who also served as chair, and Courtney McKeldin, a public-relations
manager for the City’s quasi-public Baltimore Area Convention and Visitors Association,
Inc. (BACVA).160 Three months after Schaefer signed the OMA revision, the City
incorporated a new entity, the Baltimore City Development Corporation, into which it
merged CC-IH and the Baltimore Economic Development Corporation two months later
as the City of Baltimore Development Corporation.161 Although this merger was part of
Mayor Schmoke’s revision of the City’s economic development policy, the timing
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suggests that a desire to avoid the just-enacted expanded reach of the OMA influenced
the decision to create a new corporate entity instead of retaining the old entity.162
Any hope by transparency activists that this expanded OMA definitively
established its jurisdiction over quasi-public entities like the BDC and CC-IH was
quashed by a 1996 decision by the Open Meetings Compliance Board (Compliance
Board). Upholding BACVA’s claim to not be a “public body” subject to the OMA, the
Compliance Board (including McKeldin, a BACVA employee) focused on the method of
creation of BACVA, incorporated “just as any other private corporation” and not created
by a “formal” government act. Open Meetings Compliance Board Opinion No. 96-14 at
198 (Dec. 19, 1996).163 The Compliance Board emphasized that the BACVA board,
thirteen years after incorporation, voluntarily granted the mayor the power to appoint and
control the board, and that the BACVA directors – both those who ceded direct control to
the mayor and those appointed by the mayor - had a fiduciary duty to the corporation, not
to the City. Id. at 200. Therefore, the mayor’s appointment of the entire board of
directors, the City’s contribution of most of BACVA’s funds, and the essential shared
goals of BACVA and the City was irrelevant, according to the Compliance Board. Id. at
200. Moreover, the Compliance Board ruled that “board” as used by the revised OMA
referred only to “governmental boards” and not to corporate entities with “boards” of
directors like BACVA or the BDC, based on the General Assembly’s rejection of the
original definition of “public body” as “any multimember governing body of any
corporation,” replaced in the final 1991 bill by “any multimember board, commission, or
committee appointed by the Governor or the chief executive authority of a political
subdivision of the State.” Id. at 199-200. Nonetheless, the Compliance Board recognized
the legalistic contortions of its interpretation in concluding that BACVA “is in reality an
instrumentality of City policy,” even though not legally subject to the OMA, and so “wise
policy” called for BACVA to be more transparent to the public. Id. at 200.
This contradiction between the “reality” and the Compliance Board’s legalistic
interpretation of the OMA’s reach to privately incorporated entities serving public
purposes returned to the spotlight three months later, in March 1997, when budget cuts
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forced the Enoch Pratt Free Library to cut branches. The Library board refused to release
minutes of its meetings, asserting its exemption from the OMA and MPIA as a private
corporation, not a “public body,” along the lines of the Compliance Board’s 1996
ruling.164 That same spring a bill introduced in the Maryland Senate to expand the
OMA’s definition of “public body” to include “A private entity that, during the fiscal
year in which a meeting is held: 1. will receive the proceeds of a state bond; or 2. receives
funding in the state budget.”165 Although this bill, presumably aimed at the Pratt but
applicable to other quasi public entities like the BDC, ultimately did not pass the
Assembly, the Library controversy led to a ruling of an administrative judge of the
Baltimore City Circuit Court that the Enoch Pratt Library was a “public body” subject to
the OMA.166 Friends of the Enoch Pratt Library Saint Paul St. Branch v. Board of Trs. of
the Enoch Pratt Free Library, Case No. 97238001 CC5338 (Circuit Court, Baltimore
City, Sept. 18, 1997) (Kaplan, J.). The judge ruled that the City’s ownership of all of the
Library’s buildings and contribution of over 90% of its budget made the Library a “public
body,” an interpretation that contradicted the Compliance Board’s 1996 decision, and that
forecast the expansion of the jurisdiction of the OMA to other quasi-public entities
including the BDC.167
Within weeks of this ruling, the BDC amended its bylaws to distance its board of
directors from direct mayoral control, likely aimed at reinforcing the BDC’s claim to not
be a “public body” subject to the OMA following the logic of the Compliance Board’s
1996 ruling on BACVA.168 Carmel, 395 Md. 299, 325 n. 17. Under the previous bylaws,
the BDC board had five members, at least three of whom were mayoral appointed city
employees: the Mayor’s chief of staff, the City Director of Finance, and the
Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD),
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plus the president of the corporation and one additional board member).169

This

organization, nominally independent but effectively mayoral controlled, appears
patterned on the composition of the similarly mayor-controlled Board of Estimates, made
up of the mayor and two mayoral appointed city employees (the City Solicitor and
Director of Public Works), together with the City Council President and Comptroller.170
Under the amended bylaws, the BDC board expanded to include up to 15 members, of
whom only two were mayoral appointed city employees (Director of Finance and DHCD
Commissioner), and the board itself elected new members, although from candidates
nominated by the mayor, who retained the authority to remove directors directly or
through the Board of Estimates. Carmel, 395 Md. 299, 325 n. 17. The mayor also
selected the chair of the BDC board.171 Although one impetus for the board
reorganization was to incorporate more private-sector representatives and make it more
business-like (as recommended by a mayoral advisory panel in late 1995, and adopted
over the course of the following year by Mayor Schmoke and his new BDC president, M.
Jay Brodie, a member of the 1995 advisory panel), the timing of the amended bylaws so
soon after the Enoch Pratt decision suggested a prophylactic effort to ensure that the
BDC appear more “private” and so avoid the jurisdiction of the OMA.172 By nominally
separating the new board from direct mayoral control (an anonymous BDC insider had
characterized the original five-member board as not intended to be a “working board,”
but only “set up for legal purposes”173), the bylaw amendment adopted the logic of the
Compliance Board’s 1996 opinion that board members owed a fiduciary duty to the
board, not the mayor. This bylaw amendment further codified the formal organization of
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the BDC around the board initiated in 1996 by Brodie, reinforcing the shuffle in the
BDC’s hierarchy whereby the president, and employees, reported to the board instead of
to the mayor directly as originally structured.174 Indeed, the City later used a similar
argument – that the BDC was not a “public body” because the BDC board itself, not the
mayor, elected new board members - in its Carmel appellate brief. Brief of Petitioner at
12 n. 1, Carmel, 395 Md. 299.
The very next year, 1998, in what appears to have been a response to the
confusion created by the dissonant rulings by the Compliance Board on BACVA and the
Circuit Court on the Library, a newly-appointed Baltimore state senator, Joan Conway,
introduced a bill to amend the OMA’s definition of “public body” to include “any
Maryland corporation that is governed by a governing body at least 50% of whose
members are required by the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws to be
appointees of a public officer or employee.”175 This bill thus directly reacted to the
Compliance Board’s ruling that the mayor’s effective control of the BACVA board was
not determinative of its status as a “public body,” and would have extended the OMA to
most quasi-public entities. Open Meetings Compliance Board Opinion No. 96-14 at 200
(Dec. 19, 1996). Indeed the Compliance Board itself wrote a letter urging passage of
Senator Conway’s bill in order to clarify the reach of the OMA. The Compliance
Board’s letter noted that the bill “is … quite modest in the change it brings about,”
because boards subject to the OMA retained the option of holding executives sessions for
the 14 exemptions provided in the OMA.176 Although the BDC probably would have
relied on the new bylaws to claim exempt status since its board was self-elected, the
mayor’s control of the candidates on whom the board could vote likely would qualify as
“appointees,” triggering OMA jurisdiction. This potential argument was not resolved
because the bill, despite passing the Senate, failed to clear the House Judiciary
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Committee by one vote. 177 This result displayed the power of the BDC and other quasipublic entities in resisting transparency requirements, but also revealed the determination
and strength of proponents of open government.
The Court of Special Appeals injected some clarity in a decision of the following
year. Andy’s Ice Cream, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 125 Md.App. 125 (1999), cert. denied
353 Md. 473 (1999). In considering the claim of the Salisbury Zoo Commission, as a
private corporation, to be exempt from the OMA, the court noted that the Court of
Appeals, a decade earlier, had highlighted the lack of Maryland legislative or common
law definitions of quasi-public entities while underscoring that the hybrid nature of such
entities required analysis of an entity’s operation, not just its formal organization. Id. at
157 n. 10 (discussing Potter v. Bethesda Fire Department, Inc., 309 Md. 347 (1990)).
Since a “private corporate form alone does not insure that the entity functions as a private
corporation,” the Court of Special Appeals held that the “Zoo Commission’s corporate
cloak … is illusory” because the Zoo Commission had sufficient public elements to
render it subject to the OMA. Id. at 154-55. The court focused on the degree of control
exercised by the Salisbury’s mayor and council, in particular over the Zoo Commission’s
actions, budget, bylaws, appointment and termination of board members, and dissolution.
Id. at 158. This focus on the governmental control instead of the corporate form of the
Zoo Commission echoed the Enoch Pratt ruling, while implicitly critiquing the
Compliance Board’s 1996 BACVA opinion.

The court did state that the Zoo

Commission had more public attributes than BACVA, especially the directness of control
by politicians over the Zoo Commission in contrast to the greater autonomy enjoyed by
BACVA. Id. at 152-53. Nevertheless, the court challenged the Compliance Board’s use
of the changed language in the 1991 OMA revision to determine legislative intent, noting
the difficulty of determining the precise reason for a change in language of the 1991
revision or for the failure of the 1997 and 1999 bills. Id. at 153-54. While accepting the
Compliance Board’s definition of the OMA as applying to “governmental or quasigovernmental ‘board[s], commission[s], or committee[s]’,” the court rejected the
Compliance Board’s assertion that that this definition excluded all “publicly funded
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private corporations.” Id. at 154 (quoting Compliance Board Opinion 96-14 at 199,
quoting MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV’T §10-502(h)(2)). Instead, the court emphasized
that quasi-public entities would be subject to the OMA, based on “a determination of the
extent to which the controlled entity actually carries on public business,” because to
exempt all private corporations would be “an invitation to great mischief” by permitting
“the government to operate outside of the view of the public through private
corporations.” Id. at 154. Yet despite the precedential and binding nature of this ruling,
unlike those of the Compliance Board or the Circuit Court, it only partly clarified the
limits of the OMA’s jurisdiction over quasi-public entities like the BDC since it was
limited to the circumstances of Salisbury’s Zoo Commission.
Two attempts to demarcate the OMA’s jurisdiction more precisely were
introduced in the Maryland Senate the next year, presumably partly in response to this
analysis of the Court of Special Appeals. Senator Conway reintroduced her 1998 bill
clarifying that any corporation with bylaws requiring at least half of the board to be
public appointees be subject to the OMA.178 Senator Della, peeved at the BDC’s
intransigence in releasing information about negotiations over the waiver of height
restrictions and tax-abatement subsidies for the Ritz-Carlton development in his Federal
Hill district, introduced a bill to include the BDC specifically among the entities covered
by the OMA and the MPIA.179 Supporters of the bill included business owners threatened
with displacement by the Westside Superblock project and neighbors of proposed
projects elsewhere in the city, who sought increased transparency in the negotiations and
planning process for these major economic development projects.180
The BDC lobbied hard against both bills, warning that the proposed transparency
requirements would hamper the efficacy of the BDC’s economic development efforts for
the city, render them uncompetitive, and hurt the city’s economy. The chair of the BDC
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board, Roger Lipitz, asserted that subjecting the BDC to the OMA would be futile since
“virtually the entire agenda that the BDC’s Board” considers would qualify for the OMA
exemption for discussion of economic development or real estate purchases for public
purposes, and that the appropriate venue for public knowledge of negotiations and
planning was when the City Council and or Board of Estimates voted on the BDC’s
proposals.181 BDC President Brodie echoed these points in his testimony before the
Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee, arguing that using the OMA
exemption would deter private-sector leaders from serving on the BDC board, since a
majority of the board would have to approve any executive sessions and because board
meetings would be fractured by having to separate discussions between open and closed
meetings. Brodie asserted that actions funded by private contributions to the BDC should
be exempted from the OMA, and that public funded operations were supervised by the
City Council and Board of Estimates.182
Neither Lipitz nor Brodie expressed concern that the commingling of private and
public funds might justify additional transparency and accountability requirements to
ensure that private interests did not leverage small contributions to control the BDC’s
publicly funded operations. Despite the initiative of Brodie and Lipitz to create a private
economic development fund for the BDC starting in 1997, the City’s annual contribution
to the BDC’s budget remained almost 90%, with the remainder split between other public
sources and private contributions.183 Nor did Brodie or Lipitz address the concern that
postponing public access to the planning and negotiation process until a final plan was
proposed to the City Council or Board of Estimates drastically reduced the opportunity to
shape the final proposal with alternatives – the concern expressed by Council members
with CC-IH’s forcing the height waiver for the IBM/T. Rowe Price building at 100 East
Pratt Street in 1989, as well as by Enoch Pratt patrons seeking to participate in how the
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Library structure its budget cuts. Most surprising was Brodie’s assertion that requiring a
majority of board members to approve an executive session, or to structure the board
agenda to separate topics to be discussed in open or closed sessions, would deter private
sector leaders from participating. The speciousness of this argument echoed the
contradiction between the strenuous opposition by the BDC and City to these bills as
crippling economic development efforts on the one hand, and statements by Brodie and
Mayor Schmoke that extending the OMA to the BDC would have little to no effect given
the OMA exemption for economic development efforts on the other.184
The full-court press by the BDC and the City succeeded in killing the BDCspecific bill in the Senate committee, but Senator Conway’s bill passed the same
committee and the Senate (the unanimous vote against the BDC-bill included five
sponsors of Conway’s bill, suggesting that the defeat of the BDC-specific bill had less to
do with ideological opposition and more to do with procedural strategy).185 Nevertheless,
Conway’s bill died in the House of Delegates, just as its previous incarnation had in
1998.186
Perhaps emboldened by this success, at the end of 2000, the newly elected Mayor
O’Malley expanded his direct influence on the BDC board by appointing his newly
appointed deputy mayor for economic and neighborhood development, Laurie Schwartz,
to serve on the BDC board (presumably by having the BDC board elect her upon his
nomination).187 Schwartz had previously founded and directed another city quasi-public
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entity, the Downtown Partnership (DP), for which she had asserted exemption from the
OMA as a private entity, even though 85% of the DP’s budget came from a municipal
special district tax.188 In April 2001, O’Malley added his director of Minority Business
Development to the BDC board, so that four of the sixteen board members were at-will
employees of the mayor. O’Malley defended his increased direct control over the BDC
board as providing accountability for the BDC - “the board is controlled by a publicly
elected mayor” - even as he defended the BDC’s claimed exemption from the OMA.189
Indeed, he echoed the Compliance Board’s 1996 analysis that BACVA was “in reality an
instrumentality of City policy” in describing the BDC’s status – “How ‘quasi’ has it ever
been? My gut reaction is that they’d better [vote with me] or they’d better find another
board to sit on.”190
The issue of mayoral control over a quasi-public corporation was central to the
Compliance Board’s analysis when it re-examined BACVA’s status under the OMA in
2003 in light of the Andy’s Ice Cream decision. Open Meetings Compliance Board
Opinion No. 03-7 at 291 (June 6, 2003). The Compliance Board interpreted the Andy’s
Ice Cream ruling extremely narrowly, ignoring the Court of Special Appeals’ emphasis
on the purpose of the OMA and concern that governments not “use the private
corporation form as a parasol to avoid the statutorily-imposed sunshine of the Open
Meetings Act.” Andy’s Ice Cream, 125 Md. App. 155 (quoted in Compliance Board
Opinion No. 03-7 at 289). The Compliance Board limited its analysis to whether the City
of Baltimore had less “direct and ongoing” control over BACVA than the City of
Salisbury had over the Zoo Commission, instead of considering if the degree of control
that the City of Baltimore exercised was sufficient to trigger compliance with the OMA.
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Compliance Board Opinion No. 03-7 at 291, 292 n. 12. Within this framework, the
Compliance Board viewed the mayor’s control of the appointment of the BACVA board
and chair as less than the “explicit control” that Salisbury had over the Zoo Commission,
which could be dissolved by Salisbury at will, whereas BACVA’s corporate articles
provided for perpetual succession so that the BACVA board had control corporate
governance. Id. at 291-92. The Compliance Board ruled that the City’s contribution of
the vast majority of BACVA’s budget (89% of BACVA’s 1999 fiscal year proposed
operations191) was irrelevant given that the mayor had “to rely on the good will of the
board to achieve [Baltimore]’s objectives” because of the limited “direct and ongoing
control … built into the articles of incorporation and by-laws” of BACVA – merely the
power to appoint the entire BACVA board, which included a member of the City
Council. Id. at 291, 292 n. 12. BACVA’s exempt status was so clear to the Compliance
Board that it did not repeat its prior statement that BACVA was “in reality an
instrumentality of City policy” (Compliance Board Opinion No. 96-14 at 200), instead
declaring that the mayor’s control of appointments to the board was insufficient to
transform “BACVA into a City instrumentality.” Compliance Board Opinion No. 03-7 at
292.
The Compliance Board did not repeat its prior interpretation of the failed attempts
to revise the OMA in the General Assembly, perhaps due to the cold water thrown on that
practice by the Court of Special Appeals in Andy’s Ice Cream. However, the Compliance
Board did cite BACVA’s argument supporting its claim to maintain its exemption that
the General Assembly had decided not to revise the OMA in light of Andy’s Ice Cream.
Id. at 286. The following year, 2004, the General Assembly did consider three bills to
tighten the OMA – i) to remove the exemption for “executive function” meetings meant
for administrative housekeeping in response to perceived abuse of this exemption; ii) to
expand the definition of “public body” to include “a multimember board, commission, or
committee” whose members were appointed by an “official subject to the policy direction
of the Governor or chief executive of a political subdivision” (previously only if directly
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appointed by Governor or chief executive) to incorporate advisory panels appointed by a
department head; and iii) to clarify the standing to sue for infringement of the OMA in
light of a recent court decision limiting standing to individuals “affected adversely” by
the alleged infringement.192

Although many, including Sondheim, recognized the

potential for abuse of the “executive function” exemption which did not require
publication of issues to be discussed, even the media industry failed to rally for the bill
for fear it would harm legitimate uses and called instead for a study of how the exemption
had been used.193 The other two bills, which significantly expanded the reach of the
OMA, especially in explicitly removing any standing requirement, both passed
overwhelmingly and became law, signifying the General Assembly’s continued
commitment to the principles of public transparency.194
A similar concern about the perils of backroom dealings led two City Councilmen
to propose bills requiring greater transparency and accountability by the BDC, echoing
the Council’s frustration with the BDC’s predecessor fifteen years earlier. Incensed by
the BDC’s sale of two properties to private developers for less than half of their appraised
value, Councilman Curran conducted investigations revealing that one of the developers
owed the City over $150,000 in back rent, taxes and penalties, and that the BDC had
lowered the price on one parcel to reflect the city-owned alley bisecting the parcel, only
to transfer the alley to the developer for free after the sale.195 Curran criticized the BDC’s
justification that the appraisals were out of date (2-3 years between appraisal and sale)
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and introduced a bill requiring an appraisal of all City properties within the six months
prior to disposition.196 Curran’s bill would have merely codified existing City policy,
which not only the BDC but also the Board of Estimates (including the Comptroller,
whose office had proposed this policy) had ignored in these sales.197 Nonetheless, after
the BDC joined the Departments of Public Works and Housing and Community
Development in opposing the bill, despite a favorable report from the City Solicitor, the
bill languished in the Council for two years before failing in 2007.198
The other Council bill, which became law, more clearly bound the BDC within
the City’s bureaucratic web by subjecting the BDC to compliance with the Baltimore
City Public Ethics Code (Article 8 of the Baltimore City Code).199 This bill was most
likely inspired by the BDC’s chief operating officer, Sharon Grinnell, who left to work
for one of the developers whose bargain purchase of city land was investigated by
Councilman Curran, a property that Grinnell had supervised as the BDC’s west-side
coordinator.200 The BDC had previously agreed to abide by the Ethics Code, even as it
claimed that the code “does not technically apply” to the BDC.201

BDC v. Carmel: Conclusion to Debate over BDC’s Public/Private Status
It was against this backdrop of cat-and-mouse attempts to increase transparency in
quasi-public entities and efforts by those entities to circumvent broader definitions of
“public” entities that the owners of properties to be condemned for the Superblock
redevelopment sued the BDC for using closed meetings to determine its final
recommendation to the Board of Estimates on how to develop the Superblock. In June of
2005, the trial court ruled in favor of the BDC, following the Compliance Board’s
interpretation of Andy’s Ice Cream in its 2003 decision that viewed the Salisbury Zoo
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Commission’s “public” characteristics to be the minimum requirements of a “public
body” – in particular, the degree and type of control exercised by Salisbury over the Zoo
Commission. Carmel Realty Assocs. v. City of Baltimore Dev. Corp., No. 24-C-04008608 at 12-15 (Circuit Court, Baltimore City, June 8, 2005) (Pierson, J).202 In the
court’s view, the BDC was not an instrumentality of the City because the City lacked
control over the BDC’s creation, budget, actions, existence, bylaws or election of board
members. Id. at 14-15. The court rejected as irrelevant evidence of the City’s control including the BDC’s declaration that it was “chartered by the City,” that it “is the
economic development agency for the city of Baltimore,” that the City’s website
identifies the BDC’s president as a member of the mayor’s cabinet, and that the BDC’s
president stated publicly that 87% of the BDC’s annual budget came from the City –
because are “statements” and not “operative facts” evidencing the City’s control of the
BDC. Id. at 4, 14.
The BDC’s response to this ruling, as represented by the Assistant City Solicitor
that defended the purportedly “private” nature of the BDC, echoed the revisionists’ views
of Robert Moses’s effect on New York City: “The BDC has been doing good work for
the city of Baltimore for almost 50 years, and there’s a certain sense at the BDC and here
at the city that if it ain’t broken, don’t fix it. This is a good development for the city
because it allows a good arrangement to keep going as it’s been going for a long time.”203
An opponent agreed with the background premise of this statement – that the City was
using the BDC – pointing out that “the BDC was represented by a city attorney. I don’t
think a city attorney would represent me if I asked them.”204
In reversing the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Special Appeals explicitly
rejected the Compliance Board’s interpretation of Andy’s Ice Cream as establishing the
minimum “direct control” by a government to trigger compliance with the OMA: “The
degree of control by the City over the Zoo Commission provides little or no guidance in
deciding the question of control by the Mayor and Council over the BDC. Each case
must stand or fall on an evaluation of the component parts of the final product.” Carmel
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Realty Assocs. v. City of Baltimore Dev. Corp., No. 682 at 10 (January 24, 2006).205 As it
had in Andy’s Ice Cream, the court emphasized the policy intent of the OMA, and MPIA,
as expressing the General Assembly’s commitment to public access to deliberations of
public officials conducting public business. Id. at 11. In light of this clear public policy
directive, public disclosure enjoys a presumption over the assertion of private corporate
status where the degree of governmental control is “fairly debatable, as it is in this case.”
Id. at 13. The court rejected the BDC’s argument that the board, not the mayor, elect
board members as “technically correct, but visionary,” given that all board members must
have been nominated by the mayor, who also has the authority to remove members
without cause – a view consonant with that expressed by Mayor O’Malley back in 2001.
The court rejected the emphasis on the method of creation of the BDC, holding instead
that “when a private corporation’s own governing documents give a right of control to the
government, then the Board’s meetings are subject to the Open Meetings Act.” Id. at 14.
Fundamentally, the “BDC is acting as a quasi-public corporation carrying on public
business to a degree that is inconsistent with its claim of being a private corporation.” Id.
at 14.
Despite the ruling’s clear statement in favor of transparency, however, the Court
of Special Appeals took care to soften its effect, emphasizing that “[t]here is no issue of
fault-finding or criticism of BDC’s management of the urban renewal projects on behalf
of Baltimore City,” which “benefitted from BDC’s efforts” (albeit “at the cost of a huge
investment of public funds funneled through BDC by the City”). Id. at 13. Moreover,
the court hastened to minimize the effects of its ruling, asserting that “[c]ompliance with
the Open Meetings Act will not unduly interfere with BDC’s operating as a public body”
because of the OMA’s numerous exemptions permitting closed sessions. Id. at 13. Most
importantly, the court decided to release the decision without reporting it, stripping it of
precedential value so that it only affected the BDC and not the numerous other quasipublic entities in Maryland.206 Despite these limitations, the BDC appealed the decision,
with BDC president Brodie justifying secret closed-door meetings as “a very effective
mechanism to do economic development,” while inadvertently underscoring the
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exclusively public nature of the BDC: it is unlike “traditional city agencies,” even
though “our single client is the city, and virtually our single [funding source] is the
city.”207
A unanimous Court of Appeals disregarded the assertions of the BDC and City
that secrecy was a necessary cost to achieve effective economic development and instead
forcefully rejected the BDC’s claim not to be a “public body” or “instrumentality” of the
City, as discussed above. The definitiveness and detailed analysis of the opinion, which
established precedent as a published opinion, contrasted with the gentle rebuke of the
unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. This clear statement by the Court of
Appeals that public policy favored disclosure was “unprecedented” among state supreme
courts in applying “sunshine” laws requiring open meetings to quasi-public development
corporations.208 Yet despite the clarity of the ruling, BDC president Brodie quickly
contradicted his pre-decision claims that compliance with the OMA and MPIA “would be
inhibiting,” instead asserting that the ruling would not cause the BDC to change its
operations significantly because “ninety percent of what we do is probably exempt.”209

Superblock Litigation II: 120 West Fayette Street v. Baltimore
Inspired perhaps by Brodie’s apparent intransigence, as well as by the complaints
of the businesses to be relocated by the Superblock redevelopment, a majority of the City
Council sponsored a bill to require the BDC to comply with the City’s procurement
procedures, “as if the [BDC] were an agency or unit of City government,” in February
2007, four months after the Court of Appeals issued its Carmel opinion.210 This bill
would have applied “to every request or solicitation for quotes, bids, or proposals and
every contract for the purchase of goods or services or for the purchase, sale,
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development, or redevelopment of property that is made or proposed by the [BDC] or
recommended to the City or others by the [BDC].”211 At a single stroke, this bill would
have brought the BDC’s negotiations out of the shadows by publicly defining the
procedures and limits of authority of the BDC in advising and contracting for the City,
instead of the nebulous authority claimed by the BDC based on unspecified contracts
with the City. As importantly, by enmeshing the BDC within the same legal framework
that governed all City agencies (echoing the 2005 bill imposing Ethics Code compliance
on the BDC and building on the Carmel ruling), the bill effectively signaled the end of
the BDC’s assertion to act for, but not be part of, City government – to have the authority
without the responsibility.

As with previous attempts to corral the BDC into the

government sphere, however, the BDC and its supporters beat back this effort, with
unfavorable reports by the BDC, City Solicitor, and Department of Finance leading to the
abandonment of the bill at the end of the Council term that December.212 The bill’s
opponents likely cited the lawsuit filed against the BDC and City by opponents of the
Superblock development the day after the bill was introduced, especially since the City
moved for summary judgment a week before the various departments issued the
unfavorable reports on the bill.213
This lawsuit, 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309
(2010), became the second case in which the Court of Appeals confronted the issue of
balancing the accountability of the BDC’s redevelopment efforts through increased
public transparency against the efficiency of those efforts that the BDC and City claimed
required non-disclosure grew out of the Superblock project and the Carmel litigation. The
opponents of the Superblock sought to expand the “public” realm of the BDC’s
redevelopment activities beyond compliance with the OMA and MPIA by challenging
the City’s delegation of negotiating authority to the BDC and asserting that the City
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failed to conduct the negotiations over the Superblock redevelopment under City Charter
provisions requiring the awarding of “public works” contracts to the lowest bidder. 120
W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 413 Md. 309, 322 (2010). The opponents
claimed that the BDC’s management of the bidding process for the Superblock
redevelopment - including awarding an exclusive negotiating privilege to a specific
developer for over two years to prepare a Land Disposition Agreement (Agreement) that
changed terms of the original request for proposal (parcels to be developed, sale price,
and developer’s partners) - exceeded the “administrative and ministerial” powers legally
permissible for the City to delegate to the BDC.214 Focusing on the BDC’s status as a
privately incorporated, non-statutorily constituted entity lacking the public definition
provided to City agencies by the Charter provisions that created them, the opponents
challenged the legality of BDC’s exercise of authority on behalf of the City, which “has
no direct contract” with the BDC but instead allegedly assigned, without legislative
approval, previously executed agreements with predecessors of the BDC to the BDC.215
The BDC had usurped “discretionary” authority that only “Charter defined bodies”
possessed, alleged the opponents, by selecting the developer and subsequently
“massaging” the terms of the project without receiving formal authorization from the
City.216 The plaintiffs dismissed the Board of Estimates’ final approval of the Agreement
as merely “perfunctory” and a “mere rubber stamp” because the Board “was not offered
choices or alternatives … [but] could either approve or reject the plan which it had not
participated in developing” but which was “arranged, brokered and contrived by
BDC.”217 Moreover, claimed the opponents, changing the terms of the project after the
bidding process was closed over two years of negotiations with the chosen developer
before finalizing the Agreement for the Board of Estimates to approve violated the
competitive bidding requirements of the City Charter for “public works.”218 The
opponents’ case thus centered on the contradiction between the BDC’s assertion of public
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authority and lack of a public regulatory framework delimiting the BDC’s procedures,
responsibilities and boundaries.
After the trial court dismissed the case for lack of standing and on the merits, the
Court of Appeals intervened to grant cert directly before a review by the Court of Special
Appeals. 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. City of Baltimore, 405 Md. 290 (2008). The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that the opponents had standing both
as taxpayers and as neighboring landowners, and that the trial court’s consideration of
evidence outside of the pleadings had converted the motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment without giving the opponents the opportunity to engage in discovery.
120 W. Fayette St, 413 Md. at 323 (citing 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. City of Baltimore,
407 Md. 253, 262-65 (2009)). On remand, the trial court again dismissed the case on the
merits, holding that the BDC’s actions were only advisory because the Board of
Estimates retained the “ultimate decision-making authority.” 120 W. Fayette St., 413 Md.
at 323-34. The trial court also ruled that the competitive bidding requirements did not
apply to redevelopment projects because the City Charter authorized property disposition
for redevelopment without competitive bidding and because the Superblock
redevelopment was not a “public work” subject to a separate City Charter provision
requiring competitive bidding. 120 W. Fayette St., 413 Md. at 324.

The Source of BDC’s Authority
The Court of Appeals again interceded before the Court of Special Appeals took
up the case, this time affirming the trial court’s ruling for the BDC and the City. In stark
contrast to its Carmel opinion that had criticized the attempts of the BDC and City to
avoid public scrutiny, and so accountability, the Court now came down on the side of
efficiency and effectiveness, and so limited transparency, in public redevelopment
projects. The court held that the BDC, as a “public body” under the OMA and MPIA
according to Carmel, constituted a “suitable board, commission, department, bureau or
other agency of the Mayor and City Council” specified by Article II, §15(g) of the City
Charter. 120 W. Fayette St., 413 Md. at 348-49. As an Article II, §15(g) body, the BDC
could receive delegated authority by ordinance from the City to dispose of any land to a
private entity for a redevelopment project under Article II, §15(c) of the Charter. Id. The

65

court accepted the City’s claim that City Council Ordinance 99-423, which created the
Urban Renewal Plan for the Superblock, was the source by which the City Council and
Mayor delegated authority for the Superblock redevelopment to the BDC. Id. at 346-47;
349. Section 4 of Ordinance 99-423 provided that “the [BDC] acting pursuant to its
contract with the Mayor and City Council by and through the Department of Housing and
Community Development” (DHCD) will facilitate the interaction of “existing business
owners who express an interest in returning to the redeveloped areas … [with the]
developers selected by the City.” Id. at 347 n. 18 (quoting Ordinance 99-423, Section 4).
The court noted that an alternative authorization for the BDC’s role lay in Article 13, §27(n) of the Baltimore City Code, which permitted DHCD to contract for technical
services, “subject to the prior approval of the [Board of Estimates].” Id. at 348.
In favoring efficiency over accountability, the court emphasized that “the
magnitude and complexity of the role of modern municipal government permits
delegation subject to flexible standards as long as the process is not arbitrary and the
ultimate decision is rendered by the municipality.” Id. at 350, 351. The BDC’s actions
were only “ministerial and administrative,” and did not usurp “legislative and
discretionary functions vested exclusively in the City or the DHCD,” because the court
found that “ordinance [99-423] charged the BDC with specific tasks and established
protocols for the proposal evaluation process,” thereby preventing arbitrary action by the
BDC. Id. at 350. The Board of Estimates retained ultimate control because the Board
“could have rejected the BDC’s recommendation and requested that the BDC consider
other proposals or re-solicit proposals for the project,” and indeed did request the BDC to
amend the Agreement to include a cap on City liability for environmental and demolition
costs.

Id. at 353-54.

The court distinguished the Board of Estimate’s permissible

delegation of advisory authority to the BDC from the impermissible authority delegated
by the Board to the trustees in Hughes v. Schaefer, 294 Md. 563 (1982), where the Board
could only approve projects recommended by the trustees, “effectively giving the trustees
veto power over the [Board].” Id. at 354 (discussing and citing Hughes, 294 Md. at 66162). Yet the 120 West Fayette Street court failed to note that the Hughes court had
examined each of the contested agreements to determine if the Board had illegally
delegated power to the trustees, and indeed based on that examination of the agreements
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the Hughes court ruled that the Board had exceeded its authority only in those agreements
with a clause restricting the Board to considering only projects previously approved by
the trustees, effectively granting the trustees a “prior veto over the City’s power …
[which] the City may not do.” Hughes, 294 Md. at 656-62.
This focus on administrative effectiveness by the 120 West Fayette Street court
overlooked the messy reality of the BDC’s actions and structure of its relationship with
the City, based on the complicated history of the BDC and its long-held assertion that it
was not a public entity. Despite the trial court’s assertion that “Ordinance 99-423,
Sections 4 and 5, authorizes the BDC to issue RFPs and details the process, procedure
and time frame for the RFP,” 120 W. Fayette St., 2009 WL 4889014 (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug.
14, 2009), the ordinance did not do so, as the opponents observed.219 Instead, the
ordinance only addressed the BDC’s role in Sections 4-6, which merely assigned the
BDC three discrete tasks ancillary to the overall Superblock redevelopment: (i) to help
existing businesses participate in the redevelopment (Section 4); (ii) to promote
preservation of historic architecture by encouraging adaptive reuse (Section 5); and (iii)
to include certain interest groups (including local merchants, architecture, preservation,
and planning associations) in the redevelopment (Section 6).220 Although Section 4
referred in passing to “as soon as developers are selected by the City,” it did not describe
the procedures for bidding or selection of the developer, instead stating that these sections
committed the BDC to perform these three tasks while “acting pursuant to its contract
with the Mayor and City Council by and through the [DHCD].” 120 W. Fayette St., 413
Md. at 347 n. 18 (quoting Ordinance 99-423, §4).221 The City Council included these
three sections into the ordinance not to define the BDC’s overall role, but in an attempt to
force the BDC to be more inclusive of the public and stakeholders affected by the
redevelopment in these specific areas. Nevertheless, despite quoting Sections 4 and 5,
the Court of Appeals accepted the argument of the BDC and City that Ordinance 99-423
delegated specific authority to the BDC within defined parameters. Id.
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More surprising, the court failed to discuss, or even refer to, “the contract” that
theoretically defined the BDC’s actions and so limited the BDC to “ministerial and
administrative” tasks, a stunning omission in light of the fact that the same court, four
years earlier in Carmel, had explicitly raised this issue in discussing the BDC’s status as a
“public body”:
It is not clear exactly what contract the BDC would be acting “pursuant to” as
provided in Section 4 of Ordinance 99-423. The record contains two contracts.
The first is dated September 1, 1965 and is between the Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, and one of the BDC’s predecessor companies, Charles Center-Inner
Harbor Management, Inc [CC-IH]. The second contract is dated May 26, 2004
and is entitled “COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT-29
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY AND CITY OF BALTIMORE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.”
Carmel, 395 Md. at 311 n. 7 (capitals in the original). Either of these contracts would
present problems as providing sufficient guidance for the BDC in supervising the
Superblock development, since the 1965 contract addressed the responsibilities of CC-IH,
which had a jurisdiction limited to the Charles Center and Inner Harbor developments
that did not extend to the Superblock. The 2004 contract, assuming it addressed the
Superblock, would also be problematic as a restraint against the BDC usurping
discretionary authority as the BDC had already begun the bidding process a year earlier.
The City, in its appellate brief, implicitly recognized the lack of a clearly defined
procedure instituted by the City, whether the Mayor and City Council or the Board of
Estimates, that bound the BDC – instead placing the BDC in the driver’s seat: “[t]he
BDC's typical practice in connection with redevelopment projects ….”222 Yet the BDC’s
cult of secrecy had prevented public access to any records until the final Carmel ruling in
November 2006.223
This missing contract had been noted by the 120 W. Fayette St. trial court on
remand, which observed that despite the claims of the BDC and City to be bound by a
contract, referred to in Ordinance 99-423, that specified the parameters of the BDC’s
responsibilities and the bidding process, “neither party has presented a copy of a
contract.” 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 2009 WL 4889014, trial
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order at n. 25 (August 14, 2009). Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals overlooked this
evidentiary gap, as the trial court had, and accepted the claims of the BDC and City that
this unidentified contract established sufficiently defined standards and limits for the
BDC’s actions for the Court of Appeals to hold definitively that “[t]he BDC did not usurp
the City’s authority.” 120 W. Fayette St., 413 Md. at 352. Remarkably, both courts
agreed that despite this missing contract, no genuine dispute of material fact existed to
preclude summary judgment for the BDC and City, despite the amended complaint’s
assertion that the BDC “has no direct contract with the City.”224

The Court of Appeals similarly avoided examining the alternative authorization
process presented by the BDC and City, under Article 13, §2-7(n) of the Baltimore City
Code which empowered DHCD to hire “any private, public, or quasi-public corporation,
… or other legal entity” to provide “technical or specialized services,” “subject to the
prior approval of the [Board of Estimates].” Id. at 348 (emphasis added). Not only did
the court ignore the absence of a contract as above, but it also glossed over the
requirement that the Board, not the Mayor and City Council, approve the contract before
execution, breezily asserting that “the [Board] delegated ‘ministerial and administrative’
functions to a nonprofit corporation known as the [BDC],” quoting its earlier statement in
its first 120 W. Fayette St. ruling, which provided no reference to support this claim. 120
W. Fayette St., 413 Md. at 318 (quoting 120 W. Fayette St., 407 Md. at 258-59). The
amended complaint had raised this issue, asserting that the DHCD Commissioner’s
consent to assign previous contracts, presumably with CC-IH and other entities, to the
BDC was only “allegedly on behalf of the City.”225 This willingness to overlook the
procedural requirements, in stark contrast to the Hughes court, underscored the degree to
which the Court of Appeals focused on the need to ensure flexibility for government
administration as a prerequisite for effective economic development (the recent refusal by
courts nationwide to grant foreclosure to banks and investors that fail to produce the
contracts evidencing their rights highlights the Court of Appeals’ opposite decision to
ignore procedural requirements on broader policy principles).
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This emphasis is clear from the court’s assertion that the Board of Estimates had
complete control over the redevelopment project and could have required the BDC to
start over. While technically correct, this claim completely ignores the financial and
political realities that foreclosed any but the most minimal amendments to the BDC’s
recommended Agreement. The Board did not enjoy this freedom of action because
voiding the Agreement negotiated over two years (December 2004-December 2006) and
restarting the bidding process begun more than three years earlier (October 2003) would
have chilled interest by potential developers in any city redevelopment project, reducing
the quality and driving up the costs of redevelopment. Moreover, every member of the
Board of Estimates was a politician, or an at-will employee of a politician, aware of the
political repercussions of scrapping the largest urban renewal project since the Inner
Harbor eight years after Ordinance 99-423 initiated the redevelopment.
The City Council had faced this same problem two decades earlier, when forced
by CC-IH’s intransigence to approve the IBA/T. Rowe Price building with the height
waiver previously negotiated by CC-IH. Although the Council technically had the power
to force CC-IH to renegotiate the deal, the Council recognized the tremendous costs,
financial and political, of doing so. Instead, the Council held their noses and approved
the deal, but then cut CC-IH’s budget in an attempt to prevent future fait accompli by
having CC-IH communicate with the Council before seeking final approval.226 If the
Council had felt unable to substantially change CC-IH’s proposed agreement, which was
for a single building, how could the Board have sent the Superblock redevelopment back
to the drawing boards? The court’s citation of the Board’s amendment – the cap on City
reimbursement for environmental and demolition costs – ignored the minor nature of this
alteration in improving the City’s position. Although this cap provided clarity, it was
25% more than that estimated by the parties, and also effectively halved the sale price.227
Moreover, the developer could abandon the Agreement at will without penalty during the
three years following the Board’s approval of the Agreement, which gave the developer
the opportunity to conduct environmental due diligence to confirm the estimated
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remediation costs before committing to the redevelopment.228

Indeed the court’s

language reflected the Board’s tenuous real power – the Board “requested” this
amendment. 120 W. Fayette St., 413 Md. at 354. The Board was effectively hamstrung
by its role only at the end of the negotiation process, just as the New London City
Council found that its similar procedural final approval authority was essentially hollow
in influencing NLDC’s implementation of the Council’s redevelopment plan.229
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals relied on the formal final approval by the
Board in holding that the BDC had not usurped the City’s authority, ignoring the missing
contract required under either delegation of authority (Charter Article II, §15(g) or Code
Article 13, §2-7) – a contract that might have provided the procedural framework for the
BDC’s actions that the City Charter and Code provided City agencies. Although this
emphasis on the formal approval echoed Justice Kennedy’s focus on “elaborate
procedural requirements” in Kelo to justify judicial deference to local government, the
Court of Appeals’ willingness to trust the BDC and City, without evidence, that a
contract with sufficiently defined terms to guide the BDC in its use of delegated authority
existed, without any proof, comes close to Justice Kennedy’s scenario where the
“procedures employed [are] so prone to abuse” that a higher standard of judicial scrutiny
would be appropriate. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Superblock Agreement as Sale of Land, Not Contract for “Public Works”
The court similarly disposed of the opponents’ related claim that the BDC
violated city requirements for competitive bidding by changing the terms of the project,
after the initial RFP competition and before the Board’s final approval, during extended
negotiations with the developer to whom the BDC had granted the exclusive negotiating
privilege.

The court accepted the BDC’s and City’s framing of the redevelopment

project, as provided for in the Agreement, to be only a “sale of land for redevelopment”
by the City, rejecting the opponents’ argument that the Agreement was a broader
transaction that qualified as a “public work” – a contract for an urban renewal project in
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which the BDC and City effectively reduced the property’s sale price in exchange for
requiring the developer to develop the property in a specified manner. 120 W. Fayette St.,
413 Md. at 330-35. This choice by the court determined its decision, since the court first
ruled on the application of the competitive bidding requirements for City “procurement”
contracts under Charter Article VI, §11 to urban renewal projects in general by holding
that those projects which are sales of City property for redevelopment are not subject to
competitive bidding, even as the court refused to exempt all urban renewal projects from
competitive bidding requirements. 120 W. Fayette St., 413 Md. at 332-34. In reconciling
this competitive bidding mandate with the authority granted DHCD under Article II, §15
of the Charter (and Article 18, §2-7(f)(1) of the Code) to dispose of City property for
redevelopment without restrictions, the court held that it would be “illogical and
unreasonable” to interpret the legislative intent in enacting these two provisions as
imposing competitive bidding on DHCD’s authority to sell property because competitive
procurement bidding seeks the lowest bid, while property sales seek the highest. Id.
The court then turned to the particular circumstances of the Superblock project
and rejected the opponents’ claim that the Agreement qualified as a “public works
contract” specifically subject to competitive bidding under Charter Article VI, §11(b)
because the Agreement was only a contract to sell property, not to fund redevelopment.
Id. at 334-45. Noting that the Charter failed to define “public work,” the court adopted
the definition suggested by the City in the Maryland Prevailing Wage Law: “a structure
or work … that (i) is constructed for public use or benefit; or (ii) is paid for wholly or
partly by public money,” a dichotomy echoed by the definitions in Black’s Law
Dictionary and other states’ statutory and case law. Id. at 335-36 (quoting MD. CODE
ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC., §17-201(j) (West 2009)). The court’s decision that the
Agreement constituted a sale of land determined its negative answer to the “public funds”
branch because the court refused to consider land acquisition or business relocation as
part of the City’s costs, which the court instead held consisted only of the $21 million
sale price less the $10 million reimbursement cap for environmental and demolition costs
so the City would earn at least $11 million – and therefore no public funds would be
expended on the Superblock project. 120 W. Fayette St., 413 Md. at 339-45. Although
the City retained some control over the development post-sale (affordable housing, new
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streetscaping and other requirements), the court held that this did not transform the public
incentives (the $10 million for environmental remediation and demolition) into public
“funding” because the developer, not the City, will own the property at the conclusion of
development. Id. at 343-44. The developer’s ownership of the final redevelopment led
the court also to find that the Superblock Agreement did not satisfy the “public use or
benefit” branch since the public would have no right of access, or “use,” to the final
redevelopment. Id. at 338-39. Since the developer controlled the property and right to
income from its investment in redeveloping it, the court classified the economic
development benefits to the public as “indirect and subsidiary” to the primary benefits
accruing to the private developer, and so held that the Agreement’s primary purpose is
not for the public “benefit.” Id. at 337-38. The court therefore ruled that the Agreement
failed to satisfy the public funds or public use/benefit requirements to be a “public works
contract” and that the BDC was not required to use competitive bidding for the
Superblock project. Id. at 339.

In Defining “Public Work” the Court of Appeals Relied on Inapposite Prevailing Wage
Cases Instead of Competitive Bidding Cases
The certainty of the court’s opinion, supported by numerous citations to cases,
belied the ambiguity of defining a “public work,” particularly since this was a case of
first impression in Maryland and so the court had to rely on cases from other states that
were based on state specific statutes and case law.

The increasing complexity of

innovative financing and different legal structure of quasi-public entities further
complicated the task of delineating the public and private spheres – leading the Rhode
Island Supreme Court to state: “we recognize that there is a division of authority on this
issue, depending on the nature and quality of the project to be built,” in one of the
decisions cited by the 120 West Fayette Street Court of Appeals.230 Rhode Island Bldg.
& Const. Trades Council v. Rhode Island Port Auth., 700 A.2d 613, 616 (R.I. 1997). Yet
the Court of Appeals revealed no hesitation in papering over this ambiguity with copious
citations to cases, even though only one of the fifteen cases cited defined “public works”
as applied to competitive bidding mandates, while most of the cases cited considered the
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applicability of prevailing wage laws to “public works” – laws with a profoundly
different purpose, to protect a particular class (construction workers) from competition
instead of to protect the general public from government graft and corruption. Indeed,
the court passed over its earlier decision in Hughes that specifically distinguished
between cases addressing competitive bidding and cases involving mechanics’ liens,
which are closer to prevailing wage laws in that the plaintiff is a third party seeking
action against a public entity with which it has no direct contract but is only related
through a contract through a counterparty with the public entity. Hughes v. Schaefer, 294
Md. 653, 665 (1982).
More surprising, that single competitive bidding case appeared to support the
Superblock’s opponents’ argument that the Agreement was a public works contract as
much as that of the BDC and City: the case held that a municipal water utility’s contract
with developer that built sewer infrastructure for its subdivision in return for
reimbursement and reduced rates from the utility was a “public works contract” requiring
competitive bidding. Bessemer Water Serv. v. Lake Cyrus Dev. Co., 959 So.2d 643 (Ala.
2006). The Bessemer court ruled that the financial structure of the transaction, as
reimbursements and deferred bills instead of payments, did not alter the fact that the
utility expended public funds (regardless of the final cost or benefit to the utility): a
ruling explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals in 120 West Fayette Street. Bessemer,
959 So.2d at 650-51. The Bessemer ruling also underscores the difficulty of translating
opinions across jurisdictions with variations on the common theme of “public works,”
because the Alabama definition of “public works” requires the project to include “public
property,” which the Bessemer court ruled was satisfied by the grant of sewer easements
to the utility by the developer, despite the developer’s repurchase option. ALA. CODE, §
39-2-1 (1975); Bessemer, 959 So.2d at 650-51. The Maryland definition of “public
work” in the Prevailing Wage Law does not have a similar requirement, thus reducing the
relevance of this portion of the Bessemer ruling. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals cited
Bessemer on precisely this issue, without noting the statutory differences. 120 West
Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 336, 338 (the third citation to Bessemer addressed public
financing, Id., 413 Md. at 340).
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Two other cited cases similarly differed significantly in defining “public works”:
one confirmed the jurisdiction of a regional planning agency to require an environmental
impact study to include, as a “public work,” privately financed and built improvements to
a public highway required for a private commercial development. Raley v. California
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 68 Cal.App.3d 965, 982-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). Another
cited case involved a Connecticut statute requiring performance bonds for public works
projects, with the court ruling that the anti-flipping provision of the municipal economic
development commission’s standard land sale contract that required a poured foundation
before transfer of title did not render the contract one for the “construction … of a public
building or public work” subject to the performance bond statute, in a suit by the unpaid
foundation contractor of the private developer that had purchased the land from the
commission. L. Suzio Concrete Co. v. New Haven Tobacco, Inc., 611 A.2d 921 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1992). Although this performance bond case superficially resembled the City’s
argument that the Agreement was a simple land sale, the contractor’s claim was very
different as it sought to make the city, with whom it had no contract, liable for the
nonperformance of the developer on a separate contract – a transparent attempt to assert a
contract claim, despite the lack of privity, through the performance bond statute.
The remaining twelve (of fifteen) cited cases defined the limits of “public works”
for prevailing wage laws, with six of these cases from New York State (Erie County
Indus. Dev. Agency v. Roberts, 465 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), aff’d. 63
N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. 1984); Vulcan Affordable Hous. Corp. v. Hartnett, 545 N.Y.S.2d 952
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989); 60 Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Hartnett, 551 N.Y.S.2d 346 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990); Cattaraugus Cmty. Action, Inc. v. Hartnett, 560 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Hartnett, 572 N.Y.S.2d 386 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991); Hart v. Holtzman, 626 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)), which has a
tradition of narrowly interpreting “public works” to restrict the statutory protection to
workers in the building trades:

“the Labor Law provision applies only to workers

involved in the construction, replacement, maintenance and repair of ‘public works’ in a
legally restricted sense of that term.” Erie County, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 305 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). In relying on these prevailing wage cases,
the Court of Appeals glossed over the significant differences between the policy aims of
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prevailing wage and competitive bidding statutes (protecting construction workers from
public works projects lowering wages versus protecting taxpayers from government graft
and waste), effectively removing the transparency and accountability concerns of
competitive bidding laws from consideration. 120 W. Fayette St., 413 Md. at 341. The
prevalence of prevailing wage cases shifted the focus away from the emphasis in
competitive bidding challenges on the legitimacy of the contract between the public
entity and the contractor for the public work. Instead the focus of the judicial inquiry
shifted to the fairness of extending the prevailing wage responsibilities of a public entity,
through its contract with a developer, to the separate contract between the developer and
the contractor/builder, an inquiry similar to adjudicating claims seeking to pierce the
corporate veil. Weighing the equities of conflating these two contracts, courts considering
these prevailing wage law claims also faced competing public policy concerns:
preventing public entities from avoiding prevailing wage statutes by using a nonpublic
intermediary to hire the contractor/builder versus ensuring public authorities, quasi-public
entities, and public-private partnerships the autonomy from many government
regulations, including prevailing wage laws, intended by state legislatures. These courts
therefore focused on the degree of control retained over the finished project by the public
entity to smoke out “creative financing” schemes to camouflage public building projects
as private projects. This focus derived directly from the purpose of the prevailing wage
laws – to protect construction workers – and differed substantially from the aim of
Baltimore’s competitive bidding law that sought to protect the city’s taxpayers from
corruption and waste in public contracts for goods and services, for which control is
irrelevant (e.g., the purpose of a waste-hauling or demolition contract is to dispose of the
material, not retain title or control).
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals overlooked this distinction in relying on these
prevailing wage law decisions to decide 120 West Fayette Street. Unsurprisingly, all
twelve of the prevailing wage cases cited by the Court of Appeals rejected extending the
“public” nature of the financing entity through the intermediary developer to the second
contract, finding the link between the two contracts to be too tenuous to impose public
hiring requirements on non-public entities (just as the Suzio court refused to extend
performance bond requirements to the contract between the private developer and
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contractor/builder). Yet ten of these twelve cases were governed by statutes that required
a public body to be a party to the contract alleged to be covered by the prevailing wage
laws, a requirement not in the Maryland statute (all New York State cases (Erie Co.,
Vulcan, 60 Mkt. St. Assocs., Cattaraugus, National R.R., and Hart) as well as CarsonTahoe Hosp. v. Building & Constr. Trade Council of N. Nev., 128 P.3d 1065 (Nev. 2006);
Town of Normal v. Hafner, 918 N.E.2d 1268 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Elliot v. Morgan, 571
N.W.2d 866 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); and Portland Dev. Comm’n v. State, 171 P.3d 1012
(Or. App. 2007)). This “public body” requirement clearly raised the threshold for a
“public work” and led the courts in these cases to examine the role of the public entity in
the second contract between the non-public developer and the contractor/builder – an
element irrelevant to the Superblock circumstances where the only contract at issue was
that between the City and the developer.231
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on prevailing wage cases to define “public works”
introduced a further discrepancy because these cases all focused on the financing of a
construction project (attempting to link the financing and construction contracts) as
opposed to a contract for redevelopment of a multiple block area like the Superblock.
Five of these cases involved industrial or economic development bonds that financed new
facilities for private entities that initiated, paid for, built and occupied the buildings (Erie
Co.; Rhode Island; Daniels v. City of Fort Smith, 594 S.W.2d 238 (Ark. 1980); CarsonTahoe Hosp.; and Town of Normal); three others were affordable housing projects built
by nonprofit developers financed by public entities (Vulcan; Cattaraugus; and Hart); two
concerned infrastructure projects financed partly by public entities but developed by
quasi-public entities treated by the courts as non-public entities (National R.R.; Elliot);
one was a public entity contracting with a developer to lease a building to be built by the
developer on developer’s own land (60 Mkt. St. Assocs.); and one echoed the Suzio
performance bond case with a public entity selling a property, with financing, to a private
developer to redevelop (Portland). In all cases, the courts refused to treat financing of
private construction projects as public contracts requiring prevailing wages, because the
public entity financing the project was not the one contracting the construction, and
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The BDC’s role was not relevant for this part of the Court of Appeals’ analysis, since the Board of
Estimates had approved the contract. Moreover, the Court of Appeals ascribed a public status to the BDC,
based on its decision in Carmel, in rejecting the opponents’ claim that the BDC had acted ultra vires.
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because of insufficient evidence that the intermediary developer was merely an alter ego
of the public financing entity used to avoid prevailing wage requirements.
The two cases that superficially resemble the Superblock circumstances, Elliot
and Portland, both reveal significant differences on a closer look. In Portland, the
Portland Development Commission sold a property to a private developer to redevelop,
but unlike the Superblock, this property was a single building, not a multi-block area, and
the Development Commission did not issue a RFP establishing directives for the
redevelopment of the site, but instead worked through a real estate broker to locate
potential developers. Portland, 171 P.3d at 76. Moreover, the Portland court ruled that
this was not a “public work” because the Development Commission had not “contracted
for” the construction as provided in the Oregon statute’s definition of “public work”
subject to the prevailing wage law, but instead had only sold the property with financing,
so that the prevailing wage law did not extend to the private developer’s construction
contract with the builder. Id. at 78-83 (discussing OR. REV. STAT. §279.348(3) (repealed
2005)). This “contracted for” language in the Oregon prevailing wage statute limited the
definition of “public work” and reduced the relevance of the case and statute to the
application of the Maryland prevailing wage law, which did not include that language,
especially in regard to the Superblock redevelopment, which was “contracted for” by a
public body. Portland would have been more apposite to the Superblock redevelopment,
albeit still of limited relevance given the focus on a single property, had the Development
Commission’s sale to the private developer been challenged as a “public works contract”
requiring competitive bidding.
The redevelopment project in Elliot resembled the Superblock in its unified
program for multiple properties – landscaping, sidewalks and lighting to create a
riverwalk linking publicly and privately owned land.

Elliot, 571 N.W.2d at 867.

Nevertheless, the Elliot court refused to classify the project as a “public work” subject to
Wisconsin’s prevailing wage law because the statute only applied to contracts to which a
municipality is a party, whereas the challenged contracts were between non-public
developers (a Business Improvement District and the Milwaukee Riverwalk District, Inc.)
and construction firms. Id. at 868-69 (discussing WIS. STAT. §66.293(3) (1993-94)). The
court rejected the claim that these developers were alter-egos of the municipality since
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the supporting cases relied on “non-persuasive foreign case law” and “the Wisconsin
statute differs from the statute at issue in the foreign cases.” Id. at 869. The Wisconsin
legislature had chosen not to follow many other jurisdictions, including Maryland, by
“broaden[ing] the definition of a public work to include any project which receives public
funding,” and the court could “not read such an interpretation into the wording of our
limited statute” because that “is a policy determination left to the legislature.” Id. The
Court of Appeals in 120 West Fayette Street felt no similar restraint in importing cases
including Elliot that applied different statutory and case law without reservations. Elliot,
like Portland and the other prevailing wage cases, provided a narrow definition of
“public work” because of restrictive provisions of the local statute, which differed from
Maryland’s statute, rendering these cases problematic support for the Court of Appeals’
rejection of the claim of the Superblock opponents. Had Elliot involved a challenge to a
no-bid contract between the municipality and a private developer to build the riverwalk
on city-owned property to be transferred to the developer, the case would have been more
relevant to the Superblock’s circumstances – provided that the competitive bidding
statutes of both jurisdictions were similar.

By ignoring these significant distinctions between the circumstances of the
Superblock and these cases (different local statutory and case law, competitive bidding
versus prevailing wage laws, and a single contract for redevelopment instead of two
contracts for financing and construction), the Court of Appeals glossed over the
ambiguities in defining a “public work” expressed in these cases and created the
impression of a unified definition under which the Superblock contract clearly failed to
qualify. Defining the limits of the public sphere in public-private partnerships, especially
with regard to the extension of “good government” laws like competitive bidding that
have policy justifications on both sides, has become more complex with the increased
intricacy of such transactions whereby public goals are achieved through private actors
with various types of public financial support.232 The court referred in passing to this
issue, but did so dismissively and without thought that a large redevelopment project
necessarily is an intricate mixture of public and private, not a single unit either
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completely private or totally public: “Complex financial schemes such as this one,
coupled with government oversight of a development project, arguably create ambiguity
as to whether a project is publicly or privately contracted. Nevertheless …” 120 West
Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 343 (italics added). Furthermore, the court overlooked legal
issues and cases that did not square with the court’s restricted viewpoint, issues and cases
that had more in common with the Superblock’s circumstances and that supported an
interpretation of “public works” that would include the Superblock.
The court particularly failed to recognize these alternatives within the context of
competitive bidding statutes, which have a broader public purpose than prevailing wage
laws (protecting all taxpayers, public contractors and their employees versus just
construction workers), so that “to protect the public interest requires a liberal
interpretation” of competitive bidding laws. Achen-Gardner, Inc. v. Superior Court, 809
P.2d 961, 965 n. 2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 839 P.2d 1093 (Ariz.
1992). The Court of Appeals of New York State, a jurisdiction cited often and favorably
by the 120 West Fayette Street court, has developed an extensive case law fleshing out
the boundaries of the state competitive bidding statute which also does not define “public
works contracts” subject to the statute, and in so doing emphasized that these statutes
achieve the legislative goal of preventing corruption and waste through transparency: “A
wayward public official could use the secrecy and ambiguity inherent in any agreement
not requiring public advertising and bidding to do great mischief.” Diamond Asphalt
Corp. v. Sander, 700 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (N.Y. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted).
The 120 West Fayette Street court failed to consider this broader public purpose when it
limited its case citations to prevailing wage laws, leading it to miss legal issues relevant
to the public nature of the Superblock contract.

Streetscape Improvements Should Have Satisfied Definition of “Public Work”
A key issue summarily dismissed by the court was the role of the public
streetscape improvements that the Superblock contract called for the developer to build
for the City, which would reimburse the developer’s expenses for streetscape costs,
separate from the $10 million cap on City reimbursement for the developer’s
environmental remediation and demolition costs. 120 West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at
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342-44. The court only discussed these improvements as insufficient to satisfy the “paid
for wholly or partly by public money” branch of the Maryland Prevailing Wage Law
definition of “public work,” but failed to address the “constructed for public use or
benefit” branch. MD. CODE ANN. STATE FIN. & PROC. §17-201j) (2009). Committed to
its interpretation that the Board of Estimates played a significant role in the Agreement to
reduce the BDC’s role to strictly advisory, the court focused on the Board’s capping of
the reimbursement to $10 million, emphasizing the potential for enormous costs for
environmental remediation. Moreover, the court failed to note that the streetscape
improvements would benefit, be used by, and be owned by the public, unlike the
remediation and demolition that would occur on the developer’s property. The court
emphasized public ownership as a determinant of a “public work,” but passed over the
streetscape improvements and instead limited its discussion to the overall project (and the
cited cases only involved projects on private property without improvements to the public
realm).
Yet surely this portion of the overall Agreement constitutes a “public use or
benefit” under the Maryland definition of “public work” used by the court. Other courts
have held that improvements to public streets and streetscapes, even if built and paid for
by private developers as part of a larger project, constitute “public works” subject to
government regulation. Raley, 68 Cal.App.3d at 982-83 (privately financed lane and
signal changes to public highway were “public works” subject to review by the public
planning agency); Bessemer, 959 So.2d at 650 (sewer system was a “public work”
subject to competitive bidding even if built and paid for by private developer); AchenGardner, 802 P.2d at 964-66 (off-site street improvements were “public works” subject
to competitive bidding even if built by private developer, affirmed by Arizona Supreme
Court in Achen-Gardner, Inc. v. Superior Court, 839 P.2d. 1093, 1095-97, 1100 (Ariz.
1992), vacating appellate ruling on other grounds).
In addition to providing a “public use or benefit,” these streetscape improvements
appear to satisfy the “public money” prong of the Maryland definition of “public work,”
since the Agreement bound the City to reimburse the developer for the expenses of
construction of the streetscape. Competitive bidding cases from other jurisdictions have
rigorously imposed competitive bidding law compliance on contracts for public
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improvements performed by private parties but financed with public funds. The New
York State Court of Appeals, in Diamond, ruled that the competitive bidding law
required New York City to cease its practice of aggregating public street infrastructure
work with associated private utility work into a single contract for competitive bidding,
and instead to competitively bid the public contracts apart from the associated private
utility work in order to avoid potential graft and waste by having public funds subsidize
private work. Diamond, 700 N.E.2d at 1210-14 (holding that private utility work, even if
affected by public street work, did not constitute “public works”). The Diamond court
emphasized that the absence of any intimation of misdeeds in that case did not impact its
ruling, since the competitive bidding statute’s purpose requires the court to protect a
“fastidious bidding process.” Public officials must not be permitted “to ‘indirectly’
circumvent public bidding policies and prescriptions by ‘Lego-like’ rearrangements of
the pieces of traditional contractual relationships and obligations,” in order to ensure that
the public purse does not secretly enrich private contractors. Id. at 1211.
The Arizona appellate court in Achen-Gardner also emphasized the need to
protect public money when it held that a private developer had to competitively bid the
contract for off-site public street improvements since the municipality would reimburse
the developer for these costs from future sales-tax revenues from the development.
Achen-Gardner, 809 P.2d at 966-69. Echoing the Diamond court’s concern to prevent
legalistic structuring of payments from thwarting the aims of competitive bidding
statutes, the Achen-Gardner court focused on the effect of the financing scheme, rejecting
formalistic arguments that the reimbursements were a special assessment: “the result of
the reimbursement is that monies paid to the developer brings about a dollar-for-dollar
reduction in the sales tax revenues.” Id. at 969. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed this
position:
“a municipality cannot alter the public nature of a project for the improvement of
public property, to be paid in whole or in large part by public funds, by entering into a
development agreement assigning a private party control over the bidding and letting
of the construction contract.”
Achen-Gardner, Inc. v. Superior Court, 839 P.2d at 1099. Both Diamond and AchenGarner suggest that for the Superblock the streetscape portion at least of the Agreement
should have been submitted for competitive bidding to protect the City from overpaying
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and subsidizing the developer’s private works, as well as preventing any “sweetheart”
deals arranged out of the public eye.
Yet the Court of Appeals in 120 West Fayette Street disregarded competitive
bidding case law and the public purpose of competitive bidding statutes, and so failed to
consider the Superblock streetscape improvements as public amenities and so “public
works.” Instead the court considered the streetscape improvements only within the
context of the “public money” branch of the Maryland Prevailing Wage Law definition of
“public works.” Even though the court recognized the Agreement required the City to
reimburse the developer for all streetscape improvements, the court ruled that these
improvements would be paid, as well as built, by the developer, not the City. 120 West
Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 343.233 The court reached this remarkable conclusion by
accepting the City’s formalistic argument that the streetscape reimbursements, together
with the $10 million reimbursement of demolition and environmental remediation costs,
were merely financial “incentives” given to the developer to purchase the Superblock,
and not “costs borne by the City.”

Id. For the court, the key issue was that the

reimbursements would be deducted from the total price paid by the developer under the
Agreement, so “the City is not funding that work.” Id. at 342. This view, however,
ignores that this merely plumps up the nominal purchase price, since without the
reimbursements the developer would insist on lowering the purchase price to reflect the
developer’s estimate of the cost of required demolition, remediation and streetscape
work. Moreover, the streetscaping costs differ from the demolition and remediation costs
in being improvements for “public use or benefit” on public property or rights of way, as
well as being reimbursed from “public money” by reducing the City’s income from the
Agreement (like the demolition and remediation costs). Under this creative accounting,
once the streetscape reimbursement was aggregated to the Agreement it no longer cost
the City anything, whereas had the City awarded the reimbursement as a separate grant to
the developer, then the City would have had to account for it as a cost.
This defies the fundamental principle of competitive bidding statutes - to forestall
public officials from relabeling public funds and services by “Lego-like rearrangements
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of the pieces of traditional contract[s]” to avoid public scrutiny. Diamond, 700 N.E.2d at
1211. In New York State case law, oft-cited by the 120 West Fayette Street opinion on
prevailing wage laws but not on competitive bidding laws, this issue has long been firmly
decided: “A contract which provides for a lesser income to a government unit than a
competing contract might provide, is an “expenditure”.” Diamond, 700 N.E.2d at 1210
(quoting Signacom Controls v. Mulroy, 298 N.E.2d 670, 673 (N.Y. 1973)) (italics added).
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to that of the City in 120 West
Fayette Street: in response to the claim that the reimbursement for street improvements
did not cost the municipality because the reimbursement would come from future tax
revenue created by the development for which the improvements were required, the
Arizona court stated
“[w]hile it is possible that the tax revenue might never have existed without the
development, once the development is undertaken the method of reimbursement
cannot alter the fact that [the developer] will be compensated directly from tax
money paid by the public with funds destined for and routed through the
municipal treasury.”
Achen-Gardner, 839 P.2d at 1098. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court long ago rejected a
similar shell game where a contractor asserted that its collection of fees for service
rendered to the municipality shielded it from competitive bidding:
“[t]he need for bidding requirements is just as compelling in the instant case
where the garbage collector is compensated directly by the recipients of his
service as it is when the recipients pay for service through the conduits of the
municipal treasury. In each case, regardless of who makes the final payment, it is
the taxpaying citizen who provides the necessary funds and whose interest must
be protected.”
Yohe v. City of Lower Burrell, 208 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 1965). The simplicity of this logic
contrasts sharply with the convoluted reasoning of the City and BDC adopted by the 120
West Fayette Street court.

The Maryland Court of Appeals appears to not have been aware of these rulings
despite being long established in neighboring jurisdictions (particularly Pennsylvania and
New York), presumably due to the court’s reliance on prevailing wage law cases, where
the focus lay on balancing the rights of the private developer to choose contractors
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against the policy goal of not depressing wages for construction workers – not the point
of competitive bidding statutes that protect the general taxpayer. Thus the court
transformed the income lost to the City through its reimbursement of streetscape
expenses into thin air by interpreting these reimbursements as confined solely within the
Agreement, despite the fact that the reimbursements would be applied well afterwards.
120 West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 343. As a result, the City ceded control over the cost
of the streetscape project, potentially subjecting taxpayers to inflated costs that would
subsidize the private developer, directly contradicting the purpose of competitive bidding
statutes.

The cases the court cited in support, all prevailing wage cases, are

distinguishable from the Superblock circumstances because these cases involved no
public improvements, only private construction projects on private property – key issues
for determining how far governmental restrictions extend to private parties, but not as
relevant for competitive bidding statutes seeking to ensure that public contracts do not
overpay private counterparties. Id. at 343-44 (citing Portland, Daniels, National R.R.,
Elliot and Hart).
Had the court considered competitive bidding decisions, it might have resolved
the issue of the streetscape improvements along the lines of Achen-Gardner, by ruling
that the streetscape portion of the contract qualified as a “public work,” under both the
“public use or benefit” and “public money” prongs, subject to competitive bidding. As
with Achen-Gardner, this would not necessarily require the rebidding of the Agreement,
but an amendment requiring the developer to competitively bid the streetscape portion as
a condition of receiving public reimbursement. This solution would also address the
problem of the open-ended commitment by the City to reimburse all streetscape costs
without a cap, estimate or even objective criteria for defining what projects would be
covered. The court’s refusal to consider any portion of the Agreement was subject to
competitive bidding, and myopic reliance on prevailing wage cases and the inverted logic
that reimbursements were not public funds, suggests that the court was concerned more to
maintain the power of the City, and the BDC, to pursue in redevelopment efforts that the
City clearly needed than to enforce a “fastidious bidding process” to ensure
accountability and transparency in government actions. This is all the more remarkable
in light of BDC president Brodie’s recent statement, based on consultation with the City’s
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Law Department, that demolition contracts awarded by the BDC for properties that
would be transferred to private developers for redevelopment constituted “public works
contracts.”234

Land Acquisition Costs Should Have Been Included in the Overall Accounting of the
Agreement, Which Thus Should Have Qualified As A “Public Work”
This sense of a “thumb on the scale” is reinforced by the court’s refusal to
consider the cost of land acquisition as part of the Agreement, despite the inclusion of
this land acquisition as part of the City’s performance under the Agreement, as specified
in the BDC’s presentation of the final Agreement to the Board of Estimates for approval:
“[t]he City agrees … to acquire such portions of the Property as are not currently owned
by the City by December 31, 2007.”235 120 West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 340-41.
Furthermore, the final Agreement provided that the City and developer would share the
cost of acquiring 223 and 227 West Lexington Street as part of a settlement with the
Carmel Realty plaintiffs, clearly linking the cost of land acquisition of these parcels to the
price paid by the developer.236 At closing, the developer would receive title to these
parcels and would pay the Carmel plaintiffs the $2.7 million settlement, with $2.45
million reimbursed by the City by reducing the overall price and counting the settlement
payment toward the developer’s 10% down payment due at closing.237 The developer
also would receive other Superblock parcels originally awarded to the Carmel plaintiffs
(who subsequently renegotiated the settlement to include receiving $1.5 million from the
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$1.68 million reduction in the overall price.
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City to buy nearby property, with the understanding that the BDC would later award it
back to the plaintiffs for redevelopment, as did occur), with the total price of the
Agreement changed to reflect the addition of these parcels and the removal of others as
part of a separate settlement with the Weinberg Foundation.238 By including the
acquisition cost of these parcels in the Agreement, the City recognized the inextricable
relationship between the acquisition by the City and the sale of the combined property to
the developer. Nevertheless the court asserted that “the property is acquired … through
contracts separate from the development contract,” even though the amendment to the
final Agreement laying out the integration of the Carmel settlement, with the BDC’s
explanatory memorandum, was included in the City’s appellate brief to the Court of
Appeals.239 Id. at 341. The court, however, neglected to use the final Agreement as the
basis for its analysis, instead using the original Agreement that strengthened the court’s
interpretation by not including the Carmel settlement, a striking sleight of hand.240
The court’s exclusion of the costs of the acquisition of the properties transferred
to the developer under the Agreement from analysis of the Agreement and its total
price/cost to the City, despite these links, appears inconsistent with the court’s reasoning
that the reimbursements for the future streetscape improvements could not be separated
from the Agreement. The effect of this seemingly self-contradictory reasoning was to bar
the Agreement from qualifying as a “public work” under the “public money” prong of the
Maryland definition, by classifying the public reimbursement for public streetscape
improvements as “privately funded,” while excluding the costs of land acquisition
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ensured that the City “earned” money under the Agreement, which could therefore not be
defined as “procurement” but instead as a “sales contract.” Id. at 334, 344-45.
The sole case cited by the court to support this ruling is inapposite since (i) the
contract in that case did not include or refer to land acquisition, (ii) the provisions in the
law analyzed in that case has since been changed, (iii) the legal principles involved
differed as this was a prevailing wage case, and (iv) the peculiar facts of the case led to
the particular ruling. Id. at 340-41 (discussing Demory Brothers, Inc. v. Board of Public
Works, 273 Md. 320 (1974)). In Demory, a contractor challenged the state school
construction committee’s application of the new state prevailing wage law to school
construction contracts funded by the state which led to the rejection of the contractor’s
low bid for a county public school financed by the state funds because the contractor’s
bid did not comply with the state prevailing wage law. Demory, 273 Md. 320. Citing a
provision (since-amended) of the state prevailing wage law defining “public bod[ies]”
subject to the law to include “the State or any department, … any other agency, political
subdivision, corporation, person or entity of whatever nature when State public funds are
the only funds used for the construction of a particular public work,” the Demory
contractor claimed that the county’s providing the land for the school (as well as
employing the building inspectors and processing the building permits) violated this
provision. Id. at 322-23, 330 (quoting and discussing MD. CODE ANN., ARTICLE 100,
§96(d)(1)). The contractor thus sought to regain the contract by a declaration that the
county and state school construction committee did not qualify as “public bodies” subject
to the prevailing wage law.
Demory was a case of first impression because this particular provision amending
the prevailing wage law (itself only 2 years old) had been enacted just the year before the
school contract was let, and since the General Assembly had enacted in that same session
a law providing that the state assume the costs of all public school construction. Demory,
273 Md. at 321-24 (discussing 1969 Md. Laws, c. 558 (prevailing wage law); 1971 Md.
Laws, c. 220 (prevailing wage law amendment); 1971 Md. Laws, c. 624 (public school
construction); contract let on July 12, 1972). The 1971 amendment to the prevailing wage
law extended the reach of the original 1969 law, which had only applied to state agencies
and specifically exempted county and municipal construction contracts, to include any
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project paid for exclusively by state funds, the provision cited by the Demory contractor.
Id. at 322, n. 1. In rejecting the contractor’s claim that the costs of land acquisition (and
building inspectors and permitting) be considered part of the construction contract, the
Court of Appeals cited the clear legislative intent to apply the expanded scope of the
prevailing wage law to the new state-funded school construction program (the General
Assembly, in the session following an opinion by the Attorney General that the prevailing
wage law applied to school construction, repeatedly defeated a bill to amend the
prevailing wage law to explicitly exempt school construction), reinforced by the use of
the same interpretation by the agencies charged with launching the state school
construction program. Id. at 326-27. The court emphasized that the state school
construction program regulations specifically prohibited state funds from paying for land
(or building inspectors or permits) and that this particular contract conformed by not
including any reference to these costs. Id. at 330. The Demory court therefore held that
the contract did not include land acquisition (or other costs), and so the county and state
school construction committee qualified as “public bodies” subject to the prevailing wage
law since the state bore all construction costs.
The circumstances of Demory are distinguishable from those of the Superblock,
most importantly because the Superblock Agreement included the costs of acquiring the
Carmel plaintiff’s property and required the City to acquire all parcels of the site as part
of the City’s performance under the Agreement, in stark contrast to Demory where land
acquisition was not, and could not be, part of the school construction contract. Demory’s
clean separation of land acquisition and construction, required by regulations, differed
dramatically from the intermingled processes of land acquisition and negotiation of
development terms of the Superblock, a complexity necessitated by the much larger size
and scope of the Superblock project. This difference echoes that between the nature of
the two laws: the prevailing wage law in Demory aims to protect workers in construction
not land acquisition, whereas the Superblock’s competitive bidding ordinance has a much
broader purpose of ensuring that taxpayers receive fair value when purchasing goods or
services. Unlike the county in Demory that already owned the site of the school, the City
did not own all of the Superblock at the time of the Agreement, so the cost of land
acquisition is a key element in calculating the fair value of the redevelopment the City
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procured with the Superblock Agreement. The two cases addressed different definitions
used in the prevailing wage law: Demory addressed the definition of “public body,” a
definition since changed to require only 50% state funds and that is separately defined
and used in the prevailing wage law from the definition of “public works,” which is the
focus of 120 West Fayette Street – but only in order to understand the applicability of the
Procurement Article of the Baltimore City Charter. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. &
PROC., §17-201(i) (“Public body”), §17-201(j) (“Public work”); BALTIMORE CITY
CHARTER, ARTICLE IV, §11(b)(i). Finally, the effect of the two cases is diametrically
opposed: the Demory court expanded the reach of the prevailing wage law based on
contract law and clear legislative intent, whereas the 120 West Fayette Street court cited
Demory to support the opposite effect of restricting the scope of “public work” as defined
in the prevailing wage law in order to interpret the City procurement requirements for
which relevant legislative history does not exist.
The court’s restrictive interpretation owes much to the prevailing wage cases
focused on limiting intrusion of public sector regulations into the private sector, in
contrast to competitive bidding cases that emphasize accountability of government.
Instead of relying on Demory, the court might have looked to Department of General
Services v. Harmans Assocs., 98 Md.App. 535 (1993), where the Court of Special
Appeals rejected an argument similar to the City’s in 120 West Fayette Street – that a
transaction by the state to lease land on which a private developer would construct a new
State Highway Authority headquarters that would subsequently be subleased back to the
state was a transfer of real property and not the construction of a building subject to the
state procurement law, which included competitive bidding. Judge Wilner insisted on “a
fair consideration of the overall transaction, especially in light of the State’s own request
for proposals,” which revealed that the real estate transfer was effectively illusory,
“designed to avoid the creation of a State “debt,” while the purpose of the transaction was
the construction of the building, and so the procurement law governed the transaction.
Harmans, 98 Md.App. at 546-47. Although the circumstances of the Superblock differ
substantially from those of Harmans (the state retained the ground lease and was the sole
tenant of the completed building; the plaintiff was the contractor suing on a contract
claim that the State sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the Board of Contract Appeals
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which could not rule on the sale or lease of real property), sufficient similarity exists to
suggest that the Court of Appeals in 120 West Fayette Street should have adopted the
broad approach of Judge Wilner in Harmans and considered the overall transaction
involved in the Superblock development:

that the City identified a large area to

redevelop, planned the redevelopment, asserted eminent domain powers to acquire the
numerous properties, and then requested proposals from developers for the site based on
the redevelopment plans. The BDC described the Agreement to the Board of Estimates
not as just a land sale, but focused on the specifics of the development to be constructed
on the site by the developer in return for the City acquiring and assembling the properties
on the site.241 The transfer of land from the City to the developer was only a part of the
overall project from which the City’s land acquisition, identified from the beginning of
the project and completed after the signing of the Agreement, cannot be separated. The
City effectively purchased the services of the developer to redevelop the area according
to the City’s plans, a transaction little different from the City privatizing public services
like garbage removal or the operation of parking meters or jails, where the City would
dispose of its property interest but the overall financial balance of the transaction would
remain a cost to the City. Competitive bidding laws were designed to protect taxpayers
in precisely this type of transaction to ensure the public purse received fair value.
Instead of adopting “a fair consideration of the overall transaction,” however, the
120 West Fayette Street court cited Demory to avoid addressing this commingling of land
acquisition and development in the Agreement and the final balance of payments between
the City and the developer.

By excluding land acquisition costs and ignoring the

amended Agreement that included the Carmel settlement’s purchase of 223 West
Lexington Street, the court was able to characterize the Agreement as merely a contract
for the sale of land for which the City earned income, and so would not qualify under the
“public money” prong of the Maryland definition of “public works.” This in turn enabled
the court to fall back on its prior holding that urban renewal projects in general were not
subject to the Baltimore City Charter competitive bidding statute because as sales of
property, requiring urban renewal projects to accept the low bidder would be “illogical
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and unreasonable.” 120 West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 333. Furthermore, the City
competitive bidding statute only applied to contracts over $25,000 in City expenses, so
that as long as the interpretation of the Agreement portrayed the Superblock as earning
income for the City, the competitive bidding statute would not apply to the Superblock
Agreement.

Yet the court’s characterization of urban renewal projects as merely “property
sales” for which the City earned money is disingenuous, since urban renewal from its
inception assumed significant government subsidies in the form of land acquisition and
assembly in order to attract private investment to redevelop the properties.242 The City,
with the predecessor of the BDC, sold the site acquired by the City through eminent
domain to private developers to redevelop at a loss, a practice “anticipated by city, state,
and federal statutes, and in part covered by federal funds from the Urban Renewal Act of
1954.”243 The costs born by the redevelopment agency in Portland are typical: the
agency spent $1.7 million to purchase the parcel, and sold it to the developers at a 30%
loss, with the additional subsidy of a loan from the agency to the developers for all but
$50,000 of the $1.2 million sale price. Portland, 171 P.3d at 1013. The figures available
as part of the 120 West Fayette Street litigation strongly suggest a similar loss on the part
of the City when land acquisition is included in the overall calculations. In addition to
ignoring the role the Carmel settlement played in the amended Agreement, the court also
passed over the revised purchase price in that amended Agreement (which the court had
in the Appendix to the City’s appellate brief), instead referring back to the original
Agreement’s purchase price, which was higher and so supported the City’s position that
no “public money” was expended on the transaction that instead earned the City income).
120 West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 340.
The amended Agreement reduced the purchase price from $21.6 million to $16.8
million, while retaining the reimbursements for demolition and environmental
remediation capped at $10 million (with a $8 million estimate), resulting in the City
receiving a total income of between $6.8 million to $8.8 million, less an unspecified
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amount to reimburse streetscape improvements.244 This amended total includes a credit to
the Superblock developer for paying the City’s “share” of the Carmel settlement, but
does not reflect the additional $1.5 million paid to the Carmel plaintiffs, nor the cost of
acquiring the other parcels in the Superblock. Assuming the Carmel settlement of $2.7
million for 223 West Lexington Street represented a fair value for the property, the City
would have lost money if the parcels conveyed under the Agreement were more than
three times the size and value of 223 West Lexington Street. Since 223 West Lexington
appears to be at most one-eighth of the total parcel, the City almost certainly lost money
under the Agreement, effectively paying the developer to redevelop the properties. This
estimate appears to be supported by the City’s $3.75 million settlement with another
Superblock owner to purchase a parcel that appears somewhat bigger than 223 West
Lexington Street.245 Brodie, the BDC president, estimated in 2000 that the overall value
of properties to be condemned for the Superblock project was $26.4 million, likely a lowball figure since Brodie used it to highlight the increased value of the site postdevelopment.246 Although Brodie’s estimate included parcels not part of the Agreement,
it was also made in 2000 before real estate values started to rocket skyward. Even
assuming that the Agreement only covered half of the properties in Brodie’s estimate,
that values did not increase since 2000, and that the City purchased all properties at
Brodie’s estimate, the cost of land acquisition for the Agreement would be $13.2 million,
twice the $6.8 million that the City is guaranteed to receive under the Agreement (not
including the reimbursement costs for streetscaping). The City itself relied on a similar
estimate also in 2000 when it launched the Superblock, setting aside bond revenue to pay
for the $30 million minimum it expected land acquisition, demolition and relocating
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businesses to cost.247 The City’s estimate did not include sewer, water, street, and design
improvement expenditures, nor consider the administrative costs of the BDC, Law
Department and other city officials on the project - “overhead” costs that the Agreement
did not cover, but which illustrate the City’s awareness from the beginning that the
Superblock project was not merely several sales of property, but instead a carefully
planned and orchestrated process to redevelop the site by acquiring and assembling the
land and hiring private developers to construct a revitalized Superblock, with the City
paying the developers by subsidizing the cost of land and granting them the ability to
profit from the development.248 Thus the court should have recognized that the
Agreement almost certainly satisfied the “public money” prong of the Maryland
definition of “public work” and the Baltimore City competitive bidding law’s threshold
of $25,000 in City expenses.

The court might have at least remanded for further

discovery and trial on the cost of land acquisition and the degree to which various parcels
were interwoven with the Agreement.
Instead the court inflated the City’s potential income by only using the total from
the original Agreement and not factoring in the $10 million in reimbursements promised
by the City. To support its view that the City was not “funding” the construction, the
court cited the schedule of payments the developer had to make to the City under the
Agreement as proving that the City provided no financial support. 120 West Fayette
Street, 413 Md. at 340. Yet in discussing this payment schedule the court disregarded the
City’s significant financial support by effectively giving the developer a long-term loan
(a typical public benefit supporting private developers in redevelopment projects such as
the project in Portland) by failing to note that the developer would probably not owe the
City anything until after construction was completed, and then at most 40% of the
purchase price, due to the $10 million in reimbursements for demolition and
environmental remediation which must occur before the commencement of construction.
Under the amended Agreement, the City waived the 10% payment due at closing in
exchange for the developer paying the City’s share of the Carmel settlement, which also
reduced the total owed by the developer, which also received title to 223 West
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Lexington.249 The next payment, due at the completion of construction, of 40% of the
total owed by the developer would be effectively waived by the City’s reimbursement for
up to 60% of the total cost. The City’s reimbursement commitment also would carry
over to the remaining 50% owed, to be paid in a series of payments starting after the end
of construction, effectively waiving the first 10% of the total owed. The City also
promised to reimburse the developer for an undefined amount of streetscape
improvements that would be finished, and so deductible against the developer’s debt to
the City, before the developer ever had to pay the City a dime. Thus the developer would
only begin paying the City the final 40% of the total owed, less the streetscape
reimbursements, well after construction was completed. This extended payment schedule
permitted the developer to avoid financing the purchase price with construction financing
that is more expensive than long-term post-construction financing. The court, however,
ignored these very favorable terms that amounted to low-cost financing provided by the
City to the developer in addition to the subsidized cost of the land itself, instead focusing
on the developer’s required payment of interest on the final 50% of the total price. 120
West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 340. Yet the court neglected to note that the developer
received an interest-free loan for the first 50%, that the interest would only be charged
starting after the completion of construction (when that portion came due) when the
developer would have access to cheaper long-term post-construction financing, and most
importantly that the 6% interest rate charged by the City was significantly discounted
from the prime rate of 8.25% in January 2007 when the Agreement was signed.250

The Court Erred in Declaring that Competitive Bidding Is Not In the “Public Interest”
In addition to ignoring the City’s subsidizing the Agreement by discounting the
price of land, reimbursing demolition, remediation and streetscape expenses, and giving
low-cost financing, the court asserted that the “public interest” would not be served by
classifying the Agreement as a “public works contract” subject to competitive bidding.
120 West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 341. The court’s sole justification was that including
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land acquisition costs in figuring the total financial return of the Agreement to the City
would “def[y] common sense” because the contracts to acquire the site were separate
from the contracts to develop the site – despite the court’s access to the amended
Agreement that explicitly included the purchase of 223 West Lexington Street for the
developer as part of the Carmel settlement, and despite the amended Agreement’s
requirement that the City obtain title to the site from third parties in order to transfer to
the developer. Id. Moreover, the court held that due to this supposed separation between
land acquisition and development contracts, “the purpose of competitive bidding” would
not be served by applying the costs of land acquisition to the Agreement. Id. Yet despite
the court’s recognition that competitive bidding requirements sought to prevent graft and
waste, the court’s focus on the potential intermingling of separate contracts suggests the
profound influence of the court’s reliance on prevailing wage cases, which typically
consider the equity of extending restrictions governing a public entity to a private entity’s
(construction) contracts with third parties through a separate (usually financing) contract
between the public and private entities.
Competitive bidding requirements, on the other hand, focus on individual
contracts to ensure that the public entity receives fair value for the goods or services
purchased from the private counterparty. The land acquisition costs are relevant to the
Agreement for competitive bidding purposes because these costs reveal the size of the
discount on the land values that the City gave the developer as payment for developing
the site. If the Agreement were subject to competitive bidding, the amount of the City’s
subsidy to the developer might be reduced as developers competed to produce the project,
with the lowest bid equaling the least subsidy provided by the City. This is far from the
“illogical and unreasonable result” of property sales awarded to the low bidder predicted
by the Court of Appeals but only based on the exclusion of land acquisition costs. 120
West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 333. The court, in making this holding, glossed over the
difference between basing the financial impact to the City on the sale price of the
property as opposed to based on the sale price less the acquisition price, with the latter
calculation aligning the property sale’s high bidder with the competitive bidding statute’s
mandate to reduce the overall cost to the City. Thus including the costs for the land
acquisition called for in the Agreement together with the nominal purchase price of the
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Agreement would reveal the true cost of the Agreement to the City, and under
competitive bidding would ensure the most effective use of the City’s funds in
purchasing the services of developers to redevelop the Superblock. The court similarly
erred in asserting that applying the competitive bidding statute to the Agreement would
not help prevent collusion and graft, since including the land acquisition costs would
reveal any sweetheart deals between politicians and developers that otherwise would be
obscured by portraying the Agreement as merely a sale of property (too-cozy
relationships with major City developers led to legal troubles for both Mayor Sheila
Dixon and City Councilwoman Helen Holton this year).
Surprisingly, the court failed to discuss its earlier analysis of the City competitive
bidding statute in Hughes v. Schaefer, 294 Md. 653, 664-66 (1982), instead relying on
Demory, a prevailing wage law case, and the court’s unsupported assertions that the
purpose of the competitive bidding statute would not be served by applying it to the
Agreement. The court was certainly aware of this discussion in Hughes, as both the City
and the Superblock opponents discussed Hughes in their appellate briefs, and since the
court discussed Hughes elsewhere in the 120 West Fayette Street opinion when ruling on
whether the BDC exceeded its authority in handling the negotiations for the
Agreement.251 120 West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 349-54. The court’s refusal to
address Hughes is especially striking, as Hughes echoed the 120 West Fayette Street in
holding that applying the competitive bidding law “would constitute a futile act, in the
name of a policy which would not be served, to require competitive bidding.” Hughes,
294 Md. at 666 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Hughes court held that
the specific project, despite being financed by public bond funds, did not qualify as a
“public work” subject to competitive bidding “[b]ecause the proposed project relates to a
specific location, owned or to be owned by the borrower, there is no competitor for a
project at the site.” Id. Yet the Hughes court specifically limited its ruling to “where the
particular property is held by the borrower, other than as a transferee from the City.” Id.
(italics added). This caveat was key, since it emphasized the link between the purpose of
the competitive bidding statute and the City’s transfer of property for redevelopment – if
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the development will occur on property to be transferred by the City to the private
developer then there will be competitors, as in fact occurred when the BDC issued the
RFP for the Superblock. This points out the fallacy of the 120 West Fayette Street
court’s assertion that applying competitive bidding to the Agreement would be pointless,
while also pointing out the importance of City ownership of property, even as a “seller,”
in determining if a particular project qualified as a “public work” subject to competitive
bidding. The 120 West Fayette Street court’s silence on Hughes suggests a deliberate
archiving of an inconveniently contradictory ruling by the same court in a decision used
by the 120 West Fayette Street court elsewhere in its opinion and cited in both parties’
briefs.

Public Redevelopment Efforts Expend Public Funds for Public Purposes,
And Thus Are “Public Works”
The Agreement itself illustrates the inextricable links in redevelopment projects
between public entities transferring a site to private developers to redevelop and the
public entities acquiring and assembling the properties to create that site, in specifying
that the City’s performance include obtaining title to all of the property to be transferred
to the developer.252 The City must acquire the land itself instead of directly subsidizing
the developers’ purchasing the properties because private developers lack the ability to
force landowners to sell their property, so that a private developer assembling a
redevelopment site would face holdouts that either would refuse to sell at any price, or
those that would demand prices far above market value for the individual property
because of the property’s value as part of the overall site. The City can avoid these
holdouts by using its eminent domain authority, which permits the City to acquire all
properties in a designated site regardless of the owners’ interest in selling, and at prices
limited to the individual property without regard to the additional value due to being part
of the site, provided that the City acts within its constitutionally prescribed authority. As
a result, the subsidy provided by the City in redevelopment contracts with private
developers is even larger than the total calculated by including the City’s land acquisition
cost with the redevelopment contract price, because the City may acquire and assemble a



252

Brodie, Memorandum to Board, supra n. 244; First Amendment to Agreement, supra n. 244.

98

site at a substantial discount compared to what a private developer could achieve. The
City therefore necessarily starts by identifying a redevelopment site for which it
authorizes condemnation, and then offers the site to developers at prices even below what
the City would have to pay to acquire the properties as compensation to attract the
developers to redevelop the site.

Thus the process of choosing the developers is

dependent upon the City’s ability to acquire and assemble the properties on the site, and
so the costs of land acquisition and assembly are interwoven with the City’s contracts
with developers.
The court’s curt dismissal of including these land acquisition costs in evaluating
the Agreement’s financial balance is therefore surprisingly myopic, especially the
unsupported claim that applying competitive bidding to the Agreement would not be in
the “public interest” nor prevent “collusion and government overspending.” 120 West
Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 341. This is especially true in light of the court’s Carmel
decision just four years earlier that emphasized the importance of transparency by the
BDC and Baltimore City in general as well as in the specific Superblock redevelopment
project. The amended Agreement’s inclusion of the Carmel settlement and requirement
that the City acquire the land even more explicitly tied land acquisition costs to the
redevelopment. The court’s refusal strongly suggests a conscious desire to avoid the
obvious consequence of recognizing the Carmel settlement’s inclusion in the amended
Agreement or any land acquisition costs – that these costs would easily exceed the
income that the Agreement portrayed the City as receiving, that this would clearly
illustrate that the City did spend “public money” to hire the developer to redevelop the
site, that this would satisfy the “public money” prong of the Maryland definition of a
“public work,” and so the Agreement would have to be rebid under the Baltimore City
competitive bidding requirements.

Moreover, glossing over the interdependence of the City’s land acquisition and
the Agreement enabled the court to avoid addressing how the City acquired and
assembled land, by eminent domain, which the City may only exercise for a “public
purpose” or “public use.” BALTIMORE CITY CHARTER, ARTICLE II, (2)(a); U.S.
CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT V. If the City must have a “public purpose” or “public use”
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to exercise condemnation authority to acquire and assemble a redevelopment site in order
to transfer the site to a private developer as compensation for redeveloping the site, then
how can that redevelopment not satisfy the “public use or benefit” prong of the Maryland
definition of “public work”? MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 17-201(j)(i). The
court’s silence on this issue is all the more surprising in light of the court’s recent
rebuffing of the City’s frequent exercise of “quick-take” condemnation in two 2006
cases, Sapero v. Mayor of Baltimore, 398 Md. 317 and Mayor of Baltimore v. Valsamaki,
397 Md. 222.253 Indeed in Valsamaki, the court held that the BDC and City had failed to
justify the exercise of quick-take authority not only as an immediate need, but also as for
a public purpose. Valsamaki, 397 Md. at 272-76 (Two of the seven judges only joined
the opinion on immediacy, but not on public purpose. Id. at 277). In discussing what
constitutes a “public purpose,” the court explicitly required that condemnation function
within a previously determined project: “while economic development may be a public
purpose, it must be carried out pursuant to a comprehensive plan. . . . simply providing
that a property is to be condemned for “urban renewal purposes,” without more, is not
enough.” Id. at 276.
Thus even though the Valsmaki court had just ruled that for the City to exercise
eminent domain authority it had to show a “public purpose” by following a previously
approved comprehensive plan, the same court in 120 West Fayette Street declared that the
very “public purpose” sufficient to authorize condemnation was not sufficient to define
the same redevelopment project as “constructed for public use or benefit” and so qualify
as a “public work” subject to competitive bidding. The only means by which the City was
able to transfer the site to the developer was by using its public condemnation authority,
without which no redevelopment of the Superblock would be possible. Thus considering
the costs of land acquisition and assembly, and therefore also the process
(condemnation), as an integral part of the City’s Agreement with the developer (as indeed
the amended Agreement specified), should have led the court to rule that the Agreement
satisfied both the “for public use or benefit” and “paid wholly or partly by public money”
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prongs of the Maryland definition of a “public work,” and so require compliance with the
Baltimore City competitive bidding statute.
Instead the court sophistically separated the assembly of the Superblock site from
the redevelopment contract, by ignoring the amended Agreement and citing inapposite
cases from foreign jurisdictions with significant differences in statutory and case law, in
order to avoid subjecting the Agreement to competitive bidding, in an exercise that
appears determined a priori to protect the City’s freedom to operate with limited
accountability. This echoes the court’s holding that the BDC did not exceed its authority
delegated by the Board of Estimates – despite the missing contract specifying the
responsibilities and limits under which the BDC acted on behalf of the Board. On both
claims, the court chose to ignore evidence of problematic procedures, and instead of
remanding for trial to determine the contract under which the BDC operated and the links
between land acquisition and the Agreement, the court held that the BDC and City had
acted within their authority.

Why Did the Court Change Course From Promoting Accountability
To Shielding the BDC From Accountability?
This is all the more surprising given that this ruling seems so philosophically
different from the court’s 2006 trifecta of decisions (Sapero, Valsamaki and Carmel) that
brought the BDC and the City to heel from exceeding its powers by emphasizing the need
for transparency and accountability in urban renewal projects. In all three cases the court
had indicated a profound concern that the BDC and the City had overreached in avoiding
revealing the decision-making processes governing urban renewal in Baltimore, and
insisted that the BDC and City publicly justify the use of public authority (although the
City’s use of eminent domain has not slackened since Sapero and Valsamaki254).
Although the author of all three 2006 decisions, Judge Cathell, as well as two other
judges sitting in 2006, had retired before the court heard 120 West Fayette Street, this
turnover of three of seven judges does not explain the sudden shift in philosophy, since
the remaining four judges had joined all three 2006 decisions as well as 120 West Fayette
Street, albeit with some indications of concern (Judge Harrell refused to join the



254

Id.

101

Valsamaki analysis of public purpose, but did join the judgment and analysis of
immediacy, while Chief Judge Bell and Judge Battaglia only joined the judgment, not the
opinion, in 120 West Fayette Street). 120 West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at 359.
Perhaps the court found the 120 West Fayette Street plaintiff, Peter Angelos, as
unappealing as the City had been in the 2006 cases, since Angelos challenged the very
urban renewal contracting process with the City that Angelos had successfully used to
win a part of the Superblock redevelopment, among other projects. The City had drawn
attention to this contradiction in its appellate brief, and the court may have been rightfully
wary of permitting the judiciary to be used as part of Angelos’s negotiating strategy with
the City.255 The Angelos strategy of seeking to box the court in by claiming that the BDC
was a private entity illegally acting for the Board while also claiming that the Agreement
was a “public work” - so that if the court had to either declare the BDC public, and so the
Agreement would be a “public work” or declare the Agreement was private, and so the
BDC acted illegally, with either conclusion leading to the Agreement being rebid – may
have been too clever and led the court to view the suit as a delaying tactic.
Fundamentally, however, the court’s refusal to recognize the Agreement as a
“public works contract” subject to competitive bidding, or to acknowledge the ambiguity
in the authorization process for the BDC’s actions, appears to be based on a concern not
to interrupt Baltimore’s redevelopment process too much. For the court, requiring public
transparency per Carmel, and requiring justification of an immediate public purpose for
quick-take condemnation per Valsamaki and Sapero, defined the limits of the City’s
redevelopment process without upending the process, whereas requiring the rebidding of
the Agreement, either because it was subject to competitive bidding or because the BDC
had exceeded its authority, would dramatically reshape the existing redevelopment
process. The court was also aware that the Superblock development had started over a
decade earlier, and that it represented the “largest urban renewal plan since … the city’s
Inner Harbor,” so that forcing the project to start all over again, especially in a depressed
real estate market, likely appeared a non-starter. 120 West Fayette Street, 413 Md. at
317-18. Given the obvious need for redevelopment in Baltimore, the court appears to
have decided to maintain the status quo instead of forcing the City and BDC to change
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the development process, as it had evolved over the past sixty years, to follow procedural
safeguards to ensure government accountability.
The court likely was concerned as well that ruling against the BDC and City on
this case, especially defining the Agreement as a “public works contract,” might open up
new challenges to redevelopment projects by public and quasi-public entities other than
the BDC and the City, including throughout Maryland. The court’s reliance on so many
prevailing wage law cases also suggests that the court may have anticipated that
redevelopment projects would not be limited to competitive bidding claims, but also to
prevailing wage claims. Both scenarios would clearly slow down, and vastly increase the
cost of, redevelopment projects in the City and throughout Maryland. The court therefore
opted not to change the line between the public and private spheres where it had evolved
over decades since urban renewal began in Baltimore. In so doing, the court fell back on
the Progressive paean of making government more business-like, more efficient and
effective, and based on technical expertise, as well as on the related tradition of
government corporations granted autonomy from government oversight in order to avoid
corruption, short term political aims, and promote long term professional operation. As
laid out in the introduction, government corporations operating in the shadows between
public and private spheres had been used for American urban redevelopment since the
New Deal public housing programs that subsequently morphed into the urban renewal
programs. Thus the court’s reticence to intervene radically in the City’s development
process, including the BDC’s autonomy to act on behalf of the Board, reflected this
traditional deference to the legislative intent to free redevelopment agencies from
bureaucratic entanglements, especially in the area of economic development where
governments sought to attract private business investment.256
But the court also faced a unique situation because the City’s development
process, and the BDC and its predecessors that led the process, had evolved in fits and
starts over six decades without clear statutory procedures or limits. Further obscuring the
legal authority to act and procedures governing redevelopment in Baltimore was the long
repeated refusal by the BDC and its predecessors to permit public access to their records
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based on the claim to be private entities free from requirements binding public entities, a
claim supported by the City, eager to avoid public scrutiny of redevelopment projects in
order to get projects done. The strong influence of private business groups in Baltimore’s
development process dated back to the Progressive era and the origins of public planning
in Baltimore, and so muddied the line between the private and public spheres in the
City’s redevelopment efforts. As a result, the court, facing the choice in 120 West
Fayette Street of forcing the City to define the procedures governing its redevelopment
process at the risk of halting all redevelopment, or instead endorsing the current BDC
redevelopment process based on Progressive ideals of government corporations bridging
the gap between public and private, chose the latter. In so doing, the court rejected the
movement for government accountability and transparency that also had its origins in the
Progressive movement.
The 120 West Fayette Street court echoed the Supreme Court in Kelo in relying
on the formalistic following of procedural safeguards by the City and the BDC, while
ignoring discrepancies suggesting that these procedures were largely empty gestures.
Coming down on the side of Progressive efficient, technical, business-like government
over transparency and accountability concerns, the 120 West Fayette Street court, like the
Kelo court, disregarded Justice O’Connor’s warning that “[t]he beneficiaries are likely to
be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process,
including large corporations and development firms.” Id. at 505 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). Yet for the 120 West Fayette Street court, the specter of dismantling the
Rube Goldberg evolution of public redevelopment efforts in Baltimore scared the court
into maintaining the status quo – “better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.”
The court faced widespread agreement that BDC and its predecessors, despite their
haphazard organization, had led successful redevelopment projects in the past - including
the Charles Center, Inner Harbor, and Harbor East – and the clear and dramatic need for
revitalization remaining throughout Baltimore. Faced with the dire predictions by the
BDC and the City that subjecting the Superblock contract to competitive bidding would
not only force a rebidding, but also endanger future development in Baltimore, the court
blinked. The court thus retreated from its Carmel position, highly critical of the BDC,
that the BDC was accountable to the public as a “public body” to the exceedingly narrow
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and legalistic definition of “public” in 120 West Fayette Street that the BDC could avoid
public transparency and accountability of its redevelopment projects because (i) the
BDC’s “public” status granted it public powers although the court failed to specify the
source of these powers, and so avoided imposing any limitations on the BDC’s exercise
of these powers, and (ii) redevelopment projects led by the BDC were not “public works”
because private developers built the projects, even though the court ignored the crucial
role of the BDC in assembling the site to be redeveloped.
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IV: Reshaping the City’s Redevelopment Process
Due to the Court of Appeals’ watering down of its Carmel stance subjecting the
BDC to public accountability, the BDC, and the City’s redevelopment strategy in general,
retains its nebulous identity located somewhere between the public and private spheres, a
pseudo-public entity with enormous power through its control of public financing and the
eminent domain process, but without virtually any responsibility to account for its actions
to the public in whose name it acts. The BDC effectively is accountable only to its board,
composed of mostly private business leaders and controlled by the mayor, and restrained
only by the Board of Estimates, also dominated by mayoral appointees. The City Council
has no direct oversight apart from the Council President’s limited role as one of five
members of the Board of Estimates. The council’s power to cut the BDC’s budget is
blunt at best since the council can only respond to the BDC’s past actions, which are
largely impossible to block without significant financial consequences to the City, as the
council’s ineffective response to the BDC’s predecessor in 1990 illustrates.257

The

council lacks an advice and consent role over the mayor’s selection of the BDC president,
in sharp contrast to the council’s right and responsibility to confirm the head of the
Department of Housing and Community Development and other municipal officers.258
This lack of a defined oversight role for the council enables councilmembers to avoid
responsibility for the BDC’s actions while periodically protesting for political
appearances with minimal practical effect.
The BDC’s precise organizational role in municipal government remains unclear
because the Court of Appeal refusal to require the City to provide the documents showing
if the BDC receives its authority from the Board of Estimates directly or instead through
the DHCD Commissioner. Establishing a clear chain of command, as well as the terms
of the contract under which the BDC operates, would enable the public to hold the BDC
accountable, as well as the politicians who currently can sidestep responsibility for the
quotidian operations of the BDC as outside of their bailiwick. Thus if the BDC operates
under a contract with DHCD, the mayor would be the politician responsible for oversight,
but the Council would also have an important role as supervising executive agencies.
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Alternatively, if the BDC’s contract is with the Board of Estimates, the
Comptroller and Council President would have a clearer responsibility to check the
mayor’s supervision of the BDC, and some soul-searching would be in order as to why
the mayor has such control over an entity chosen to advise the Board of Estimates,
nominally a check on the mayor’s unfettered use of public power. Finally, if the BDC
instead is an entity that directly reports to the mayor outside of a contract with the Board
or DHCD, then it lacks authority to oversee urban redevelopment projects under the
current legal framework. Indeed the legal requirements permitting private entities to
contract for public business with the Board or DHCD are predicated on these entities
being subject to some oversight by the legislative branch of the City, whether the council
directly or through the Council President’s seat on the Board. The council therefore
would likely require a specific oversight role of the BDC in any legislation authorizing
this third framework of an executive agency status for the BDC.
The current ambiguous status enhances the power of the BDC as an entity
simultaneously inside and outside the City’s government structure, a position similar to
that of Robert Moses’s Triborough Bridge Authority. In theory, mayoral control of the
selection of the BDC’s board members and president, as well as control of the Board of
Estimates, should firmly ensconce the BDC under mayoral direction, so that the
electorate could hold the BDC accountable through mayoral elections as Mayor
O’Malley publicly asserted in supporting the BDC’s current role.259 Yet the practical
effect of the largely private board is to insulate the mayor from direct responsibility for
the BDC’s actions, especially because the board approves the BDC head’s determination
of what documents must be publicly released. The BDC board, dominated and led by
leaders of the private business world where discretion and secrecy are the currency of
trade, has reaffirmed the institutional reticence of the BDC and its predecessors to
publicly release records of the BDC’s operations. Even though Carmel compelled the
BDC to comply with the MPIA and OMA, both the BDC president and chair of the board
declared their opposition to transparency by aggressive claims to exemptions under these
laws: “virtually the entire agenda of the BDC board” and “ninety percent of what we [the
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BDC in general] do is probably exempt.”260 This embargo of information prevents public
awareness potential intervention during the BDC’s planning, negotiating, and decisionmaking stages, with most public knowledge limited to the BDC’s press releases
announcing completed negotiations and final decisions. This shields the mayor from
facing politically challenging questions and calls to intervene until after the BDC has set
its course on a particular project, at which point the mayor can justify not intervening as
too costly to the City to scrap the project and start over. Moreover, the BDC can protect
the mayor from accountability by proposing a politically unpalatable project supported
private by the mayor, who can assert the project’s necessity as determined by the
“independent” judgment of the business leaders on the BDC board – an option not
available for a project proposed by the DHCD Commissioner or other executive agency
leader.
Yet the mayor is as likely to be co-opted by the BDC board as to use the BDC
board to push unpopular initiatives, since the mayor relies on the private business board
members as conduits to financial support as well as for endorsements as a businessfriendly leader in political campaigns, a potent endorsement in a city in desperate need of
the jobs and tax revenue, as well as the cheerleading, of the business community. This in
turn provides leverage to the private business leader board members of the BDC who can
influence decisions that will have significant financial impact on the board members and
their employers without leaving public fingerprints courtesy of the BDC’s guarded
secrecy. Even though the mayor effectively appoints the board members, the mayor
would be loathe to overrule a decision or initiative backed by the private business
members that are the majority of the BDC board. Insidiously, board members can
pressure the mayor out of public view since their leverage rests on the public impact of
their resigning due to a lack of confidence in the mayor’s willingness to work with the
business community.

Mayor Schmoke, when he fired the president of the BDC’s

predecessor in 1991, made sure to wait until after the mayoral primary, the de facto
election in heavily Democratic Baltimore, in order to avoid a “potential political issue for
the mayor’s opponents.” Schmoke’s careful handling of this issue was wise, given his
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modest primary victory and the public criticism of the firing by the Sun, which reported
that “many business leaders … feel less and less like partners” with the City because the
Mayor and staff “simply don’t know much about economic development.”261

Yet

Schmoke had more leverage than mayors under the current BDC bylaws (enacted in
1997), since the BDC’s predecessor reported directly to the mayor without the
interference of a board dominated by private business leaders.262

Nevertheless, the

business community’s criticism of Schmoke’s first BDC president, catalyzed by the
resignation of Sondheim from the BDC board in 1994, led first to Schmoke’s firing that
BDC president just before the 1995 mayoral primary and then to the wholesale
restructuring of the BDC led by the current president, M. Jay Brodie, as an entity led by a
“private sector board” starting in 1995.263
Brodie’s overhaul of the BDC’s organizational structure limited mayoral control
by increasing the role of private business leaders and the authority of the board. The
BDC president and staff no longer reported to the mayor directly, but instead operate
under the leadership of the board.264 This change did not merely place an intermediary
between the mayor and BDC, but more importantly shifted the allegiance, and legal duty,
of the BDC president and staff to the BDC board instead of to the mayor.

The

domination of the board by private business leaders crucial for a mayor’s electoral
success further limited the mayor’s ability to resist initiatives supported by the BDC.
Moreover, recent mayors have focused on redevelopment projects as measures of their
political success and so been reluctant to slow down or interfere with BDC efforts:
Mayor Schmoke, in his final term, chose Brodie to restructure the BDC and to embark on
the Westside redevelopment including the Superblock intended to be his political
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legacy,265 and Mayor O’Malley successfully followed William Donald Schaefer’s path to
the Governor’s Mansion by revitalizing Baltimore’s downtown.266 Both Mayors Dixon
and Rawlings-Blake succeeded to the office to finish their predecessors’ terms and so
were in particular need of endorsement from the business establishment that the BDC
board provided for their first mayoral campaigns, especially since the economy was in a
recession so that any apparent disruption to economic development plans would impair
their political chances. Brodie’s push to remake the BDC as less-public and more private
entity led by a business-dominated board thus had two sides – on the one hand it
encouraged greater involvement of the business establishment but it also did so in by
increasing the business establishment’s leverage in backroom dealings.
Moreover, Brodie’s restructuring of the BDC cemented Brodie’s status as the
city’s power broker in redevelopment. Brodie has remained as BDC president for more
than fourteen years under four mayors, but this same continuity also suggests that Brodie
has carved out a sinecure nominally subject to mayoral approval but effectively
independent because of Brodie’s careful cultivation of the City’s business community. In
a delicate dance, Brodie has made himself indispensible by providing what each mayor
has needed politically while also making his retention a key symbol of an incoming
mayoral administration’s business-friendliness.267

His lengthy prior experience in

Baltimore government during urban renewal (starting at DHCD’s predecessor in 1962, he
served as deputy commissioner from 1969-77, and as commissioner from 1977-84), as
well as his network with federal agencies and national private real estate developers
during his decade as head of the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation in
Washington, D.C. and then as head of planning for the international planning firm RTKL,
provided him with experience, institutional knowledge, and politically savvy to fulfill an




265

C. Fraser Smith, “Schmoke tries new approach: Legacy,” Sun, December 16, 1997, 2B; Robert Guy
Mathews, “Mayor’s focus is back on downtown; Schmoke sees Inner Harbor as key to revitalization,” Sun,
January 23, 1998, 1B.
266
Tom Pelton, “Sparing development, if not feelings,” Sun, December 9, 2000, 1A.
267
Thus Mayor O’Malley relied on Brodie to push ahead with the Superblock development, although with
changes advocated by O’Malley, while O’Malley focused on crime reduction. Peter Kaplan, “City agency's
mission: do more with less cash. (Baltimore Development Corp.),” Baltimore Business Journal, September
10, 1993. When O’Malley became governor, Dixon’s retaining Brodie was reported as a sign of continuity
with the business-friendly O’Malley administration. John Fritze, “Brodie to remain head of BDC, Dixon
says,” Sun, January 11, 2007, 3B.

110

incoming mayor’s desire quickly and without political uproars.268 With each year Brodie
remained as BDC head, he became that much more important as providing continuity to
the lengthy redevelopment process (the Superblock has been ongoing for over a decade),
so that an incoming mayor risked significantly setting back any redevelopment efforts
that an incoming mayor would need for the next campaign by replacing Brodie. Thus
Brodie survived Rawling-Blake’s initial review of the BDC with the goal to reshape the
BDC to encourage more transparency, although Brodie’s close associate and former
lieutenant, Andy Frank, who was also supported by the City’s business establishment, did
not.269 Brodie’s influence is further reflected by Rawlings-Blake’s reliance on leaders in
the business establishment to conduct the review of the BDC, which provided her
political cover but which also limited her ability to act outside of the review’s
recommendations (just as she did not fire Frank, but forced Frank to resign by isolating
him from any decisions, presumably out of concern to limit the damage to her
relationship with the business establishment).270 Brodie’s continued sway was most
recently illustrated by his convincing a majority of the city council’s taxation committee
to endorse a tax-increment financing district for Harbor Point, despite opposition to
dedicating future city revenue to subsidize upscale development.271 Brodie’s testimony
was accepted as that of an expert untainted by political concerns, on the Progressive
model of the government corporation, and without concern that his engagement with the
business establishment served not only to improve the City’s economic development but
also to increase his own power and job security.
Brodie’s longevity, knowledge, and willingness to exercise the power he has built
up have enabled him to use the undefined authority of the BDC to expand his power. The
fact that the Court of Appeals accepted – twice! – the BDC’s claims of authority to
perform redevelopment projects for the City in the face of a cloudy and problematic chain
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of authority underscores the BDC’s ability under Brodie to establish power merely by
asserting it.272 Andy Frank, Brodie’s executive vice president before becoming deputy
mayor, succinctly described the process: “[f]or those of us who have worked at BDC,
[the rules] passed on from generation to generation.”273 Brodie, of course, had been
involved with the BDC and its predecessors almost from the beginning (Charles Center
Management Office started in 1959, three years before Brodie joined the DHCD’s
predecessor, although Brodie had worked in Baltimore as an architect from 1960), and so
has outlasted all but a select few urban redevelopment professionals in Baltimore (Martin
Millspaugh and Robert Embry are likely the only others).274 Even the City Law
Department claims to be unclear as to the limits of the BDC’s authority, according to the
City Solicitor: “We all have varying levels of information on what BDC is allowed to
do."275 This cavalier attitude to the BDC’s authority by other City officials further
enabled Brodie utilized the BDC’s murky authority to take steps he believed necessary,
including awarding no-bid contracts to demolish buildings owned by the BDC without
public notice, for which he obtained, without questions, the approval of the DHCD
Commissioner.276

Brodie has used this accumulated power to rule the City’s

redevelopment process with only the barest veneer of seeking approval of the politicians,
recommending the Superblock project to Mayor O’Malley and the Board of Estimates as
“[i]t’s my strategy … and if it fails, you can blame me” (emphases added) in rejecting
calls to rebid the project due to significant changes in the Request for Proposals.277
Brodie’s statement highlights his belief in the Progressive ideal of expert technical
authority that craft and finalize policy for politicians to accept or reject with minimal
amendment. Yet this Progressive model has permitted Brodie, like Robert Moses, to
reshape the City with limited public accountability by exercising, through secrecy and the
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BDC’s ambiguous authority, power accumulated from political and business
relationships.

Alternative A: Retain and Reform the Quasi-Public Corporate Structure of the BDC
Yet effective redevelopment does not require secrecy and unaccountability
enabling an unelected official to amass this much power. Indeed, this concentration of
power in a single person for decades risks damaging a city’s redevelopment prospects by
fossilizing the city’s approach to redevelopment around a single viewpoint, as Robert
Moses’ focus on highways impacted New York City.278 Brodie himself expressed a
similar view in endorsing a two-term limit (eight years total) for Baltimore mayors:
I think there’s a burnout factor. Not strictly in the person of the mayor but the
people around him. … For government itself, it gets difficult to think new
thoughts. … The ability to change things is awfully important, and I think it gets
harder to do after a certain point.279
If this is true for a mayor, who is confronted daily with alternative approaches by
individuals with power and whose ability to deliberate secretly is circumscribed by public
transparency mandates, the risk of such static group-think is exponentially more likely for
the head of an entity like the BDC that operates largely outside of public view and
unfettered by statutorily defined authority.
The protestations of Brodie, BDC chair Lipitz, and the City that compliance with
the MPIA and OMA would limit the effectiveness of the BDC proved to have been
theatrical gestures given the wide latitude of the exemptions in these laws that the BDC
subsequently asserted covered much of the BDC’s activities.280 Before Carmel, Brodie
had claimed that the only alternative to the BDC’s secrecy was a “public referendum
about [redevelopment] proposals when they are still being reviewed,” ridiculing any
possibility of expanding public transparency, and hence accountability.281
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Yet an alternative model that provides significantly more transparency and
accountability exists, and that may have been the model for Mayor Schmoke’s creation of
the BDC by merging CC-IH, the central business district development corporation, with
BEDCO, the city’s industrial development corporation in October 1991: the New York
City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC).282 Schmoke’s move echoed
Mayor Dinkins’s creation of NYCEDC in July 1991 as a budget-reducing consolidation
measure by combining multiple economic development corporations with different
jurisdictions (urban development efforts in real estate v. financial support).283 Like the
BDC, NYCEDC is a private, non-profit corporation that retains its institutional
framework of its predecessor, the New York City Public Development Corporation,
founded decades earlier in 1966 (1965 for the BDC).284 NYCEDC receives the authority
to engage in redevelopment efforts on behalf of New York City through contracts with a
municipal agency, the Department of Small Business Services, just as the City alleges is
the case with the BDC.285
In contrast to the BDC, however, NYCEDC has additional transparency and
accountability requirements.

NYCEDC’s two contracts with the city are subject to

annual renewal,286 and subject to the municipal procurement standards.287 Although
NYCEDC has a private board like the BDC, the intermediary role of the board is lessened
by the mayor directly appointing seven of the twenty-seven board members, and only ten
members chosen by the board chair from mayoral nominees. The ten remaining members
are selected by other elected officials, although formally appointed by the mayor: five
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chosen by the city council speaker and one by each of the five borough presidents.288 Six
of the current twenty-four NYCEDC board members are municipal officials, four top
officials for borough presidents, the head of the municipal law department’s economic
development section, and the deputy mayor for economic development.289

This

organization echoes that of the New York City Industrial Development Agency, a
NYCEDC subsidiary, which board has four ex officio members, six members appointed
by the mayor, and five selected by the borough presidents.290 This greater inclusion of
politicians other than the mayor broadens the viewpoints represented on the board, and
increases transparency and accountability by expanding the range of politicians
responsible for NYCEDC’s actions – the mayor, borough presidents, city council
president and her council colleagues. Perhaps most remarkably, NYCEDC not only
publishes the agenda of board meetings, but also the minutes of those meetings, including
discussions about pending real estate negotiations.291 NYCEDC has not avoided criticism
for lack of transparency and accountability, but its structure is nonetheless significantly
more open than that of the BDC, and yet has not been attacked as ineffectual.292

Conclusion (Alternative A): Restructure the BDC to Resemble NYCEDC
NYCEDC thus represents a model for reform of the BDC that would stop short of
a radical reshaping but that would still increase the accountability and transparency of the
BDC’s operations. At the simplest level, the BDC could adopt NYCEDC’s transparency
standards and engage in public disclosure in good faith instead of an instinctual and
aggressive assertion of the need for secrecy. NYCEDC suggests that a more reasonable
alternative exists.
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Similarly following NYCEDC’s model, the City could straighten out the precise
relationship between the BDC and the City by reissuing the “mythical” contract under
which the BDC purports to operate, and making this contract subject to annual renewal
like that of NYCEDC. This would enable the politicians to confront the question of what
functions the BDC should assume, and permit citizens, the business community, and
media to participate in such a discussion. The idea that the BDC, in 2010, still operates
under the terms of a contract issued several decades earlier, with no updates reflecting the
innumerable federal and state economic development programs, as well as statutes and
regulations, closed and introduced in the meantime, verges on the ludicrous. Even
though the annual renewal of this contract would likely become a formality, the required
reconsideration each year would provide the opportunity to revisit the relationship based
on changing needs or circumstances, and it would also ensure that the tasks assigned and
limits of the authority delegated to the BDC would be known publicly. The public
availability of the contract would give BDC employees and opponents a better sense of
the limits of the BDC’s powers, unlike the current reliance on “generational memory”
described by Andy Frank above. Moreover, if a particular action by the BDC triggered a
significant response to inspire the city council to act, it would no longer be limited to the
largely ineffectual cutting off of the BDC’s budget as happened with the T.Rowe
Price/IBM building (discussed above), but instead could amend the contract directly or
require certain contractual amendments as conditions for the BDC’s budget.
The BDC could also follow NYCEDC’s broader involvement of politicians in
selecting board members instead of the total mayoral control over the current board.
Thus the mayor, in addition appointing the four ex-officio municipal officers, might
nominate five other members to be appointed by the board, while the remaining six
members would be selected by other elected officials, such as the city council president
on behalf of the council and the comptroller (in place of New York’s borough
presidents). This change would bring the other politicians into greater involvement with
the day-to-day oversight of the BDC, while the mayor’s appointees would still hold the
majority necessary to give the BDC direction. Furthermore, the inclusion of both the city
council president and comptroller would involve all of the key members of the Board of
Estimates, the third leg of Baltimore government, and one that no longer exists in New
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York City where the mayor and city council divided the powers previously held by the
New York City Board of Estimates.293
Finally, NYCEDC suggests that the BDC should follow Brodie’s own statement,
quoted above, on the peril of stagnancy for an organization with a perpetual leader – by
imposing term limits on the BDC presidency. No NYCEDC president has served for
more than five years, and most served for four years, without any significant criticism
that these cyclical changes have made NYCEDC less effective at promoting economic
development.294 These four-year terms have largely followed the mayoral (and city
council) terms, so that it has become standard for the organization to have periodic and
expected change in leadership that reflects changes resulting from municipal elections.
This provides an opportunity for NYCEDC to be held accountable to the electorate since
both the mayor and city councilpersons may run on specific aspects of redevelopment
policy that may guide the new NYCEDC president and board members, partly chosen by
the incoming city council speaker and borough presidents. Such a change also presents
the opportunity for new blood and approaches, while the balance of municipal officials
and private business leaders on the board, as well as staff, should dampen any seismic
shifts caused by the pendulum swinging nature of elections.
In light of the cyclical nature of real estate, this turnover of NYCEDC’s president
and board enable NYCEDC to mount a more effective response as an individual project
does not become identified with a single president determined to complete it as planned.
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Given Brodie’s personal identification with the Superblock as awarded, a change in the
BDC president after the 2002 or 2006 elections, might have permitted more substantive
negotiations that might have avoided the lengthy lawsuits seeking the rebidding of the
original 2003 Request for Proposals. While the litigation may not have been avoidable,
the BDC and City have settled with several of the significant opponents, including
Carmel Realty, by involving them more significantly in the redevelopment.295 Turnover
of the presidency, and board, should also lead these actors to view their time as limited
and so push to get projects done by compromising instead of looking to create a longterm legacy. At the same time, tying the BDC presidency to municipal elections may
galvanize public support for certain projects, if a central issue in a decisive election, that
may permit faster resolution. Moreover, such a discussion about redevelopment plans in
an electoral campaign might obtain greater buy-in by the electorate and awareness of the
complex tradeoffs necessary in redevelopment projects. Although Brodie, Lipitz and
others in the BDC and City government would argue that increased transparency would
hobble the completion of redevelopment projects, the Superblock’s drawn-out evolution
highlights the inability of the current secrecy-dependent process to achieve results –
ground has still not broken over a decade after the project was proposed and seven years
after the RFP was published.

Alternative B: Transforming the BDC from Quasi-Public Corporation to Public Agency
Considering NYCEDC as a model for the BDC, however, raises the question of
why Baltimore has a BDC – a private corporation that runs its economic development
efforts. New York City dwarfs Baltimore, with more than thirteen times the population
than Baltimore (8.4 million v. 637,000), almost four times as much land area (303 square
miles v. 81), and over twenty-four times as many wholesale and retail sales ($229 billion
v. $9.3 billion).296 Does Baltimore’s much smaller scale and population really require the
same organizational approach as New York City, or does the imposition of a quasi-public
corporate entity on New York City’s model only create an additional layer of
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bureaucracy preventing clear and effective economic development? The total control of
the BDC’s board by the mayor without any involvement of other politicians, further
weakens support for the BDC, as it does not even serve the function of providing a forum
in which politicians, as representatives of the voters, may negotiate the future of
Baltimore’s development.

Instead, the BDC appears to be an executive agency

responsible only to the mayor, without any meaningful legislative oversight, that really
functions to internalize in the mayoral administration the desires of the business
establishment leaders that sit on the board. Whatever debate occurs does so behind
closed doors, due to the predilection for secrecy and the lack of other politicians’
involvement in selecting the board members. The recent effort by the Greater Baltimore
Council, representing the business community, to build support for an alternative site for
a new arena represents a much more productive approach to development, since this
proposal forces a public discussion of plans for the future in which all stakeholders can
participate.297
Indeed, does the Progressive model of “business-like” government achieved
through a quasi-public government corporation help or hinder Baltimore redevelopment
efforts? The Port Authority, the first such government corporation, was created to permit
a single approach to development of New York Harbor split between two states, and
subsequent government corporations, like the Tennessee Valley Authority or New York
State’s Urban Development Corporation provided a single focus to a multi-jurisdiction
problem, whether hydroelectric energy or affordable housing (although this initial single
purpose often expanded significantly as the corporation took on more tasks).
Government corporations also proved useful for long-range infrastructure programs with
a public purpose and defined focus that required significant capital investments, such as
airports, bridges, or water supply. The first housing and urban renewal government
corporations, the precursors to NYCEDC and the BDC, were designed as conduits for
massive federal aid that required autonomy from municipal officials otherwise tempted to
reroute the federal aid to alternative local purposes. With the drying up of federal aid,
these development corporations subsequently became a useful conduit of private money
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through bond issues on the capital markets that did not impact the sponsoring
government’s debt load. These development corporations either focused on a single
purpose citywide – industrial development – or on a specific geographic site in a multijurisdictional manner – port infrastructure or revitalizating a neighborhood by addressing
housing, economic development, health, and crime.

The latter type relied on the

autonomy of the government corporation to retain its geographic focus and jurisdictional
breadth instead of being swallowed by a larger, single jurisdiction municipal department.
But the BDC does not address any of these purposes. The BDC does not have a
multi-jurisdictional focus like the Port Authority or Urban Development Corporation.
The BDC’s role directing the limited federal aid available today pales in comparison to
its other activities. The BDC does not issue its own bonds, unlike NYCEDC, which does
so through its Industrial Development Agency subsidiary,298 which requires a corporate
structure separate from the municipal government to attract bond purchasers. Finally, the
BDC does not focus on one type of development citywide or address a single geographic
area holistically, but instead purportedly addresses all types of economic activity in all
areas of the city.
The BDC appears to have taken the quasi-public corporation form due to
historical accident and subsequently by institutional expansion, not because the quasipublic structure was necessary to achieve its responsibilities. Although the history of the
BDC as a quasi-public entity extends back to 1959 with the creation of CC-MO, the
current BDC with its mismatch between corporate form and public purpose was
effectively created by two transformations: (i) when Mayor Schmoke created the BDC by
merging the city’s industrial development corporation, BEDCO, with its downtown
development corporation, CC-IH Development Corporation, Inc., in October 1991; and
(ii) when Mayor Schmoke turned to Brodie to mastermind a new BDC starting in
1995.299 By these two transformations, the BDC became a “shadow government” for
redevelopment, aggregating a vast array of responsibilities behind the shield of a private
corporation.
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Evolution of the BDC as a Quasi-Public Corporation Responsible for the City’s
Redevelopment Process
The City had used private non-profit corporations under exclusive contract with
the City to perform public tasks before the BDC’s formation in 1991 – both BEDCO and
CC-IH Development Corporation, Inc. were such entities – but those quasi-public
corporations had been used for more focused tasks, usually involving the management of
city real estate to promote economic development. One of the earliest was CC-IH,
incorporated in 1965 to manage the redevelopment of the Inner Harbor following the
1964 Master Plan sponsored by the Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) representing the
business community.300 CC-IH was merely the incorporation of the Charles Center
Management Office (CCMO), a two-person management team that managed the
redevelopment of the Charles Center according to the Charles Center Plan prepared by
the GBC and the Committee for Downtown and approved by the city council in 1959.301
In both cases the GBC - following a long tradition of private business leaders proposing
development initiatives for the City to adopt - proposed, funded and performed
significant parts of the Charles Center and Inner Harbor plans.302

Having invested

significant funds and time on getting these projects to the construction phase, the GBC
was concerned that the City’s bureaucracy lacked the experience to supervise the
construction, leasing, and subsequent management of these projects, and so suggested the
management of the project be done by a non-public business entity – CCMO, later CCIH, headed by the chairman of the Committee for Downtown.303 CCMO was created to
ensure the GBC that the Charles Center project would be handled expeditiously by
experienced staff who had worked on the preparation of the plan, and so CCMO charged
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the City $1 a year for its services – a contract focused on providing CCMO legal
authority to oversee the project.304 With the Inner Harbor’s vastly more complex scale,
the GBC would not be able to continue to subsidize CCMO, so CCMO was incorporated
as CC-IH, maintaining the same legal structure of a private entity performing services for
the city under a contract with DHCD’s predecessor, the Baltimore Urban Renewal and
Housing Agency (BURHA), but receiving its budget from the City.305 This contractual
framework has been characterized as reflecting a different purpose for CC-IH, providing
as-needed, temporary technical support, “unlike a city agency which has a permanent
function.” (emphasis added).306 The transition from CCMO to CC-IH also changed the
role of the GBC, which had dominated the Charles Center project, but which played a
reduced role in the Inner Harbor, leaving CC-IH as the most important link to the
business community through its chair, J. Jefferson Miller, the head of the Committee for
Downtown and executive vic-president of the Hecht department store.307 Although CCIH thus shared its corporate form with today’s BDC, its mandate was much narrower,
limited to managing the leasing, marketing, and upkeep of Charles Center and the Inner
Harbor once CC-IH had finished overseeing the construction of these projects in
accordance with plans approved by the City.
BEDCO, the other leg of the BDC, also began in 1965 when the Baltimore
Economic Development Commission (EDC), a panel of business leaders established in
1962 to advise the mayor on how to combat the deindustrialization of Baltimore,
proposed a land bank to assemble industrial sites on behalf of the city, the Baltimore
Industrial Development Corporation (BIDC).308

Despite much support, BIDC only
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became a reality in 1972 under the newly elected Mayor Schaefer who had successfully
supported a bonding issue to fund the land-bank operations.309 Like CC-IH, BIDC was
set up as a private corporation to manage real estate related projects on behalf of the
City.310

Schaefer’s initial proposal for the BIDC followed the example of the

Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation as a partnership between the City and
the business community, each providing half of the annual budget and half of the board,
with BIDC operating under a contract with the Board of Estimates, although the final
version removed the business community’s direct involvement and financial
contribution.311 In 1975, Schaefer adopted the GBC’s proposal to focus and catalyze the
city’s economic development efforts by merging BIDC with EDC to create BEDCO.312
Concerned that BEDCO and CC-IH coordinate on any overlapping issues, Schaefer made
BEDCO, like CC-IH, report to, and receive its budget from, DHCD, in a change from
BIDC which had reported directly to the mayor and received its budget from the mayor’s
office.313 The aim of this change was to have the activities of BEDCO and CC-IH
registered with, if not actually supervised by, a single Commissioner and municipal
department, and also to unify all of the City’s urban development initiatives under the
same department, DHCD.314 Although BEDCO’s combination of management of
industrial parks and city promotion foreshadows today’s BDC, BEDCO’s mandate was
narrower, focused primarily on attracting industry, which required large parcels that
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BEDCO would attempt to create by ensuring sufficient industrial zones and by
assembling industrial parks.315
Both BEDCO and CC-IH therefore adopted the structure of the private
corporation under contract with the City because of the significant involvement of the
GBC, and business community, in the creation and operation of these entities. BEDCO
and CC-IH also had relatively narrow mandates that arguably were better served outside
of the municipal bureaucracy, with their small size and direct reporting to the mayor
permitting quick action.316 When Mayor Schmoke merged BEDCO and CC-IH to create
the BDC, however, the benefits of the private corporation model – small size, narrow
focus – were mostly lost while the negative aspects of this model – autonomy from
political oversight, secrecy as a nominally private corporation – increased dramatically.

BDC I: Consolidation of the City’s Economic Development Entities
The 1991 merger of BEDCO and CC-IH was the culmination of Mayor
Schmoke’s strategy, announced soon after he became mayor in 1987, to consolidate the
multiple economic development corporations that were the hallmark of Schaefer’s
administration, including the Market Center Development Corporation (MCDC), created
in 1979 to revitalize the area around Lexington Market, and the Charles Street
Management Corporation, created in 1983 to revitalize the Charles Street corridor.317
Some in the Baltimore redevelopment community assert that Schmoke’s aim was to
“clean house” of Schaefer’s influence on the administration, while Schmoke justified his
push towards consolidation as reducing redundancy, promoting efficiency, and saving
money.318

Another influence on Schmoke may have been an article critiquing

Baltimore’s “Renaissance” under Schaefer as limited to the downtown area supervised by



315

Frank P.L. Somerville, “Cherry Hill shift voted; 35 industrial acres to be used for residences,” Sun,
March 27, 1963, 9.
316
See infra text accompanying n. 338.
317
Michael A. Fletcher, “Schmoke wants possible merger of BEDCO, Center City explored,” Sun,
November 9, 1990. MCDC was incorporated on March 30, 1979 (SDAT # D1002526, F 2441 / 1444);
Charles Street Management Corporation was incorporated on December 12, 1983 (SDAT # D1646835, F
2623 / 2952). R. B. Jones, “Mayor Schmoke Brings the 'Shadow Government' Back to Town,” Sun, July
24, 1992.
318
Fletcher, “Schmoke,” supra n. 317; Kevin Thomas, “BEDCO president Gillece quits post; Resignation
comes just after merger of two city groups,” Sun, September 26, 1991; Thomson, Political Control, supra
n. 305, at 167-68 (citing anonymous sources).

124

CC-IH and leaving the neighborhoods to decline, an academic version of the attack on
Schaefer’s redevelopment policy mounted by Schaefer’s 1983 opponent.319
Schmoke began by merging MCDC into CC-IH, renamed Center City-Inner
Harbor Development Inc., in 1989.320 This merger dramatically expanded the jurisdiction
of CC-IH to west and north of the Inner Harbor, and Schmoke further extended CC-IH’s
mandate to include the neighborhoods east of central business district.321 This was a
radical change of territory and of focus for CC-IH, which had heretofore been limited to
implementing and managing two discrete projects – Charles Center and the Inner Harbor
– but which now also took on the task of revitalizing a declining neighborhood with no
clear redevelopment plan, few city-owned parcels, and declining government funds for
urban redevelopment. Schmoke similarly expanded the responsibilities and authorities
for another of Schaefer’s development corporations in early 1990, when the Charles
Street Management Corporation became the Downtown Partnership to reflect its changed
focus from a single commercial strip to the entire central business district.322 Concern
that absorbing MCDC’s responsibilities would diminish CC-IH’s effectiveness led
Walter Sondheim, the long-time chair of CC-IH, to resign. His successor, Al Copp,
quickly outraged the city council with his refusal to share the Architectural Review
Board’s report on the proposed building height waiver for the IBM/T.Rowe Price
building, and resigned a year later, replaced by Sondheim on an interim basis.323
Schmoke quickly moved to merge CC-IH (still processing its absorption of MCDC) with
BEDCO and appointed BEDCO’s president, David Gillece, to lead the newly created
BDC.324 This move pleased the city councilman that had led the withholding of CC-IH’s
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budget over the IBM/T.Rowe Price building dispute, who believed that this consolidation
would lead to increased transparency and a broader mandate beyond downtown for CCIH and the City’s redevelopment strategy in general.325 The Sun similarly applauded the
merger as “indicat[ing] that [CC-IH]’s days as a largely independent entity are over,”
with the new BDC placed “more tightly under the Schmoke administration’s planning
umbrella.”326
This prophecy of direct mayoral control proved true more quickly than the Sun
anticipated: less than a year after Schmoke proposed merging CC-IH and BEDCO, and
only days after finalizing the merger, Schmoke’s hand-picked choice to lead the newly
consolidated economic development entity, David Gillece, resigned, allegedly because of
too much interference by the mayor’s office.327 Gillece’s sudden resignation concerned
many in the development and business communities, given Gillece’s experience and
connections (prior to serving as BEDCO’s president for three years, he had directed
GBC’s economic development program and been deputy director of Citizens Planning
and Housing Association).328 As disconcerting to many was Schmoke’s choice to replace
Gillece: his special assistant for economic development, Honora Freeman, who lacked
Gillece’s economic development experience but who had close ties to Schmoke and had
previously worked at a law firm closely associated with Schmoke.329

This unease

increased existing concerns that the BEDCO-CC-IH merger would reduce focus on
downtown and permit the Inner Harbor to decline, with CC-IH’s resources effectively
transferred to cover BEDCO’s citywide mandate.330

Thus Schaefer, as governor,
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suggested a joint state-city task force focused on the Inner Harbor, while GBC’s former
executive director, William Boucher III, discounted the possibility that “two entities [CCIH and BEDCO] that are so different in purpose, methods and personnel [can] fit together
and work well as one,” contrasting BEDCO’s “scattershot approach” with CC-IH’s “rifleshot” focus.331 Sondheim later declared the merger a “bad idea,” and the reason he
stepped down from BDC’s board.332
Schmoke and Freeman, as well as Gillece, all rejected the fears that the combined
BDC would mean a loss of attention to downtown, but the larger reality of dramatically
declining federal urban aid – a $24 million annual loss in his first term - always lay
behind these protestations that the merger was done solely to improve the effectiveness
and coordination of the City’s redevelopment efforts.333 Although Gillece in 1991 had
estimated that the merger would lead to a 10% budget savings from the combined
budgets of CC-IH and BEDCO, by 1993 the cut to BDC’s budget had doubled, while
Gillece’s estimate of a 10% cut in staff had grown to 38%, with BDC’s 33 staff only
slightly higher than CC-IH’s 29 pre-merger.334 At the same time, the BDC faced a larger
mandate than its predecessors, including the loss of one-eighth of the city’s jobs between
1989 and 1994 due to the recession as well as the complex application for a federal
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Empowerment Zone grant.335 Schmoke’s fiscal conservatism, which enable the City to
retain its top A1 bond rating and earn inclusion in the ten best-managed U.S. cities
according to Business Month and Financial World, also prevented the City from
borrowing to replace some of the loss of federal aid and reducing the recession-caused
budget cuts, and so further limited BDC’s ability to respond effectively.336
By the end of his second term, four years after he had proposed merging BEDCO
and CC-IH, Schmoke had successfully consolidated the City’s economic development
entities into a single entity that reported directly to him, with the president a trusted
advisor and the five-member board appointed by him, including the president, his chief of
staff, the City finance director and the DHCD commissioner, the latter three his
employees.337 This absolute mayoral control certainly ensured the accountability of BDC
by politicizing it as a direct extension of the mayor, just as the consolidation concentrated
all complaints about economic development onto BDC, both a sharp contrast from the
pre-merger situation in which each entity was largely autonomous and complaints about
one entity’s performance would not necessarily be linked to the performance of the others
(although Schaefer’s famously attention to detail and passion for the revitalization of his
city vested accountability for these entities in Schaefer, but this reflected the individual,
not the office).
Yet by consolidating these quasi-public corporations, Schmoke also reduced their
effectiveness, losing the very elements that Gillece, as head of BEDCO, had highlighted
as justifying the autonomous status of these corporations:
we are intended to have a fairly special purpose. I mean, we are a boutique, if you
will, while the Department of Public Works is a department store. We are
supposed to be small, flexible and be able to turn on a dime, and that is more
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readily accomplished in a quasi-public arrangement rather than being a full
agency of municipal government.338
Although budget cuts had reduced BDC staffing levels to almost the same as either CCIH or BEDCO pre-merger, BDC’s mission required BDC to adopt multiple “special
purposes,” including managing large industrial parks, revitalizing a peripheral residential
neighborhood, redeveloping an aging commercial zone, or soliciting potential new
businesses to move to, or open in, Baltimore. This fragmentation of focus undercut a key
element of the Progressive idea of business-like government – to provide expert,
technical advice on a limited subject – while the mayoral control blocked the central
Progressive tenet of insulation from politicians, control associated with cronyism, a
charge leveled against this first BDC incarnation.339

In December 1994, as Schmoke faced a potentially tough primary challenge
focused on the loss of jobs, and economic development strategy in general, during his
administration, the Sun ran a series of withering articles giving voice to criticisms of
BDC as incompetent.340 These attacks asserted that the merger of CC-IH and BEDCO
“was a total disaster,” in Schaefer’s words that others echoed, and that BDC president
Freeman was unqualified and had been selected only because of her close relationship
with Schmoke.341 Although BDC president Freeman justified this close relationship to the
mayor as crucial to a unified and effective economic development strategy, the Sun and
others identified this “politicization” of BDC as the problem, with one “knowledgeable
observer” asserting that "[BDC] tends to have one client and that is the mayor. There is
another client, the job-producing corporate community. That connection has been lost."342
This call for a greater involvement of private business interests in BDC’s operations
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echoed a central campaign pledge for the victor of the Baltimore County executive race
in November, Dutch Ruppersberger, to make the county’s economic development efforts
more assertive by partnering with business, including possibly privatizing the county’s
economic development office.343
Both Freeman and Schmoke energetically defended BDC’s efforts, pointing to the
loss of federal funds and economic downturn as factors masking their efforts.344 In
November, BDC had started a campaign to revitalize Howard Street beginning with
artists’ housing based on a study paid for by the private nonprofit Abell Foundation and
performed by three prominent Baltimore developers, indicative of a BDC responsive to
the private sector. This Howard Street revitalization was the germ of the Westside
“Renaissance,” which eventually was anchored by the Superblock plan.345 Morever, ten
days after the Sun published its scathing article and editorials, the Sun ecstatically
reported a “Bonanza for Baltimore” - Baltimore had won one of six federal
Empowerment Zones (EZ) nationwide, a designation that brought Baltimore $100 million
in federal grants, and that could leverage additional funds from multiple sources
potentially totally $800 million.346 Schmoke had declared the EZ program a primary
target of his administration despite predictions that Baltimore had little chance, and
Freeman had dedicated half of BDC’s staff to preparing the complex application and had
hired Michael Seipp, an official with extensive economic development experience in
Baltimore and state government, to lead the EZ team.347
Yet this success was swiftly forgotten when USF&G announced in January that it
was leaving its eponymic downtown building and consolidating into its Mount
Washington office due to the recession, a move filled with symbolic potency because
USF&G’s downtown building had anchored the Inner Harbor development in the 1970s,



343

“Doing business in Baltimore County,” Sun, February 14, 1995; Patrick Gilbert, “Ruppersberger
chooses Hannon for economic development director,” Sun, April 1, 1995.
344
Woodruff, “Schmoke defends development agency,” supra n. 333; Freeman, “Letter to the Editor,”
supra n. 333.
345
Edward Gunts, “City sees Howard St. as Baltimore’s SoHo; Buildings in 400 block to be bought as first
phase of artists’ community,” Sun, November 8, 1994; Tom Pelton, “5 proposals offered for Howard St.
area; `Change is coming,' city agency says,” Sun, September 21, 2000.
346
“Bonanza for Baltimore,” Sun, December 21, 1994; Eric Siegel, “Study faults Schmoke on development
efforts,” Sun, July 8, 1995 (noting that Baltimore won one of six EZ grants nationwide).
347
JoAnna Daemmrich, “City chooses zone for 'empowerment’,” Sun, February 23, 1994; C. Fraser Smith,
“Mike Seipp: the $100 million man,” Sun, April 7, 1994.

130

projecting business confidence in Baltimore’s revival despite the 1968 riots.348 Although
the USF&G CEO stated that BDC could not have changed the decision to move, which
was motivated by the company’s ownership of the suburban campus and lease the
downtown office, and even though some of the jobs would remain in Baltimore since the
Mount Washington campus straddled the city-county line, political and business leaders
in Baltimore united to condemn BDC and Schmoke for failing to know of the impending
move or attempt to respond.349 Schmoke’s primary challenger, city council president
Mary Pat Clarke, claimed the move illustrated BDC’s subservience to Schmoke and
disregard for the business community, and the council held hearings on BDC calling for a
larger role for business leaders.350 Even the news that BDC had helped bring another
major employer downtown failed to quench the criticisms, especially when BDC’s acting
head, Robert Hannon, who took over while Freeman was on sick leave, left to become
head of Baltimore County’s economic development office.351

BDC II: Realignment from Quasi-Public to Quasi-Private Entity
Schmoke did not launch a search for a new director, as he had when he chose
Gillece to merge BEDCO and CC-IH, but instead arranged to have BGE’s economic
development director assigned to BDC to replace Hannon for six months).352 Instead
Schmoke responded by following the example of Baltimore County Executive
Ruppersberger who, just weeks earlier, had appointed a task force to evaluate what
economic development tasks could be privatized.353 In convening a panel of business
leaders to review BDC’s operations and propose steps to improve its effectiveness,
Schmoke chose six developers with regular dealings with the City, the heads of two city
business organizations and the CEO of a firm that had just moved to Baltimore,
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suggesting that Schmoke’s priority lay in getting redevelopment projects built, as
opposed to expanding the number and size of businesses through recruitment and
assistance.354 Schmoke also transferred Freeman from the presidency of BDC to become
his deputy chief of staff, a move which only further catalyzed opponents of Schmoke and
his BDC.355 Schmoke’s primary opponent, city council president, echoed by others,
asserted that BDC’s “failure is not Honora Freeman’s; it’s the mayor’s and the direction
he gives.”356 The city council passed a non-binding resolution calling for the existing
BDC board, four of five members who were Schmoke administration officials, to be
disbanded and replaced with a “new and more independent” board of business leaders.357
Although the panelists were close to the Schmoke administration, their report was
sufficiently critical in a tight election that Schmoke refused to release it publicly, even
after a copy leaked to the Sun.358 The panel faulted BDC for a lack of focus and
recommended that its responsibilities be winnowed down to the physical redevelopment
of the central business district and the marketing and recruitment of commercial and
industrial firms, with all other economic development, promotion and property
management efforts, including neighborhood business development, transferred to other
city agencies, the Downtown Partnership or business groups.359 This proposal would
effectively transform BDC from the City’s one-stop shop for economic development
originally envisioned by Schmoke when he consolidated BEDCO and CC-IH back to
those two constituent elements.360 The panel declared that BDC suffered from a
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perception that Schmoke did view economic development as a priority, and that BDC
needed increased funding and a new leader with economic development experience and
the confidence of the business community.361 A key element missing from the existing
BDC, according to the panel, was the “independence needed to succeed in a highly
entrepreneurial environment.”362

As the Sun noted with approval, the panel’s

recommendations suggested BDC return to the development structure under Schaefer, the
autonomous quasi-public entities of the “shadow government” that Schmoke had vowed
to end in his first mayoral campaign.363 The Sun accused Schmoke of resurrecting this
shadow government by his reliance on a private law firm just as Schaefer used his
“trustees” to do public business through autonomous quasi-public entities to avoid public
accountability.364 In the context of BDC, this charge is ironic, since the Sun, and many
others, attacked BDC as too beholden to the mayor and called for greater autonomy for
BDC, which would reduce its public accountability by restoring the autonomy it enjoyed
under Schaefer.

Despite the animosity surrounding BDC, and his long-held antipathy to
Schaefer’s quasi-public entities, Schmoke appears to have experienced a Damasacene
conversion during the 1995 election, leading him to declare he would “change my style”
to create a more “pro-business image.”365 Within a week after winning the primary that
ensured his reelection, Schmoke publicly indicated that he planned to overhaul BDC and
restore the quasi-public autonomy of its predecessors by selecting Roger Lipitz, a
business executive who had just completed seven years as chair of the board of directors
of the University of Maryland Medical System (UMMS), as chair of the BDC board
tasked with reorganizing BDC to be more business-friendly.366 His close advisor, Larry
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Gibson, recalled that Schmoke did so in fulfillment of a campaign promise to revive
Schaefer’s “trustee” system367 – a clear indication that Schmoke now valued the political
benefits of a nominally independent body insulating him from criticism and the alluring
promise that an autonomous quasi-public entity would get redevelopment projects started
quickly. Schmoke had already chosen this approach when he responded to the crisis
surrounding the departures of USF&G and Hannon by creating a panel charged with
suggesting solutions, and so avoiding accountability for BDC, at least until the panel
issued its report. Soon after appointing Lipitz as chair, Schmoke announced that the
BDC board would be doubled in size to eleven members, with nine of the eleven private
business leaders, a radical change from the prior BDC board of three municipal
employees, a former municipal employee (Freeman), and one other member.368
The new BDC board echoed the emphasis of the review panel on Baltimore
developers involved in projects with the City – six of the nine of the review panel
members, and five of the nine private sector board members, two of whom were on the
review panel.369 This prominence suggests that Schmoke’s focus in revamping BDC lay
in streamlining the redevelopment process in order to get projects built, especially with
the Rouse Company’s director of new business development replacing a less prominent
Rouse representative together with Rouse’s Baltimore director, who had also served on
the review panel. The presence of these senior Rouse representatives underscores how
Schmoke’s new BDC focused on the Inner Harbor, especially as two other board
members were developers along the eastern Inner Harbor.370

At the same time,

Schmoke’s choice of Lipitz, fresh from leading the board of UMMS, which dominated
the city’s west side, and Elinor Bacon, whose firm had conducted the study proposing the
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revitalization of Howard Street starting with artists’ housing used by Freeman’s BDC,
indicated a commitment to the Market Center area that would eventually lead to the
proposed “West Side Renaissance,” Schmoke’s anticipated “legacy” equivalent to
Schaefer’s Inner Harbor.371 Two-and-a-half years later, Schmoke would announce the
West Side Master Plan, “one of the most exciting moments” of his administration,
prepared by a task force that included two of these BDC board members, as well as
UMMS officials.372
These appointments highlighted the degree of Schmoke’s turnaround from
criticizing Schaefer’s legacy as a “downtown mayor” in his first mayoral campaign to
embracing the return of BDC’s focus to downtown redevelopment – CC-IH’s mission.373
Similarly, the selection of Richard Berndt, the architect of the referendum approving
Harborplace in 1978 that cemented the Inner Harbor, underscored Schmoke’s outreach to
Schaefer supporters.374

Schmoke also reached out to the business establishment by

appointing Frank Bramble, CEO of then First Mariner Bankcorp and incoming chair of
GBC.375

The most prominent signal given by Schmoke that he was returning to Schaefer’s
model lay in his selection of Brodie as BDC president.376 Although nominally appointed
by Lipitz and the board, Brodie was Schmoke’s choice, as Brodie was a member of the
review panel Schmoke appointed months before selecting Lipitz as chair.377 Schmoke
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had also tried, unsuccessfully, to recruit Brodie to head CC-IH in 1990, before he decided
to merge it with BEDCO.378 Brodie had declined at that time, remaining as head of the
Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation (PADC) in D.C., but he had left that
position in 1993 when the recession and accompanying real estate crash suspended
PADC’s building program and took position as director of urban planning for RTKL
Associates, an international design and engineering firm.379 When BDC came under fire
in early 1995, Brodie reached out to Schmoke to see if the job might still be available,
landing first a place on the review panel, and then the presidency six months later.380
Schmoke’s interest in Brodie stemmed from his leadership of PADC when it
successfully jump-started the revitalization of D.C.’s ceremonial city, bringing in
residents as well as offices and businesses.381 As head of PADC, Brodie had shown the
ability to “get things done,” a theme Brodie emphasized in taking the BDC presidency:
“Baltimore has had a lot of studies. The key now is in doing some work.”382 Brodie also
brought extensive knowledge of Baltimore and its municipal administration, having
worked at DHCD and its predecessor from 1961 to 1984, the last seven years as DHCD
Commissioner and the prior eight as deputy commissioner, during the years when CC-IH
supervised the development of the Inner Harbor under the supervision of DHCD.383
Having remained a resident of Baltimore during his hiatus working in D.C. after Schaefer
“eased him out” as DHCD commissioner, Brodie had kept up with developments over the
decade he was away.384 Brodie’s relationships with key figures from the Schaefer era
such as Robert Embry, the head of the Abell Foundation, may also have attracted
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Schmoke as a means of reaching out to constituencies that felt largely ignored during his
first two terms.385
Schmoke’s key move in changing directions on BDC was the appointment of the
review panel, followed by the board, and only then tapping Brodie to lead the new BDC.
Had Schmoke started by choosing Brodie, and then had Brodie rebuild BDC with an
expanded board, the old criticisms that Schmoke controlled the BDC president would not
have disappeared. Instead the review panel established a program for rebooting BDC
seemingly independent of Schmoke, and the appointment of Lipitz, who nominally chose
the board that then chose Brodie, further distanced the new BDC, board and president
from Schmoke. Although these steps were not entirely Kabuki theater and did provide
some external evaluation of how BDC could improve as well as permit an indirect
rapprochment between Schmoke and the business community, this distancing created a
model of autonomy that Brodie, with the support of Schmoke and subsequent mayors,
together with Lipitz and the BDC board members, turned into a shadow government that
exceeded anything of Schaefer’s era. Most importantly for Schmoke, this transformation
appeared to have been driven by independent experts from outside of his office. Given
that Brodie reached out to Schmoke when BDC was melting down in spring 1995, it is
entirely possible that Brodie suggested Schmoke adopt this strategy of a series of steps,
especially in light of Brodie’s strong belief in private boards:
Part of the new situation [at BDC] is not simply myself as president. It's the [creation]
of a major private sector board, a first-rate board. That's very important. That means
that we're going to have to understand the way we do business with a board. Boards
set policies. Staffs do a lot of hard work but are there to implement policy and make
policy recommendations to the board. I saw that as a very effective relationship at
PADC, where the board played an important role, was able to open doors for us, help
get things smoothed out, and get approvals quickly. . . . I think the creation of an
effective board, with a first rate chairman at its head, with energy and dedication, is
an important move.386
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Brodie fulfilled his promise to move quickly, restructuring the internal
organization, adding new staff and emphasizing outreach to the business community.387
He was helped in changing the perception of BDC by the upturn of economy and by
Schmoke’s newfound enthusiasm to reach out to the business community and public push
for development projects.388 As evidence of his commitment, Schmoke increased BDC’s
budget by 12% to $2.8 million, although this was still less than the review panel had
recommended.389 One of Brodie’s priorities was to increase the BDC budget by creating a
fund raised from private businesses for economic development modeled on those in
Cleveland and St. Louis, a model also pushed by Baltimore County Executive
Ruppersberger.390 Such a fund clearly required an independent, private board to convince
potential contributors that the funds would not be accessible by public officials. Indeed
Brodie justified his opposition to proposed legislation subjecting BDC to the MPIA and
OMA because it would require BDC efforts involving “exclusively private money” to
abide by public transparency laws and so would hamper BDC’s private fundraising
initiatives.391
Despite Brodie’s effectiveness in reviving the energy and effectiveness of BDC,
he chose to not follow one of the key recommendations of the review panel: to narrow
BDC’s focus to only downtown development and citywide business recruitment and
support. Instead BDC remains the City’s economic development entity. Brodie ignored
the review’s explicit call to transfer neighborhood business development to DHCD, and
BDC continues to run the Main Street program that delivers that service.392 Brodie’s
refusal to narrow BDC’s focus likely is due to his belief in his capacity to lead an
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organization with such a broad ambit, especially given his time as DHCD commissioner,
responsible for 1,000 employees and numerous projects throughout the city.393 Brodie
also likely believed that retaining responsibilities increased his likelihood of enlarging
BDC’s budget, which he managed to almost double to $4.7 million in 2003, with 61 staff,
almost twice the number of his initial staff.394

BDC’s Weaknesses
Yet despite this expanded staff and budget, BDC was unable to keep up with one
of the central missions of CC-IH: the upkeep of the Inner Harbor. Six years after Brodie
took over BDC, in an indication of a perceived neglect, GBC began reviewing the
disjointed oversight of the Inner Harbor, some of which was due to the expansion of
development out from the original development area.395 BDC quickly launched its own
initiative, inviting proposals for a new master plan extending the harbor in late 2001,
while Mayor O’Malley responded by officially inviting GBC to conduct the study, even
as BDC selected the firm to create a new master plan.396 This loss of focus on the Inner
Harbor, and the subsequent separation of physical planning and management in responses
to the Inner Harbor’s decline concerned former CC-IH head Sondheim, who viewed it as
a result of BDC’s overly broad responsibilities.397 In contrast, Sondheim held up CCIH’s narrow mission, which he believed was the key to the original success of the Inner
Harbor: “We weren't brighter. What we had was a limited job to do. All we had to do was
worry about the Inner Harbor. [Whereas] I have a real concern about the fact that
[Brodie’s] plate is so full of things to do. [BDC]'s more likely to be an agency being
reactive to a proposal that's been made, rather than proactive.”398 Martin Millspaugh, his
former CC-IH co-worker, echoed Sondheim: “We had a focus of responsibility. When we
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got up in the morning, we had no other thought in mind than to make sure the Inner
Harbor worked. The GBC concluded that the focus of interest and responsibility really
doesn't exist now. It makes it difficult for the city to control what happens there.”399
Sondheim proposed that problem be resolved by creating a new entity with responsibility
only for the Inner Harbor that included both planning and maintenance in a holistic
manner, while GBC’s report specifically referred to CC-IH as the model for the new
entity.400 These criticisms of BDC’s neglect as derived from BDC’s overly broad
mission, however, did not prevent BDC from maintaining control, under BDC’s vice
president Frank over the coordinating group for another two years until the creation of a
new quasi-public corporation, the Partnership for Baltimore’s Waterfront (PBW) took
over responsibility.401 Yet PBW was modeled more on the Downtown Partnership than
on CC-IH, and so only had responsibility for maintenance, leaving the planning of the
Inner Harbor in BDC’s hands.402
BDC’s neglect of the Inner Harbor is due not only to its overly broad mandate,
but also to the focus on the Superblock which has absorbed enormous energy over the
past decade. While the push to redevelop this area and create a new “Charles Center” or
“Inner Harbor” drew the support of Mayors Schmoke and O’Malley, eager for a legacy
project, the process with its focus on large scale eminent domain land assembly and
clearance bears the imprint of the era of urban renewal, the period in which Brodie was in
DHCD’s leadership and the era in which PADC’s model, New York State’s Urban
Development Corporation, was created.403 On assuming the BDC presidency Brodie
made his intent to build projects and his belief that his BDC post represented a
continuation of his DHCD efforts: “When I left [D]HCD, I left behind not a library full
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of plans but building that you could see and touch. We had tangible results, because I’m
a results-oriented person. I plan to do the same at BDC.”404 The original scale of
demolition became controversial in the 1999 mayoral campaign, with a Republican
candidate and developer, David Tufaro declaring: “I am unhappy that there has not been
a higher priority placed on preserving the historic buildings in the area and retaining the
existing small businesses. This strikes me as the kind of old-fashioned urban renewal
projects that have really done damage to cities.”405 O’Malley, the eventual victor, agreed
with these goals of saving buildings and small businesses, and justified his vote against
the West Side urban renewal plan when he was a councilperson as leverage to force BDC
to adjust the approved plans. O’Malley also declared his support for creating a separate
development corporation to focus solely on the West Side in place of an overworked
BDC, an approach advocated by Millspaugh and others that echoed the calls of Sondheim
and GBC for BDC to cede its control of the Inner Harbor to a smaller group with a
narrower focus.406 As mayor, however, O’Malley indicated his support for Brodie’s
approach, albeit with increased sensitivity to preservation of the small businesses and
historical buildings in the Superblock, and BDC retained control of the Superblock
project.407 The limits of Brodie’s ability to move beyond urban renewal’s bulldozing
methods were recently revealed when BDC issued no-bid contracts without public notice
to demolish structures throughout the city to “prepare the grounds” for future
development, but without guarantees that the proposed development would occur.408
After public outcry, most demolitions were put on hold, although Brodie viewed the error
to have been only over BDC’s legal authority to demolish, not the risk that the potential




404

Kevin L. McQuaid, “Brodie to direct city BDC agency RTKL official tapped by Schmoke to bolster
Baltimore's economy,” December 14, 1995.
405
Tom Pelton, “Mayoral hopefuls differ on west side; Candidates divide support of downtown business
leaders; Howard Street corridor,” Sun, August 26, 1999, A1.
406
Id.; Martin Millspaugh, “Letters to the Editor: West side's story could recreate downtown's success,”
Sun, July 26, 1999.
407
Pelton, “Mayoral hopefuls differ on west side,” supra n. 405.
408
Annie Linskey, “BDC cancels pact for demolition that was not openly bid; Sun follow-up,” Sun,
September 11, 2009, A1.

141

development might not occur, leaving the sites for more surface parking to pockmark
Baltimore’s urban fabric.409
Brodie’s assemble-and-clear approach was recently explicitly repudiated by a
panel of urban redevelopment experts convened by the Urban Land Institute to review
BDC’s Superblock project and the West Side renewal: “No bulldozers [are needed] in
this area. This is not an area that needs urban renewal. It needs regeneration.”410
Reflecting current best planning practices, the ULI panel called for the city to sell its
properties quickly instead of waiting to assembly large swathe of land, and to involve
multiple developers instead of a single large developer on whose progress would depend
the success of the entire revitalization effort. Most importantly, the mayor had to take
charge personally, since the panel concluded that renewal had stalled for lack of
leadership, an implicit criticism of BDC’s approach and of prior mayors’ outsourcing the
management of the project to BDC and Brodie.411
Another problem with BDC’s current structure, in addition to the lack of focus
due to the “jack of all trades, master of none” approach, and to Brodie’s reliance on old
“command-and-control” methods of urban renewal unchallenged because BDC
controlled all economic development, is the almost guaranteed conflict of interest of the
board members. Thus Anthony Hawkins served on both the 1995 review panel and the
new BDC board at the same time as he was negotiating with the City, through BDC and
Brodie, over the City’s contribution to renovations at Harborplace, which Hawkins
managed in his job at the Rouse Company.412 Similarly, “Skip” Brown, another member
of BDC’s new board, received a no-bid lease from BDC to docking space adjacent to
shops owned by Brown’s company.413 While both Hawkins and Brown were significant
stakeholders in the development community, publicly interested volunteers in efforts to
improve Baltimore, and the requests made by their firms likely above board, a clear
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conflict of interest existed in both cases. These cases are clearly just the tip of the iceberg
given BDC’s role in all economic development efforts throughout the city and the
importance for BDC of having board members with knowledge and experience relevant
to redevelopment. In light of these inevitable conflict-of-interests, the culture of secrecy
and autonomy from political accountability justifies the perception that BDC is a
“shadow government” doling out contracts to politically important individuals – as the
Sun accused BDC doing when it negotiated subsidies for the hotel of a major Schmoke
campaign contributor despite a rejection by BDC staff; or when BDC awarded no-bid
demolition contracts to a frequent contributor to then-Mayor Dixon and other city elected
officials.414 Thus the cronyism that the Sun and others so bitterly complained typified the
operation of Schmoke’s first BDC, was not prevented by the new private-board BDC, but
in fact may have been exacerbated since Brodie’s tenure could be directly affected by the
support or opposition of politically important individuals. This perceived culture of
cronyism corrodes the reputation of a city and drives away potential economic
development. The only way to limit these conflicts of interest is through transparency,
accompanied by political (and legal) accountability. But this is anathema to BDC’s
private board culture, as much as its structure.

Does BDC’s Quasi-Private Corporate Structure Help or Hinder Public Redevelopment?
In light of these criticisms of BDC – its neglect of key areas of responsibility; its
outdated approach to redevelopment; and its tolerance of conflicts of interest – that are
directly related to its structure, why does Baltimore continue to use a Progressive model
of “business-like” government achieved through a quasi-public government corporation
for its economic development efforts? BDC’s current structure as a private corporation
run by a “private-sector” board that controls virtually all elements of the City’s economic
development strategy (as well as MAGLEV Maryland!) happened accidentally, not as a
result of any thoughtful public debate on the purpose, responsibilities and limits of an
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economic development entity in relationship with the rest of city government.
Schmoke’s initial consolidation of BEDCO and CC-IH into a single entity responsible for
all economic development activities created an entity with a much broader reach and
hierarchy than either BEDCO or CC-IH. His subsequent transformation of BDC from
direct mayoral control, albeit with the appearance of a private corporation but one with a
majority of the board at will employees of the mayor, into an autonomous entity in which
municipal employees were a small minority put the consolidated power of the initial
BDC into the shadows, with the board both shielding the mayor from political fallout
while simultaneously limiting the mayor’s freedom of action. Most importantly, all
discussions, negotiations and reports of BDC were secret (Carmel only forced a sliver of
light into the shadows, given the exemptions of the MPIA and OMA), preventing the
public from understanding whether the board was truly independent and acted as a check
on the mayor’s power. Even if the board did act responsibly, it was not accountable to
the public.
At the same time as Schmoke and Brodie transformed BDC into its current
structure, Baltimore County considered a similar approach to privatize its economic
development efforts.415 The criticisms of the ineffectiveness of the City’s economic
development efforts under the initial BDC were also levied against Baltimore County’s
economic development office, and County Executive Ruppersberger hired Hannon away
from being active head of BDC to lead the county’s office and implement its
privatization.416 Like Brodie, Ruppersberger also cited the possibility of raising private
funds as a primary motivation for privatizing the agency. Hannon himself said that the
main benefit of privatizing the office would be to insulate it from political changes that
led to a new county executive, without a trace of irony over the fact that his overhaul of
the office was due only to Ruppersberger’s election and his power to choose a new
economic development officer who could restructure the department. Yet after careful
consideration of the benefits and detriments of privatization, and after Hannon had
revitalized the economic development office, Ruppersberger decided that privatization
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would be counterproductive. Besides concerns that privatization would actually reduce
the overall effectiveness of economic development efforts in the county by competing
with existing private economic development entities for the same private funds,
Ruppersberger recognized that Hannon’s leadership, as well as the improving economic
circumstances, had transformed the office into a success and so would remain public.417
Indeed the chair of the county Chamber of Commerce emphasized that the key ingredient
in success was leadership: “Under Bob Hannon, the office is very aggressive, whether
it's privatized or not. There has been teamwork with the administration.”418
This raises the question of whether Schmoke could have achieved the same results
had he focused on the leadership of BDC and not its structure. Ruppersberger negotiated
with Schmoke to lure Hannon away, suggesting that Schmoke might have been able to
keep Hannon and have him restructure BDC without transforming it further with a
private board as Brodie did.419 This is especially true since Hannon revived a completely
public agency, retaining or creating over 7,000 jobs and attracting over $250 million in
investment in the county over 18 months - without the secrecy and privacy that Brodie
and Lipitz continuously insisted was necessary for economic development.420 Although
Hannon was certainly helped by the economic recovery, this applied equally to the
county and city and enhanced Brodie’s performance as well.421 In fact some observers of
Brodie’s early performance emphasized the organizational shakeup as key to BDC’s
improved performance, not the private board structure: “They seem to be more organized
and more directed than they ever have. They're much more focused.”422
Focus and leadership thus appear to be the key ingredients to successful economic
development, not necessarily the degree the structure of a public entity resembles that of
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a private firm.423 Baltimore County’s decision to not privatize underscores the important
role that truly private economic development entities play outside of any formal link with
government, especially if it leads to more public discussion of alternatives for future
development.

Thus GBC has played a crucial role in Baltimore’s development by

preparing plans and analyses, and by cheerleading initiatives GBC deems worthy, such as
its recent effort to have the City consider an alternative site for a new arena.424 Moreover,
privatizing a public economic development office may suffocate some of these private
entities by competing for the same pot of private funds, contributing to a loss of diverse
viewpoints.
The ULI panel suggests that rather than acting in a “business-like” manner by
assembling land for a massive redevelopment, and so suffocating existing small
businesses, the City involve private developers at the local level, a method that would
also expand the number of potential participants in the redevelopment.

Increased

participation not only would provide a diverse development, it would also diversify the
risk of failure so that an overall renewal program will not succeed or fail on the basis of a
single developer or the status of the credit markets, since smaller loans for multiple
projects are easier to come by than large financing packages for a single project. One of
the largest criticisms of Brodie’s BDC is that it is too business-like, that it has the unfair
advantage of public power and financing that prevent private entities from being able to
compete. Moreover, the concentration of all economic development efforts under BDC
promote larger projects like the West Side and Superblock in order to show success
justifying BDC’s role, with the effort and funds expended on these blockbuster projects
draining funds and staff from multiple other projects throughout the city that lack the
charisma to get headlines but that cumulatively have a far larger effect on the city’s
economic health.
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Conclusion (Alternative B): Make the BDC Truly Public and Accountable As A
Municipal Agency
This analysis of BDC’s history emphasizes as well how BDC’s scale of
responsibilities, assumed due to the merger of BEDCO and CC-IH, have limited the
effectiveness of previous efforts which were more narrowly focused, but holistic in
addressing multiple aspects of the revitalization of a single area or specialized category of
economic development (e.g., industrial or port development). And yet, the ULI panel
suggests that BDC’s concentration of authority over all economic development and
power as an unaccountable quasi-public entity has not even provided the direction and
leadership – the effectiveness – that is the primary element of the Progressive ideal of the
government corporation.

Instead, the current BDC has become that which it was

nominally created to avoid: a bureaucracy, full of managers, but with limited leadership
at the top or focused mission at the bottom. Yet unlike a public bureaucracy, BDC is
unaccountable to the electorate and able to hide its use of public funds and powers behind
the smokescreen of its private status.
Therefore, instead of tinkering with the private structure of BDC as suggested
above as the more modest reform proposal, the more radical, and likely more effective,
reform would be to disband BDC completely. A new office, or department, of economic
development would take over BDC’s current responsibilities, headed by a deputy mayor
or commissioner subject to confirmation by the city council. This would emphasize the
importance of leadership from the mayor, rendering the performance of the office
accountable through the mayor and through the city council. Establishing such an office
would also permit a public discussion of the appropriate jurisdictional boundaries of tasks
currently handled by BDC, including its control of neighborhood business revitalization
and code enforcement officer – why are these tasks not united with the code enforcement
section of the Housing Authority or the Community Development section of DHCD? A
consolidation of these efforts would not necessarily have to mean increased responsibility
for DHCD, as a good argument exists that Community Development might profitably be
separated from the Housing Authority and joined with economic development. Another
jurisdictional boundary that needs to be addressed is that between the Department of
Planning and BDC: what is the purpose of the Department of Planning’s preparation of a
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new comprehensive plan or a new zoning code if BDC is in charge of preparing a master
plan for the Inner Harbor, which is defined so broadly as to encompass most of the
central business district? Might it not make more sense for the Department of Planning
to retain control of master plans, while the economic development office concentrates on
advocating for businesses and identifying potential revitalization projects?
Similar considerations led to the proposal to merge DHCD, the Department of
Planning and BDC in Schmoke’s second term, a merger that probably was best left as a
proposal.425 Nonetheless, this proposed merger does identify the shared jurisdiction of
BDC’s current economic development authority.

By creating a new economic

development office, the mayor and city council would enable a public discussion of how
economic development should be done in Baltimore and the mission and jurisdictional
boundaries of all entities involved. Moreover, as a municipal office or department, such
an entity would be required to abide by the transparency mandates of MPIA and OMA,
and less likely to be defined by the culture of secrecy of the private sector. This approach
clearly worked for Baltimore County, and should be able to be adapted to the City’s
different circumstances.
At the same time, consideration should be given to reestablishing entities similar
to CC-IH: small, narrowly-focused entities, but subject to transparency requirements and
with a clear chain of command to the office of economic development. These entities
could expand or contract depending upon the particular needs of an area: an entity
coordinating the redevelopment efforts on the West Side would clearly need more
resources before and during redevelopment and less afterwards. Unlike CC-IH, however,
these entities would be responsible for implementing the direction established by the head
of the economic development office, in consultation with the mayor and council, and for
coordinating efforts with other municipal departments and private businesses. Although
these entities could be established a nonprofit corporations, in which case they should be
statutorily created by municipal ordinance, they would likely be more effective as teams
within a relatively small office or department that would enable constant and direct
communication between the deputy mayor and these specialized entities.
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The council needs to play a larger role beyond its current limited authority,
although this should be limited to increasing the transparency and accountability of the
City’s economic development efforts, and not through veto power over individual
projects. One model may be the D.C. Council’s oversight role of the National Capital
Revitalization Corporation (NCRC), which reports to the deputy mayor of planning and
economic development. The former head of NCRC, Elinor Bacon, who is also a private
developer in Baltimore and D.C. and who served on BDC’s review panel and the new
board, has declared that it “works well to have all of the projects under the deputy mayor
with council oversight.”426 NCRC’s corporate status does not take away from the
effectiveness of combined reporting to a deputy mayor and council oversight.
Finally, private business should be encouraged to participate in entities like GBC
or the Baltimore City Chamber of Congress, and to contribute, as individuals or through
these entities, to public discussion of Baltimore’s economic present and future. Relying
on such groups, instead of a position on the BDC board, will permit a freer conversation
with multiple viewpoints and with more information released publicly. This will ensure
that decisions are made on an informed basis, and permit the electorate, which includes
the business community, to hold politicians accountable for these decisions. Baltimore
deserves to be known for more than the home of “Shadow Government.”
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